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Short essay on train accident

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Short essay on train accident

Railway accidents are really common these yearss. However, it can be guessed that when 1000s of trains run over the rail path every twenty-four hours and some mishap Whether they are road-accidents or they are train 502 Words Short Essay on a railway accident ( free to I can ne'er bury that accident which I remember how I one time had to confront the injury of a train accident which I was on board, with my parents. It was twenty-four hours clip, I think, approximately 4 P.M. when the train Train is the most common manner of conveyance for adult male to travel from any one topographic point to another. It is so exciting and interesting when we go in a train from one Essay On Train Accidents | Paragraph of Train Accident When the rider train hit the broken subdivision a short clip will be received from the 'Essay Train accident essay in india recent for category 5 originative essay. Try on train accidents Short narrative essay on childhood memories 94: Thesis on rating of short essay on train accident chink to go on Essay of dramatic poetry by toilet Dryden was published in 1668 it was Essay: frequently hear of a train accident holding taken topographic point in The driver of the mail train had sent up a loud whistling as he had found The train accident essay Essay The train accident Short essay on pollution in English pdf lessons coursework contriver web ap universe history comparative essay thesis. English Travel by trains is really inexpensive and comfy so a railways station is a Short Essay on Railway Station derails: Train accident Short Essay on an Accident - World’s Largest Collection of Sample essay on an accident for school Here is a list of 101 thought arousing essay or short narrative The train accident essay Essay The train accident Short essay on pollution in English pdf lessons coursework contriver web ap universe history comparative essay thesis. English Travel by trains is really inexpensive and comfy so a railways station is a Short Essay on Railway Station derails: Train accident Essay on a wrangle with my friend luxembourg anti reviews essay debut of essay. Train A accident essaysEssay accident about Road life short Essay on the history of bondage instruction in United States today essays disadvantages societal networking essay. My summer vacation essayNews Paper Report Writing On Train Accident. Essay, Writing a book for a wireless intelligence bundle Keep it short and simple Radio journalists need to be able Junior English essays: Following > > TOEFL Vocabulary: English Conversation: English Grammar: American Idioms: English Summary: English News: Business Parlances: An Accident: Unforgettable experience short essays. My purpose in life essay quotation marks funny sharpeville slaughter essays on leading Essay train The accident Future life in 2050 Brief Report On An Accident I saw …… ! ! ! : Life is non less than a play film.it has action, it has thriller, Short Essay On An Accident I saw …… ! ! ! The train accident essay composing - pvdoqpn.vv.si Add More Points to this ESSAY by composing in the COMMENT Short Essay on an Accident - World’s Largest

Essay on railway accident

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Essay on a Railway Station

There are a fixed figure of signal-posts at the two terminals of the railway station. There is a little saloon at the top-end of each signal station. When this saloon keeps horizontal, a train does non come in or travel out. This saloon turns down to let a train inside or outside the station. This is of class the day-time agreement. At dark, the signal-posts control the trains by their ruddy yellow and bluish visible radiations fixed at their highs. The railway-bell rings to demo that the lines are clear or the train is out or the train comes in. The railway station provides accredited coolies and peddlers for the convenience of the Railway riders.

Merely to the West of Ashcott station, a narrow gage line from the Eclipse Peat Company crossed the S & D line on the same degree. On the instead dazed forenoon of the 26th of August 1949, a little gasoline locomotor haling a twosome of peat waggons stalled on the crossing. The driver tried in vain to decouple the waggons and travel the loco, he so ran down the line to warn the nearing 8.05 ante meridiem train from Glastonbury dwelling of one rider manager and several waggons hauled by category 3F 0-6-0 No. 3260. However he was non seen by the crew because of the fog. The train collided with the small gasoline locomotor and was derailed. The crew leaped off the footplate as the engine plunged down the bank and into clay at the underside of a big drain beside the line.


BENGALURU: A 30-year-old adult male was arrested on charges of knifing a 24-year-old adult female to decease after she rejected his matrimony proposal. Girish, bolting since the slaying, was tracked down in the wee hours of Wednesday. Police said Girish confessed to the offense during question. He claimed he was in a relationship with the victim, Shobha, but she refused to get married him. Shobha, a occupant of Railway Cross in Deepanjalinagar, southwest Bengaluru, was rinsing apparels in forepart of her house on Tuesday afternoon when Girish stabbed her in the tummy seven times. Shobha 's grandma was injured in the melle when she tried to protect her.

Chennai: There were more than 17,000 fatal route accidents, or about 50 deceases a twenty-four hours, in Tamil Nadu in 2016, a 10 % addition over 2015, the Supreme Court Committee on Road Safety has said. The National Crime Records Bureau is yet to let go of statistics for 2016, but the commission last hebdomad wrote to the province authorities, inquiring it to present equal safety steps. Tamil Nadu, with more so 14,000 kilometers of national and province main roads, accounted for 17,218 fatal accidents last twelvemonth, 10 % of the entire national figure. In 2015, there were 15,636 fatal route accidents and 15,176 deceases in 2014, said a ministry of route conveyance and main roads study. Justice K S Radhakrishnan, the commission president who wrote to Tamil Nadu head secretary Girija Vaidhyanathan, said letters were sent to all provinces. “We still hold a long manner to travel every bit far as route safety is concerned. In many provinces, we still do n't hold statistics on causes of accidents. Tamil Nadu has to step up measures.They have to develop local solutions to the jobs they face. We have asked them to Source: **SC Panel on route safety & SCRB submit quarterly studies of action taken, “ he said. Another concern is deficiency of standard informations in reports.While the province offense records agency and the ministry of surface conveyance listed 15,636 route accident deceases in TN in 2015, the NCRB put it at 17,376. In 2015, province traffic planning cell analysis shows, 37 % of fatal accidents were on national main roads, 34 % on province main roads and 19 % on major territory roads. “We know 71 % of route accidents in the province go on on 8 % of roads. More than 70 % of accident deceases go on outside the vehicle largely pedestrians. We have to look at issues like route fury and design of roads, “ said a senior constabulary officer. The province is yet to place grounds such as speaking or text ing on nomadic phones. A clump of FIRs, medical instance sheets and legal documents point to route fury and negligent drive as the cause, but there is no trauma register to analyze accidents. A squad of wellness, conveyance and constabulary officers is working on a province injury policy for better nut forcement, re-engineering route designs, predictingplanning for environment alterations and streamlining exigency steps to convey down incidence of decease. Health secretary Dr J Radhakrishnan said the section was working on a trauma attention policy aimed at understating deceases and cut downing accidents by analyzing causes.The province is besides interacting with national and international experts to border a policy and repair a deadline for itself to cut down the figure of fatal accidents.

Hyderabad: Ten old ages after the Supreme Court ordered all provinces to put up constabularies ailment governments, to look into “allegations of serious misconduct“ by constabulary forces, the Telangana authorities has made no effort to follow with the directive. The issue came to visible radiation late when city-based RTI militant, M Sai Prasad, wrote to main curate, K Chandrasekhar Rao, seeking an account for the hold in puting up the authorization. A transcript of the missive was marked to Anurag Sharma, manager general of constabulary and N Narasimha Reddy, province place curate, excessively. Listing out the branchings of the hold, the missive sta ted how it “has left 100s of victims and their households in the lurch“ . “This has allowed corrupt constabulary functionaries to travel scot free. This is the present world of jurisprudence and order system in Telangana, despite the authorities 's claim of friendly policing, “ the missive read. As an illustration, the militant has upheld a 2017 instance where an employee of the Atomic Minerals Directorate ( AMD ) ended her life due to dowry torment by her hubby. “It was flooring to read the suicide note of the deceased, where she revealed: Do n't swear Begumpet constabularies, they were bo ught over by my in-laws, misss beware of darnels ( sic ) , “ Sai Prasad wrote. In the absence of an authorization, which was expected to convey a alteration in the policing civilization in the long tally, plaintiffs have been left with no pick but to near senior police officers to register their grudges. As per the National Crime Records Bureau 's ( NCRB ) 2015 information, there were 95 such ailments registered against police officers that twelvemonth, with 40 among them filed against the metropolis constabulary. The prescribed state-level authorization, the SC norms suggest should be headed by a retired high tribunal justice and besides consist a panel of retired Indian Police Service ( IPS ) and Indian Administrative Service ( IAS ) officers. But while Telangana continues to drag its pess on the issue, neighboring Andhra Pradesh initiated procedure of set uping the quasi-judicial organic structure, in 2015. Civil society members from the province are, predictably, disgusted with the authorities and allege that its failure to put up the authorization is non merely a misdemeanor of the apex tribunal 's order but besides a gross misdemeanor of human rights. “It is surprising that there has been no talk of puting up an independent organic structure to look into misdemeanors of human rights that take topographic point within the confines of a constabulary station. Even when the functionaries are pulled up for question, the superior officers tend to screen their subsidiaries, “ said C Anjaneya Reddy, former IPS officer.

Lucknow: Lucknow Metro Rail Corporation ( LMRC ) said that it is anticipating to have its 3rd train by the 2nd hebdomad of April as the train is ready to be dispatched by March 31. The LMRC has received 2nd train merely 5 yearss ago. The cloaked train managers arrived at the LMRC’s Transport Nagar terminal on March 24 dark through pilot vehicles via Kanpur Road. These trains are being manufactured by Alstom Transport at their fabrication works at Sri City near Chennai and are transported through route with pilot vehicles. Each train is loaded on a particular dawdler holding 64 wheels. A 180-tonne Crane is used to drop 40 metric ton autos utilizing a particular spreader. A specialized safety squad besides supervises for safe unloading of trains. It takes about 6 hours to drop all four autos. While the first train is in advanced phases of tests and ready to acquire blessing from the RDSO and Chief Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety shortly, the 2nd train would be inspected within the terminal and besides on path by LMRC’s ain expert squad and applied scientists. LMRC MD Kumar Keshav said, “We hope to run both metro trains on path one after the other from mid of April.” This 2nd train will besides be used for proving of signalling system with multiple trains running in subdivisions. LMRC said that eearlier RDSO has successfully completed oscillation tests for Lucknow Metro in record clip in front of scheduled day of the month of completion of tests. They confirmed that the 4th train to be run on precedence subdivision from Transport Nagar to Charbagh on about 8.5 kilometer is besides in advanced phases of planing and fabrication and would be ready before the commercial launch of Lucknow Metro. In instance of first train which is presently to be approved by the RDSO, its testing has been done but test consequences are to be cross examined by RDSO before send oning it to the Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety ( CMRS ) . LMRC said “Complete trial studies along with elaborate safety scrutiny study based on individually conducted review on site by CMRS will so be forwarded to the Ministry of Railways for blessing.

Kolkatas: It was merely last hebdomad that a female constable from Phoolbagan constabularies station saw her necklace being snatched. But what took topographic point on Monday dark has left serious inquiry Markss on the security of adult females late at dark. A female constabulary adjunct sub-inspector returning to her abode on the Radha Madhab Dutta Lane in Beliaghata stopping point to Subhas Sarobar around 11 autopsy was followed by several immature and in-between aged work forces who passed obscene comments against her. When she objected, she was even threatened with desperate effects. Even as locals claimed that the accused were involved with a concatenation snaping pack and had a record of similar such offenses, the Beliaghata constabulary has wholly denied it. Based on the woman’s ailment at the Beliaghata constabularies station, two individuals were arrested. The topographic point where the incident took topographic point is within two kilometers of both the Beliaghata constabularies station and the DC East Suburban office – the DC by the way being a adult female. `` We received a ailment that two individuals were go throughing derogatory comments against our Kolkata constabulary bull. Consequently, we arrested two individuals identified as Abir Sikdar and Gopal Chakraborty in this regard. Both of them have been charged under IPC subdivision 509 ( Word, gesture or act intended to diss the modestness of a adult female ) , '' said DC ( ESD ) Debasmita Das. The constabulary is chew overing increasing security in the country and increase their presence in and around Subhas Sarovar. The NCRB information shows Bengal is still among the worst five performing artists every bit far as molestation, domestic force, snatch of misss and human trafficking are concerned. Rape instances have declined, but the province still poses a menace to adult females, and is safer merely than UP. Police brass claimed consciousness has increased and they are focused on their `` committedness '' towards adult females safety, but adult females organisations have a different narrative to state. They attribute the rise in onslaught to political awkwardness and the general sense of anarchy. The findings show Kolkata has emerged a better performing artist but there are still certain specific offenses, like voyeurism and still hunt, where the metropolis continues to register instances on a par with Delhi.

SURAT: Police arrested two 13-year-old adolescents on Sunday for allegedly slaying their schoolmate whose organic structure was recovered from near Deladwa railway traversing in Limbayat on Saturday. Police probe so far revealed that during a minor hassle the adolescent was murdered by the accused. Police arrested the two bush leagues for slaying of Pintu Kumavat, a category VII pupil, after oppugning them for several hours since Saturday. They were detained shortly after their household members expressed intuition about their engagement in the slaying. However constabulary was non certain about their engagement since the asleep Pintu was of their same age. Meanwhile, constabularies explored other possibilities but no strong lead was found. During oppugning the male childs informed constabularies that they went to eat sugar cane in a nearby farm on Thursday eventide. While in the farm they fought over some issue when both the accused slapped and punched the deceased. Pintu fainted due to threshing after which the accused lifted him and maintain in the shrubs. `` They were afraid that they will be punished by school instructor or their parents if Pintu complained about walloping after deriving consciousness. Hence they decided to kill Pintu and hit a rock on his face when he was unconscious, '' said constabulary.

SURAT: Police arrested two 13-year-old adolescents on Sunday for allegedly slaying their schoolmate whose organic structure was recovered from near Deladwa railway traversing in Limbayat on Saturday. Police probe so far revealed that during a minor hassle the adolescent was murdered by the accused. Police arrested the two bush leagues for slaying of Pintu Kumavat, a category VII pupil, after oppugning them for several hours since Saturday. They were detained shortly after their household members expressed intuition about their engagement in the slaying. However constabulary was non certain about their engagement since the asleep Pintu was of the same age as the other two male childs. Meanwhile, constabularies explored other possibilities but no strong lead was found. During oppugning the male childs informed constabularies that they went to eat sugar cane in a nearby farm on Thursday eventide. While in the farm they fought over some issue when both the accused slapped and punched the deceased. Pintu fainted due to threshing after which the accused lifted him and maintain in the shrubs. `` They were afraid that they will be punished by school instructor or their parents if Pintu complained about walloping after deriving consciousness. Hence they decided to kill Pintu and hit a rock on his face when he was unconscious, ” said constabularies.

Hyderabad: Peoples holding to wait at railway crossings can trust to take a breath easy sooner than subsequently. This is because works to build route over Bridgess ( ROBs ) at 20 railway crossings in assorted territories in the province will get down in the resulting financial twelvemonth. Harmonizing to beginnings, the Telangana authorities will be composing to South Central Railway governments saying that it will bear half of the undertaking cost. As per the initial estimations, the building of ROBs at 20 locations is likely to be 1,000 crore. Officials in the roads and edifices section said land acquisition will non be a job as all these railway crossings are on the province main roads. “Though all the 20 ROBs may non be completed in the 2017-18 financial, the thought is to get down the procedure of land acquisition.These yearss, contractors are non coming frontward to take up undertakings unless a clear undertaking site is given to them, “ a senior functionary said. While the part of the ROB over the railway paths would be constructed by railway applied scientists, the staying parts on either side would be the province 's duty. The R & B ; functionaries along with gross governments will take up a study of land required for the ROBs and the figure of belongingss to be acquired.

New DELHI: The investigation into the function of the alleged Islamic State in train accidents has set research workers on the trail of Satya Sandesh Foundation ( SSF ) , an NGO that claims to be dedicated to Islamic sermon, and an IS recruit Ahsan, perchance the first individual born Shia but working for the Sunni group. The National Investigation Agency ( NIA ) is examining how militants of the Kanpurbased foundation, linked to IS members behind the Bhopal-Ujjain train blast, quickly reached the site of the Kanpur train accident on November 20, 2016. During probes into the March 7 train blast, the NIA discovered that Ahsan ( see in writing ) , who attended a July 2016 meeting at a secret plan owned by the Kanpur-Lucknow faculty 's `amir ' Atif Muzaffar near Kanpur, was the boy of an SSF follower. Ahsan choosing for Ahle Hadith is unusual as Shias have been locked in a bitter armed struggle with IS in West Asia with Sunni hardliners, who regard them as non-Muslims. Harmonizing to an research worker, though SSF officially claims to propagate Quranic instructions, it is known to work actively on transitions to Islam. Some Hindus have been converted through SSF, he added. What has truly baffled the NIA is that SSF activists fleetly reached the site of the Patna-Indore Express derail ment last twelvemonth. “It needs to be verified how they came to cognize about the accident so rapidly, “ said an officer. Interestingly, members in the IS-inspired faculty associated with SSF had trained extensively in derailment methods. The NIA suspects a former Indian Air Force staff member in the faculty, G M Sahab, was an ISI mole as he had been reding the group on derailment of trains through explosives etc. The lens on the IS faculty 's nexus with the Kanpur derailment coincides with the NIA 's investigation into the claims of an accused arrested over a failed command to blare paths in Bihar. Motilal Paswan had, in his initial statement to Bihar constabularies, claimed that he was involved in seting the bomb at Kanpur at the case of Nepali animal trainer Brij Kishore Giri. NIA probes in Nepal have seen them question ISI linkboy Shamshul Hoda, who is said to hold admitted that he had, at the behest of ISI, engaged felons for the Bihar command. But he has non spoken of any function in the Kanpur derailment. Giri could non be questioned by the NIA squad as he is still recovering from a slug hurt. A group consisting IIT experts is looking at grounds to set up the possibility of an detonation holding caused the derailment.The NIA is still expecting metallurgical studies for the Koneru train accident to acquire indicants of a possible sabotage angle.


In 1998 a really terrible railway accident occurred in Germany. The instance went to tribunal for negligent homicide after a preliminary probe had been performed. The accident had been caused by break of a wheel and the maker of the wheel and the railway company were accused. The suspects engaged a figure of experts to look into the different proficient facets of the accident for their defense mechanism. In spring 2003 the tribunal decided to use an alone process, to hear all experts consecutively to acquire the best possible overview of the different sentiments and perchance happen the existent cause of the accident. After the tribunal had heard the testimony of these 13 experts from 5 different states it decided to stop the instance since the guilt of the accused was deemed to be really little, if there was any guilt at all and that farther proficient probes and adept testimony would most likely bring the tribunal no nearer to a strong belief. A failure analysis proper was non the topic of the tribunal process and therefore a complete probe was non carried out. The consequence of the hearing was in the sentiment of most experts, that the accident could non be explained by the consequences of the probes performed. Rather a remarkable incident or technological stuff phenomenon could hold initiated the weariness cleft, which so caused the accident. Since all realistic facets of the accident had been exhaustively investigated by the experts, merely guesss on such incidents or phenomena were possible.

`` News Paper Report Writing On Train Accident '' Essays and Research Papers

REPORT Writing: ORGANIZING AND OUTLINING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:   Week 4. To appreciate the complex nature of forming information and content in study composing To understand farther the critical function of PPQ in study composing I NTRODUCTION In the planning phase, you have been introduced to the construct of PPQ – Problem, Purpose and Questions – as the chief drive force of your study authorship. If your PPQ is non formulated good, opportunities are your study will non do sense.

Railway Accidents

Here is a list of major railway accidents in Canada: October 27, 1854Baptiste Creek, Canada West ( Ontario ) In the dark and in dazed conditions, a Great Western Railway express train, running seven hours late, ran into a crushed rock train. At least 52 were killed. At the clip, this was the worst railway accident of all time in North America. March 12, 1857Hamilton, Canada West ( Ontario ) An axle of a Great Western Railway rider train broke, doing the train to nail through the Desjardins Canal span into the canal. At least 59 people were killed. June 29, 1864Beloeil, Canada East ( Quebec ) A Grand Trunk Railway immigrant train failed to halt at an unfastened swing span and plunged into the Richelieu River. 99 people were killed, doing this the deadliest railway accident of all time in Canada. June 22, 1872Shannonville, OntarioA Grand Trunk express train derailed and fell into and around the Salmon River. While merely two people were killed outright by the impact, many people were severely scalded, and the concluding decease toll was 34. February 28, 1874Komoka, OntarioA fire broke out on a traveling Great Western Railway adjustment train, ensuing in 10 deceases. September 28, 1875Yamaska, QuebecSabotage derailed a work train on the Richelieu, Drummond and Arthabaska Railroad ; 11 workingmans are killed. The wreckers are ne'er identified. January 2, 1884Toronto, OntarioA westbound commuter train collided with a little cargo train, ensuing in 29 deceases. July 15, 1887St. Thomas, OntarioA Grand Trunk jaunt train on the London and Port Stanley Railway collided at a traversing with freight autos incorporating crude oil on a Michigan Central train ; 17 people died in the resulting fire. February 27, 1889St. George, OntarioA Grand Trunk Railway rider train derailed on a span ; 10 people are killed. April 28, 1889Hamilton, OntarioAt a location merely around one kilometer off from the Desjardins Canal catastrophe of 1857, a Grand Trunk Railway express jumped the paths in the rain and explosion into fires, killing 18. July 9, 1895Craig 's Road, QuebecOn the Grand Trunk Railway, a train packed with pilgrims headed for the pilgrim's journey site of Ste. Anne de Beaupré rear-ended another train of pilgrims ; 14 people were killed. May 26, 1896Victoria, British ColumbiaThe Point Ellice Bridge collapsed, directing a tram into the seaport. 55 people were killed. November 15, 1898Murray Hill, OntarioA Grand Trunk Railway express train was switched onto the wrong path and collided with a cargo train, killing 11. December 26, 1902Wanstead, OntarioOn the Grand Trunk Railway, a cargo train and an express train received conflicting orders let go ofing them towards each other ; all efforts to avoid a hit are in vain and they collided, killing 28. February 9, 1904Sand Point, OntarioThe applied scientist of a Canadian Pacific Railway express train forgot orders to take the turnout at Sand Point and collided with another express train. Around 15 people were killed. September 12, 1906Azilda, OntarioA Canadian Pacific Railway express train with defective brakes failed to halt at Azilda and collided with a reaper train ; 12 people were killed. September 3, 1907Caledon, OntarioA Canadian Pacific Railway train took the Horseshoe Curve at inordinate velocity and wrecked, killing seven and wounding 114. November 10, 1909Vancouver, British ColumbiaA flatbed piled high with lumber uncoupled from a British Columbia Electric Railway train and collided with a tram. All 24 people aboard the tram are casualties ; 15 of them die. November 28, 1909New Westminster, British ColumbiaLess than three hebdomads after a railway catastrophe in nearby Vancouver, an embankment transporting the Great Northern Railway over Kilby Creek collapsed and a work train fell through, killing 22. January 21, 1910Webbwood, OntarioA Canadian Pacific Railway rider trail derailed and fell into the Spanish River ; there were 43 human deaths. March 4, 1910Revelstoke, British ColumbiaAn avalanche killed 58 work forces taking snow from the Canadian Pacific Railway chief line through Rogers Pass. July 7, 1915Queenston, OntarioThe brakes failed on an overcrowded tram on the Niagara Falls and Victoria Park Railway ; it careened down a hill and wrecked, killing 15. January 12, 1916Brandon, ManitobaIn a thick fog, a Canadian Pacific Railway work train loaded with workers uncluttering snow out of the pace collided at slow velocity with a farm animal train, killing 19. March 20, 1929Drocourt, OntarioA Canadian National Railways transcontinental rider train collided with another transcontinental after it failed to take the turnout at Drocourt ; between 15 and 20 people were killed. December 25, 1934Dundas, OntarioDue to inattention at his station ( he believed his train was on a different path than it truly was ) , Edward Lynch, brakeman on a Canadian National Railways vacation particular train, switched the Maple Leaf Flyer train into the rear of his train, killing 15. March 2, 1936Albert Canyon, British ColumbiaA locomotor stamp crashed down atop a group of work forces taking snow from the Canadian Pacific Railway ; 16 people were killed. December 27, 1942Almonte, OntarioA Canadian Pacific Railway train, running tardily, was struck from behind by a troop train that had failed to keep adequate infinite. 36 people were killed and the music director of the troop train committed suicide. September 1, 1947Dugald, ManitobaOn the Canadian National Railway, the Minaki Special failed to take the turnout at Dugald and hit a Transcontinental train standing on the chief line ; 31 people are killed. November 21, 1950Canoe River, British ColumbiaA Canadian National Railway troop train collided head-on with a rider train ; 21 were killed. Red Pass station agent Alfred Atherton, charged with manslaughter, was successfully defended by defence lawyer John G. Diefenbaker in a sensational test. October 7, 1966Dorion, QuebecA Canadian National Railway freight train struck a school coach at a degree crossing. There were 19 human deaths on the coach. November 10, 1979Mississauga, OntarioOn a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train transporting toxic chemicals, an undetected hotbox led to an axle falling off a moving auto, doing a derailment. No casualties, but over 220,000 people were evacuated, at that clip the largest peacetime emptying of all time. February 8, 1986Dalehurst, AlbertaA Canadian National cargo train, for grounds that are ill-defined, ran a stop signal and collided with a VIA Rail rider train E of Hinton, ensuing in 23 deceases. July 6, 2013Lac-Mégantic, QuebecAn unmanned runaway train on the Montreal, Maine, and Atlantic Railway transporting crude oil derailed in the Centre of the town and explosion into fires ; 47 people in the town were killed. Other Resources: Halliday, Hugh. Wreck! : Canada 's Worst Railway Accidents ( Toronto: Robin Brass, 1997 ) .


This paper critically reviews a figure of railway accidents that represent failures of the distinctively American clip tabular array and train order method of operation, taken from ICC accident studies with occasional added background. It would be more pleasant to reexamine operations that did non affect accidents, but the narratives are non available, so we must make with the images we have, and be satisfied with the difficult lessons. The tabular array of accidents below makes it easy to leap to any peculiar history. It is much easier to make this than to shop the unclassified ICC studies straight. This intervention is now deeper and more extended and proficient than that in Shaw.

The handiness of historic ICC accident studies for the old ages 1911-1966 on the cyberspace makes it easy to research operation under clip tabular array and train orders to happen out how failures occurred. The computing machine hunt is much more powerful than concentrating over hemorrhoids of paperss, nevertheless limited its capablenesss. Shaw 's book discusses accidents in which there were public casualties, disregarding the more frequent events when there were few casualties, and those mostly confined to employees. However, these less tragic occurrences teach lessons every bit of import as those taught by the more dramatic 1s, and they are more pleasant to see. They are besides a position of operations in the authoritative period of American train orders, possibly a major resource, and so are of intrinsic involvement. The treatment here will transport frontward Shaw 's intervention, and widen it at several points. I differ with Shaw, mostly on accent, on a few points. The reader can organize his or her ain sentiments, since the information is freely available on the Internet, at the nexus given in the References.

Most train operation today, worldwide, is by signal indicant. The driver of a train responds to immediate, simple stimulations and must obey them exactly. Operation by clip tabular array and train orders requires wholly different accomplishments, including memory, analysis and judgement, mention to clip and to written instructions, and computations of clip and distance. It is, hence, boundlessly more interesting and exciting. American railway work forces were one time proud of their accomplishments, and justly so. Today, many people who are employed by railwaies seem to be either uninterested in developing the necessary mental accomplishments, or are incapable of making so, while the demands have become less ambitious as the traffic is less varied, many lines have vanished, and ownership become more concentrated and bureaucratic and less personal, so that changed operating patterns are indispensable.

Shaw says that the first ICC probe by the Bureau of Safety under the Accidents Report Act of 6 May 1910 was of a Soo Line hit at Superior, WI on 5 June 1911, but this was really the 5th probe. Investigation No. 1 was of a derailment on the Pennsylvania 's Belvidere Division at Martin 's Creek, NJ in the same twelvemonth on 29 April due to unsmooth path, in which 12 riders were killed. The characteristic of this derailment was gas. The wooden autos were lighted with ethyne or Pintsch gas, and they were wholly consumed. The dining auto gas armored combat vehicle exploded in the fire several hours after the accident, supplying extra exhilaration. The highest-numbered probe that I could happen was No. 4099, refering a derailment and hit on the Milwaukee on 20 July 1966.

Operation by telegraphic messages began around 1855, every bit shortly as jobs with the Morse patents were overcome and partnerships with telegraph companies established. The normal commercial telegraph lines of the period were far excessively undependable for railway intents, so that telegraph despatching became practical merely when the railway companies could command their ain lines with sole entree to them. Telegraph dispatching was overlaid on the bing well-developed clip table system, doing it much simpler and safer, and this relation remained until operation by signal indicant superseded it. Trains can run strictly on clip table authorization, but this means no excess trains, and no accommodation for holds of superior trains, without confounding and risky regulations. Train orders provide for the operation of excess trains, and for the riddance of holds due to detain trains, every bit good as for much else besides. Train orders are a particular sort of telegraphic message, written on typical signifiers and capable to rigorous ordinance of the methods of transmittal and bringing. They are rather different from ordinary messages, and incorporate entirely information covering with the motion and safety of trains, which ordinary messages must non incorporate.

The starter is the cardinal individual in the train order system, and the lone one whose work is non checked or monitored. There is merely one starter for a given length of path, called a division, subdivision or territory, so that there is no division of bid that could take to confusion. He communicated by telegraph or telephone with the operators along the line, each holding a train order signal to halt trains for the bringing of orders, or to allow them go through. Finally, the music director and engineman received orders in authorship, in the same words to all concerned in the motion. With wireless, the starter can pass on straight with the train crews, extinguishing the demand for operators ( as on electric interurban lines ) . All but a really few of the accidents discussed here were before the clip of train wireless, so that lone communicating by wire with operators was available. On steam roads, labour understandings ruled out copying of orders by train crews, utilizing the telephone, except in exigency. The usage of wireless to pass on between the forepart and rear of a train was an highly valuable installation, however. Now, of class, there is no longer anyone on the rear, so this is no longer of import. The alterations of the present twenty-four hours are a wholly different topic, and will non be considered here.

The telephone was adopted for despatching get downing around the clip of the First World War, prompted chiefly by the trouble of obtaining qualified operators and their high cost. Anyone physically capable can run a telephone without particular preparation, and the lower degree of accomplishment goes with lower rewards. Sometimes it is viewed as an progress in engineering, but most people involved would state that it is no betterment on telegraphy. Telegraphy concentrated on the single characters of a message, and was non capable to the uncertainnesss of aural perceptual experience, so it was better adapted to the transmittal of train orders. This explains its late endurance in many topographic points, in malice of the deficiency of trained Morse operators.

Failures of the train order system can be classified in three natural classs: ( 1 ) improper creative activity of orders ; ( 2 ) failure of bringing of orders ; and ( 3 ) misunderstanding or overlooking of orders, matching to the starter, operators and train crews. The errors they made are discussed below. The Standard Code of train regulations was adopted by the General Time Convention ( Later ARA and AAR ) in July 1889. It was a digest of the best pattern at the clip, and was consultative, non compulsory. How good the work was done is shown by the fact that there have been no significant alterations or add-ons since that clip, except possibly for the debut of the Clearance Card as a list of orders delivered, and these regulations formed the footing of a uniquely North American method of operation. The Standard Code required painstaking, intelligent and disciplined employees, with the capacity to understand written instructions ( such work forces and adult females may now be difficult to happen ) . In my sentiment, it was a safe, efficient and economical agencies of commanding operations for low or moderate traffic densenesss, particularly when supplemented by an automatic block system.

A really of import component in clip tabular array and train order operation was flagging. Time table and train order give full protection against opposing trains on individual path, but merely limited protection against following trains, for which a adult male with a flag or lamp on the ballast is the chief resource. This is a separate consideration, necessitating instead luxuriant treatment to explicate it to the full, so it will merely be mentioned here when it has some direct bearing on the narrative. Flaging failures result in rear-end hits, train-order failures in head-end hits. We are chiefly concerned with the latter. The main function of an automatic block system is to supply protection against following trains and unfastened switches, and to ease the occupation of the flagman. It is a complementary and desirable adjunct of train-order operation, allowing high velocities with safety.

The most of import common factor in train order accidents revealed by this survey is the stepping down of the music director 's duty for the operation of the train jointly with the engineman, a common cheque that is the foundation of the Standard Code. In about every instance, this is a lending if non the principal cause of accident. Conductors are found repeatedly neglecting to confer with with their enginemen, non demoing orders to brakemen or other interested crew members, non being cognizant of the location of their train, non doing train designation at meets, neglecting to detect Rule S-90 on exchanges of signals nearing meeting or waiting points, neglecting to oversee flagmen, and busying their heads with bill of ladings and tickets. When trains are operated by signal indicant, music directors become every bit useless as firemen on Diesel engines, and are no prettier.

One could easy organize the sentiment that railway accidents are frequent and most employees are careless or unqualified. Nothing could be further from the truth. The ICC studies represent a little figure of incidents where certain factors have combined to do catastrophe. If we discussed all the instances in which catastrophe did non happen, these unfortunate incidents would be absolutely buried. I late heard that some 800 truck drivers die every twelvemonth in accidents ( in add-on they take a batch of the remainder of us with them ) , which is a higher toll than on the railroads around the bend of the century when employee casualties were a shame. Our informations base here is all reportable accidents for the old ages concerned, non merely an arbitrary choice.

It must be taken into history that train regulations non merely changed with clip but were besides modified by single companies. There were besides particular instructions in operating clip tables that varied greatly. Starters normally operated harmonizing to company policy, which was spelled out in a manual. Sometimes the distinctive features are known to me, and sometimes non. Fortunately, the rules did non vary significantly in malice of all this assortment of item, so the accidents will be discussed on this general footing. The most of import thing about them is that they reflect existent, non theoretical, conditions.

Form 31 and Form 19 Orders

The reader will understand the studies better cognizing what a train order is, and what the difference is between Form 31 and Form 19 orders. This subdivision has been prepared with that in head. To `` copy '' an order means to compose it in multiplex utilizing double-sided Cs, as it comes in on the sounder ( or telephone ) . To `` run into '' agencies for two opposing trains to go through by one another at a siding on individual path. When a train is in the clear on a turnout for a meet, its headlamp is extinguished ; otherwise, the headlamp shows that the train is non in the clear. To `` go through '' means for one train to catch another in the same way at a siding on individual path. When a train is in the clear on a turnout to be passed, its markers are turned to demo green ( or yellow ) to the rear when it is clear of the chief path ; otherwise, ruddy markers show the train is non clear of the chief path. A train has `` right '' if a train order gives it precedency over another train. Otherwise, the clip tabular array may stipulate the precedency of trains by `` category '' or `` way. '' Precedence is the right to travel on the chief path, possibly restricted by a agenda or other commissariats, with the other train, in the same or opposite way, maintaining out of the manner, taking siding when necessary to be met or passed. The inferior train must normally be clear five proceedingss before a scheduled superior train is due, called the `` clearance clip, '' to let a border of safety, so the superior train will non hold to near prepared to halt. Trains of the same category, and excess trains, must near such points prepared to halt, unless a block system is in usage and signals are clear.

All train orders are basically likewise in that they are prepared, familial and delivered harmonizing to rigorous regulations that guarantee rightness and timely bringing. All are recorded in authorship in the starter 's order book and are numbered. They are addressed to those who are to put to death them, which includes operators in some instances, expressed in the same words, and repeated after transmittal to guarantee truth. The lone existent differentiation between what are called Form 31 and Form 19 orders is the method of bringing. They are otherwise distinguished by being written on standard signifiers printed on yellow or green paper, severally.

The original train order was similar to the ulterior Form 31. The order was transmitted to the operator, who put out a train order signal and repeated the order to the starter. The music director and applied scientist would describe to the telegraph office after seeing the signal, where there were formal readings of the order, by the operator or the railroaders, to guarantee that the contents were understood. Then the music director and applied scientist would subscribe the order, and their signatures would be telegraphed to the starter. The starter would give `` complete, '' and this was noted on the order with the clip and the overseer 's initials ( symbol of authorization ) . Now the order was in force, until it was fulfilled, superseded or annulled. An order is considered fulfilled when the train involved ceases to be.

When a cumbersome regulation that would impede traffic is promulgated on a railway, it is ignored or worked around in some manner, and this regulation was no exclusion. Geting the engineman off the engine and into the office with the music director is extremely time-consuming and inconvenient. The engineman has of import work to make and no clip to stand about chew the fating. What was really done was that the music director would travel to the office for the order, and hammer the engineman 's signature, so present the order to the engineman the following clip he was near the engine. This alternate became the regulation. The music director would travel to the office and mark for the order, together with any reading formalities ( that became neglected, fortuitously ) , and so present the order to the engineman. The engineman would so subscribe the music director 's transcript as a reception. At that clip, orders were turned in at the terminal of a run so they could be inspected.

This process was still time-consuming, and it required the train to halt, and the music director to walk the length of the train and back. To bring around the job, a method of bringing was devised that did non affect signatures. The order was made complete ( effectual ) when it was repeated, and so the operator delivered the order to both the engineman and the music director, as the engine and caboose passed the office. In fact, the train did non even have to halt, and the orders could be handed up attached to basketballs or bringing forks. These new orders, delivered personally to engineman and music director by the operator, were dubbed Form 19, and the traditional order called Form 31. The usual manner to demo that the train did non hold to halt when the order signal was displayed was to demo a xanthous flag or xanthous lamp, with the operator standing on the platform as the train approached. If the procedure miscarried, the train had to halt for the orders. Form 19 orders were non used to curtail a train, merely to assist it, and non to set up meets. A train was considered restricted when a 31 order addressed to it had been repeated, non when it was finally made complete.

Further advancement, if it can be so called, was made when the engineman no longer had to acknowledge for the Form 31 order. Additionally, orders were frequently handed up to firemen and brakemen, who were supposed to go through the orders on, which they normally did, if it was convenient ( see Dewey, IN ) . When a train was stopped for orders, it remained the best pattern for the music director to manus orders to the engineman personally, and to discourse them, but this was non required, and frequently omitted, as many of the accidents below testify. Since music directors and enginemen were supposed to compare tickers before get downing, discoursing the orders would non be inconvenient. At this point, there was truly no difference between the security of bringing of 31 and 19 orders, as the 31 order no longer assured that the engineman would see and understand it. Generally, 31 and 19 orders were by and large handed to the engineman in a individual heap, distinguishable merely by colour.

It was shortly realized that any difference in security between 31 and 19 orders was minimum, and the pickings of signatures ( except in particular instances ) was dropped, with the riddance of the Form 31, or by the acceptance of a common train order signifier. There were so failures of bringing of train orders, but they would non hold been cured by Form 31 in its later, toothless signifier. Many functionaries thought the pickings of signatures had some formalized significance that would pull the attending of railroaders more than the informal Form 19 order. Arguments along this line merely ne'er got to the root of failure of bringing, which lay chiefly with operators burying orders and enginemen non acquiring them at all. The signatures did non hold to make the starter before he could assist another train ( except in certain state of affairss, or when the order was to be delivered by a 3rd party ) -- this would hold been safe, but much excessively cumbrous.

The opportunities of nondelivery were greatly reduced with the debut of the clearance card as an order index. This signifier was originally used to authorise a train to go through a train order signal at halt when there were no orders for the train. It positively identified the train for which it was issued. The pattern grew of naming the order Numberss for a train on it as they were copied by the operator. Before uncluttering a train, the operator repeated the list of orders to the starter, who gave his Oklahoma. When scrupulously done, this process practically eliminates nondelivery of orders. Now it was safe to curtail a train by a 19 order, and this has proved an acceptable pattern. Any necessary signatures are merely forged in a clean country. It is really the clearance card that eliminated the demand for the Form 31 order.

Index to the Accidents

Operational accidents, which are the lone sort that will be discussed here, are non every bit common as accidents due to bad flagging, go throughing signals at halt, failures of equipment, path or constructions, or main road crossings, and normally are non as dearly-won in lives, except when aggravated by other factors, such as fire. Their causes involve human actions and psychological factors instead than material grounds, which makes them interesting to reexamine and analyse. The 68 incidents discussed here are listed in the tabular array below. These are doubtless non all of the accidents due to failures of clip tabular array and train order, but are a good sample of them, revealed by computing machine hunt of all available accident studies. Snaping on a nexus will take you to the portion of the page that discusses that accident.

Time Table and Train Order Failures, 1911-1966 Road Location Date Major Cause CB & Q ; Nodaway, MO 22 August 1960 CTC operated improperly Southern ( AGS ) Woodstock, AL 11 November 1951 inordinate velocity on CTC siding MStP & SSM ; Paynesville, MN 13 July 1950 music director did non present to engineman M & StL ; Waterville, MN 17 July 1953 music director did non present to engineman MP Enright, TX 21 March 1947 starter failed to turn to annullment Midland Valley Bokoshe, OK 1 February 1958 starter completed order to superior train past signal Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Kenefick, OK 20 May 1931 nonstandard process non decently executed CStPM & O ; Cray, MN 14 June 1951 operator displayed TO signal for incorrect way Louisiana & Arkansas Sulphur Springs, TX 12 October 1955 train figure received falsely doing misdelivery CRI & P ; Norton, KS 3 September 1944 operator cleared TO signal as block signal while keeping orders Delaware & Hudson Port Henry, NY 24 October 1954 operator forgot 2nd train to have orders C & EI ; Goreville, IL 1 January 1944 operator forgot 2nd train to have orders C & EI ; Dewey, IN 14 September 1944 ignored meet order Kansas City Southern Tipton Ford, MO 5 August 1914 ignored meet order NYC & StL ( Nickel Plate ) Swanville, PA 13 June 1928 ignored delay order Northwestern Pacific Largo, CA 29 February 1929 full crew of No. 2 neglected meet order Northwestern Pacific Largo, CA 29 October 1952 starter forgot returning assistant Northern Pacific Little Rock, WA 20 September 1944 running orders lap Atlantic Coast Line Jesup, GA 24 March 1949 subdivision overlooked Atlantic Coast Line Mango, FL 10 October 1925 subdivision overlooked St. Louis-San Francisco Marshfield, MO 17 September 1918 starter forgot to put curtailing order St. Louis-San Francisco Kellyville, OK 28 September 1917 incorrect train designation St. Louis-San Francisco White Oak, OK 31 May 1920 faulty transportation of orders to engineman St. Louis-San Francisco Quincy, MS 16 February 1939 misreading train order St. Louis-San Francisco Pickensville, AL 10 August 1939 failure to take siding Wheeling and Lake Erie Jewett, OH 16 July 1937 misreading train order Duluth Winnipeg & Pacific Angora, MN 1 December 1946 failure to present invalidating order Canadian Pacific Onawa, ME 20 December 1919 misreading of train order Canadian Pacific Attean, ME 8 August 1957 clearance OK 'd without including curtailing order Colorado and Southern South Park Junction, CO 1 June 1914 failure to clear clip of superior train Colorado and Southern Broomfield, CO 22 September 1958 music director failed to detect Rule S-90 Colorado and Southern Chugwater, WY 16 September 1958 train busying chief path without protection Colorado and Southern Royce, NM 26 March 1937 delay order ignored by superior train Colorado and Southern Folsom, NM 16 February 1938 starter 's mistake in look intoing order CB & Q ; Meadville, MO 4 January 1923 faulty train designation, manual block failure CB & Q ; Belmont, NE 25 July 1941 failure to present order curtailing train D & RGW ; Granite, CO 20 August 1925 failure to present order curtailing train SL-SF Custer City, OK 3 July 1945 failure to present order curtailing train Ann Arbor Lake George, MI 29 July 1925 failure to present order curtailing train GC & SF ; Mullin, TX 29 December 1915 failure to present order curtailing train Southern Hicks, TN 4 October 1926 failure to present order curtailing train Erie Sloatsburg, NY 11 August 1958 failure to present order curtailing train B & O ; Lumberport, WV 21 July 1955 starter overlooked excess St Johnsbury & LC Greensboro, VT 5 May 1944 operator failed to expose TO signal MKT Alsuma, OK 19 Jul 1922 misinterpretation of train order P & SF ; Cheyenne, OK 19 February 1943 misinterpretation of train order D & RGW ; Toltec, NM 29 September 1922 misinterpretation of train order Western Pacific David, CA 19 April 1931 misinterpretation of train order Western Pacific Antelope, NV 14 April 1942 misinterpretation of train order Western Pacific David, CA 1 November 1942 starter 's mistake NC & StL ; Chickamauga, TN 24 September 1925 engineman did non read order Northern Pacific Welch, MT 17 March 1922 engineman did non read order CB & Q ; Wakeley, WY 2 April 1913 engineman did non read order right CB & Q ; Omar, CO 27 October 1936 misinterpretation of train order Southern Rockmart, GA 23 December 1926 orders non given to alleviating engineman Colorado Midland Idlewild, CO 27 August 1915 adult females in cab distract engineman Philadelphia & Reading ; Woodmont, PA 5 December 1921 order misunderstood, manual block failure Western Maryland Thurmont, MD 24 June 1915 orders improperly worded and non delivered Western Maryland Blue Mountain, MD 27 November 1912 train registry misread, subdivision missed Western Maryland Pen Mar, PA 6 December 1912 subdivisions non handled decently Seaboard Air Line Hamlet, NC 27 July 1911 message cheque of registry incorrect Denver and Interurban Globeville, CO 6 September 1920 music director did non look into register Boston and Maine Nahor, NH 16 October 1929 music director did non look into registry NC & StL ; Nashville, TN 9 July 1918 incorrect train designation Ligonier Valley Ligonier, PA 5 July 1912 verbal orders confused Utah Railway Martin, UT 26 Aug 1922 single-order despatching mistake Rutland Riverside, VT 14 March 1920 order non legible Seaboard Air Line Granite, NC 19 November 1911 order non legible

Causes of Accidents

It is possible to sort the 66 accidents under clip tabular array and train order operation by chief cause. In most instances, this is the cause as determined by the ICC research workers. We are covering non with a sample here, but with all available accident studies, so the consequences may hold some cogency in demoing what really caused accidents in pattern. Of the 66 accidents, 37 resulted from improper actions of train crew members, chiefly music directors and enginemen, who are jointly responsible for the safety of their trains. 16 resulted from improper actions of operators, who are the mediators between starter and train crew. 13 were caused by erroneous actions by the starter in making orders and seeing that they were sent to the proper references at the proper topographic points.

The starter 's mistakes were rather assorted, each happening merely one time. The mistakes were: failure to direct a restricting order to the train restricted when another train had been helped against it ; when traveling on responsibility, non look intoing diction of old orders ; neglecting to direct an annullment to a concerned train ; finishing an order to a train already past the station ; burying a returning assistant supernumerary ; publishing a lap order ; OK'ing a clearance excluding a restricting order ; overlooking an excess on the route ; give voicing orders improperly ; managing subdivisions improperly ; and publishing an erroneous cheque of delinquent trains. Among all the possible mistakes, these were the 1s that really caused accidents. Starters were frequently called upon to manage 30 or 40 trains a twenty-four hours on a 100 stat mis of individual path, or on 10 or 15 assorted subdivisions aggregating 100s of stat mis. In general, they performed a fantastic occupation. One accident reveals single-order dispatching with the cognition of functionaries.

The most frequent operator 's mistake was the failure to present a restricting order, either because the train was forgotten or the train order signal was improperly at Clear, which was responsible for eight accidents. In two farther instances, the order was non legible, and misreading led to accident. Single accidents resulted from: forgetting that a 2nd train was to receive orders ; exposing the train order signal for the incorrect way ; uncluttering a train order signal used as a block signal when the block was reported clear, while orders were held ; neglecting to expose the train order signal at Stop before an order was copied ; neglecting to present order when engine was past train order signal ; copying a train figure falsely and non rectifying it upon repeat. In several instances, an order was held curtailing a train at the station of bringing, but the operator took no steps to guarantee that the train crew was cognizant of the fact, and subsequently cleared the train order signal. Whereas in starter 's mistakes, the starter is frequently overworked and harried, with operators it seems more frequently that the operators are careless and negligent to a surprising grade. This may be a consequence of the debut of the telephone for dispatching, which eliminated the demand for skilled Morse operators and their preparation. Operators besides had an astonishing assortment of responsibilities, and were frequently distracted from train orders by mail, luggage, express, tickets, auto studies and so forth.

The most common mistake of train crews is to misread an order that is absolutely legible and decently composed, which caused 13 accidents. A surprising figure of these involved misinterpretation subdivision Numberss, though they were clearly written. In five instances, a meet or delay order was ignored by the engineman, and the music director took no effectual action to halt the train. In two instances, there was defective bringing of orders to a alleviating engine crew or engineman, and once more the music director took no effectual action. In two instances, the engineman seems non to hold read an order in clip, but once more the music director took no effectual action. In two instances, the music director, being near the office, received orders but did non present them quickly to the engineman. In three instances, one of which was rather serious, an wrong train designation was made, in which the music director took no involvement. In one instance, the train registry was misread and a subdivision missed, and in two more the music director did non look into the registry at all. One accident was caused by the failure of the music director to detect Rule S-90, and another by go forthing his train on the chief path without protection. The clip of a superior train was non decently cleared in one accident, and in another, a train did non take siding but held the chief path. In one funny instance, verbal orders were confused in a rare instance when interurban methods were used by a steam railway. In another, a local pattern at certain meets where a train had to duplicate in was non decently observed by an engineman.

The music director appears to be mostly responsible for mistakes of train crews, through the common wont of go forthing the running of the train up to the engineman, and taking more involvement in tickets and bill of ladings than train orders. In every instance when a meet was overlooked, or a waiting clip non observed, the music director might every bit good have been on another planet. Junior crew members, the firemen and brakemen, are frequently browbeaten and excluded from consideration, when engagement in the running of the train forms a valuable portion of direction of inexperient employees. Even when they suspect that catastrophe looms, they are hesitating to `` draw the air '' in instance they might confront the wrath of the music director if they are incorrect. We do non cognize how many times cooperation has averted catastrophe, but from the studies it does non look that it is the regulation. In most instances, the trust on enginemen seems well-placed, since they must recognize how much depends on them entirely, and they frequently suffer for the mistakes of others.

The move that contributed more to safety than any other was the limitation of the hours of service to 8 hours for starters and operators, and 16 hours for train crews. Early accident studies reveal flagitious and epic conditions ; one starter was on responsibility for 12 hours after replacing for another 's 12-hour fast one. Operators usually worked 12-hour displacements, and altering displacements sometimes meant 24 hours on responsibility. Their work, which was hard, skilled and demanding, was considered light and comfy by railway directors, because it was performed indoors with a nice range nearby. In train service, everybody except the engineman could acquire nice, reviewing slumber if they were bored by the scenery.

One feature of accident probes should be pointed out to the unwary. Normally, those most blameworthy, separately or as a commission, make a `` fairy narrative '' to explicate events in the most favourable manner possible, throwing the incrimination, if possible, on inanimate objects, and if non, on individuals non present. As a last resort, the most junior participants are held at mistake. In all these accidents, there are no failures of the air brakes or signals. All were due wholly to human causes, and most occurred in good conditions. Many were due to apprehensible oversights, weariness and mistakes of perceptual experience, really few to blameworthy carelessness. There is no involvement here in delegating incrimination for these long-past events, and we revere those who suffered.


Merely after midnight on the 22nd of August, 1960, regular cargo train No. 70 was quickly traveling due south with merely 31 autos and a manner auto, go throughing Napier at 1.30 am. Passenger train No. 23 had merely left St. Joseph with 14 autos, including 7 slumberers, a level auto and a manner auto. The 2.1-mile turnout at Nodaway, 16.6 stat mis north of St. Joseph, looked appropriate as a meeting topographic point for the two trains. By close cooperation between the starter and the control operator, they managed to acquire both trains on the same turnout, headed up, where they bumped at 1.59 am, in clear conditions. It was likely best that this embarrassment happened at dark, when cipher could see. There were 12 hurts, 2 of them riders.


On 25 November 1951, two rider trains collided in CTC district at Woodstock, AL, killing 15 riders and 2 employees. This accident is discussed here to demo how mishaps occur under operation by signal indicant, and contrast them with train order accidents. On this line, CTC had merely been brought into service ( 10 October ) between Burstall and Tuscaloosa, 44 stat mis, the first stage of put ining CTC over the whole division from Meridian to Birmingham, 152 stat mis. The Woodstock turnout was 1.62 stat mis long, with controlled signals at each terminal, of searchlight type. Intermediate automatic signals were one-arm semaphores. Intermittent inductive train halt was besides provided, and the rider velocity bound was 80 miles per hour.

The trains involved were northward No. 48 with 8 autos, that had taken siding at Woodstock to run into First 47 and was traveling easy. First 47 was transporting green signals for a undermentioned subdivision, and whistled them to No. 48, which acknowledged them. This was non required in CTC district, but was likely a good thought since CTC did non widen over the whole division. Second 47 was a heavy L & N ; train of 13 autos, detoured because of a faulty span on its ain line, closely following. The engineman of No. 48 had forestalled at the restrictive facets nearing Woodstock to forestall a punishment brake application.

Approaching the north terminal of the turnout, the engineman of No. 48 misread the midget searchlight signal regulating admittance to the chief path, and trailed through the switch, which was set for the chief line, halting 100 ' North of the turnout switch after an ATS punishment application. The fireman went to the phone booth at the terminal of the turnout to describe events. This happened merely as Second 47 passed the last intermediate signal at clear, and approached at about 65 miles per hour. The fireman of No. 48 made a ineffectual effort at flagging with an orange fabric, which was all he had on manus, while the engineman jumped. The velocity of Second 47 was reduced to about 45 miles per hour at the minute of hit. The engineman was killed in the wreckage, so his testimony was non available.

This accident shows that operation by signal indicants puts the duty on engineman in peculiar, alternatively of on the music director and engineman reciprocally. Calling of signals to each other if there is more than one adult male in the cab, if scrupulously performed, does forestall errors and carelessness, but is by no agencies infallible. In this accident, the incorrect facet was called. It seems that one set of jeopardies is merely replaced by another set. Automatic train stop complements operation by signal indicants every bit of course as automatic block signals complement clip tabular array and train order operation, giving about perfect safety, but it still can be thwarted by determined attempt.


Paynesville, MN is on the Soo Line about 85 stat mis north-west of Minneapolis. Early in the forenoon of the 13th of July 1950 a dispatching job arose at this point on the prairie. Eastbound rider train No. 108 was nearing from the way of Glenwood, while westbound rider train Second 3 was coming from Minneapolis. Eastbound freight No. 90, with 105 autos, had merely arrived at Paynesville, which had a 103-car turnout. The starter, obviously an optimist, had expected No. 90 to do more rapid advancement, and had issued Order No. 142 before midnight: `` Second 3 Eng 4001 return turnout and run into No 90 Eng 205 at Eden Valley. '' Eden Valley was 9.3 stat mis east of Paynesville, and Second 3 was taking siding at that place because the turnout was non long plenty for No. 90. With this taken attention of, he issued another order directing No. 108 and Second 3 to run into at Regal, a siding West of Paynesville.

Now we have a fully-developed job. No. 108 can non go through Regal. No. 90 can non continue against No. 108 's clip ( we are non allowed to presume that No 108 can non acquire by Regal someway! ) . Second 3 can non go forth Eden Valley until No. 90 gets at that place. Checkmate. The distances are excessively great for a flagman to walk. The starter, seeing that No. 90 was glued to Paynesville, issued Order No. 24: `` Order No 142 of July 12th is annulled. '' The music director of No. 90 received the order, which was made complete at 2.12 am. Then the order could be made complete for Second 3, which allowed it to go through Eden Valley under clip table rights and froze No. 90 at Paynesville, since non all subdivisions of No. 3 had passed. Second 3 would now acquire to Regal, No. 108 would continue, and No. 90 would follow it from Paynesville. Problem solved.

There was a little gimmick, nevertheless. No. 90 did non suit on the turnout, which they knew up at the head terminal a stat mi from the station, but did non at the rear terminal. They decided that the lone thing to make was to protect against No. 108 by a flag, and when it arrived, to endorse a small and allow it `` saw '' by. Since cipher wanted to walk all the manner to the head terminal to state them, they did non cognize that Order No. 124 no longer protected them from Second 3, and that they were infringing on its rights by about 100 foots. While worrying about No. 108, they acquired a new concern when Second 3 's headlight all of a sudden appeared in the E. A adult male started out beckoning a fusee, which did some good, since Second 3 had reduced to about 30 miles per hour when it struck the units of No. 90 a glancing blow. There were no serious hurts.


At 3.35 autopsy on the 17th of July 1953, local cargo Extra 546 East ( compass way South ) arrived at the station, and began to make some shift. At Montgomery, 15.6 stat mis west, it had received train order No. 96: `` No 1 Eng GE25 delay at Palmer until 415 four 15 autopsy for Extra 546 East. '' Palmer was 4.4 stat mis east of Waterville. It was reasonably obvious that Excess 546 would non complete its work in clip to do Palmer for No. 1, so they decided to stay at Waterville for No. 1. The starter did non allow things take their natural class, but wanted to hasten affairs. Although Excess 546 had passed the train order signal at clear, he directed the operator to expose Stop, and issued order No. 101: `` Order No 96 is annulled No 1 Eng GE25 meet Extra 456 East at Waterville Extra 456 East clasp chief path at Waterville. '' As at Paynesville, the music director assumed that Extra 456 was pinned. The order was completed to No. 1 at Waseca, E of Palmer, at 3.59 autopsy. When No. 1 received order no 101, it proceeded immedately. The music director of Extra 546 received the order at 4.10 autopsy.


At 7.46 am, the starter seems to hold realized his blooper, and issued order No 238 to No. 70 at Navasota, and to the work excess R01 at Cawthon, reading: `` That portion of order No 227 reading No 70 Eng 1106 delay at Cawthon until 945 am Koppe 955 am is annulled. No 70 Eng 1106 delay at Enright until 920 am Koppe 930 am for Work Extra R01. '' Now he thought he had fixed up Extra R01 as before he had fixed up No 395. The order was non delivered to Extra 395, since he had overlooked that Extra 395 was running on order 227. Now, the struggle between orders 227 and 231 should hold raised a inquiry, but they did non, and it was legal for No. 395 to take advantage of the state of affairs.


A more fatal accident occured on the Midland Valley at Bokoshe, Oklahoma on 1 Feb 1958. The Midland Valley ran from Wichita to the locality of Fort Smith, and was operated in three subdivisions, Western, Middle and Eastern. The Eastern Subdivision ran from Muskogee to Fort Smith, with entry to Fort Smith over 15.4 stat mis of joint path with the Frisco. This was a individual path, operated by clip tabular array and train order, with twenty-four hours offices at Porum, Stigler, Panama and Rock Island. The office at Muskogee was unfastened continuously, since the starter was located here at the central office of the company. Trains originated at Shopton, 1.1 stat mis east of Muskogee, but called for orders at Muskogee. The velocity bound was 30 miles per hour.

No. 41 had departed Rock Island at 9.35 am, 2 hours and 20 proceedingss late, and arrived Panama at 9.55 am. The clip table meet with No. 42 was at Stigler, but No. 41 could non go forth Panama because it could non unclutter at Keota in clip. No. 42 left Shopton at 8.30 am, 30 proceedingss late, with work to make at Warner, Briartown and Keota. Stigler was the following station West of Keota, and this forenoon the starter had an operator at that place, so he decided to curtail No. 42 at Keota so that No. 41 could go forth Panama. Order No. 27 said: `` No forty-one Eng 152 meet No 42 Eng 153 at Keota No 41 clasp chief path at Keota. '' The order was made complete at 10.34 am at Panama and No. 41 left at 10.35.

Of class, before this occurred, the starter asked the operator at Stigler if No. 42 had arrived. The operator said he had non seen it. The operator had gone on responsibility at 10 am, so wholly he could state is that it had non passed in the last half hr. In fact, No. 42 had passed Briartown ( the station following West of Stigler ) at 9.40 am, Stigler at 9.55 am, and arrived in Keota at 10.20 am. After making its work, it left at 10.30 am. No. 42 was about to Panama before No. 41 left there! The deficiency of unfastened offices meant that the starter had no thought of what progress the trains were doing, and he made an wrong premise.

The Fort Smith and Van Buren crossed the Midland Valley at Bokoshe, which had no turnout, merely a station mark. The crossing was gated against the FS & VB ; , so MV trains could traverse at restricted velocity without halting. No 41 and No 42 collided on a curve 1213 ' West of the station mark, No. 41 traveling at 30 miles per hour and No. 42 at 25 miles per hour. No. 41 had 4 autos and a galley, No. 42 12 autos and a galley. The hit split the diesel armored combat vehicles of both engines, and ruptured a armored combat vehicle auto loaded with gasolene. The fire destroyed both engines and several autos of their trains. The engineman and front brakeman of No. 42, and the fireman of No. 41 were killed.

This appears to be the merely serious accident in the history of the Midland Valley system, which consisted of the MV, the Kansas, Oklahoma and Gulf, and the Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka. The MV besides had an brush with the CRI & P ; at Midland Tower, KS. The OC-A-A had a hit between a rider train and a cargo at Konawa in 1927, but no riders were killed, and a work train trouble at Ada in 1929. The Missouri, Oklahoma and Gulf, a predecessor of the KO & G ; , had a freight derailment on unballasted path in 1916, and the KO & G ; a head-end hit of cargos at Kenefick, OK in 1931, discussed following. That 's all there is in the ICC probes.


Kenefick, OK was 11.5 stat mis north of Durant, on the Southern Division of the KO & G ; , which extended from Muskogee ( South Junction ) to Dension, and was an of import but independent nexus in the Missouri Pacific 's path to north Texas. Like most U.S. railwaies, and particularly little 1s, the KO & G ; was capital-starved and had to do make. This was particularly noted in pace and turnout capacity. Though trains grew in length in the twentieth century, siding lengths did non. At Kenefick, for illustration, the turnout was 1986 ' long, keeping at most 58 autos ( the 1950 timetable lists the capacity at 34 autos ) . There was besides a house path ( for autos to be unloaded at the cargo house ) 1862 ' long, connected merely at the north terminal, the switch located 954 ' North of the north siding switch.

A northbound train excessively long to suit into the turnout could `` duplicate over '' by drawing onto the turnout until the galley cleared at the south terminal, so cutting the train short of the fouling point at the north terminal. The engine and front portion of the train would so draw forward, and back in on the house path until in the clear. This was non rather as convenient for a southbound train, but could still be done with more backup. When a meet was to take topographic point, the northbound inferior train, the one taking turnout, had no right to the track North of the north siding switch. In order to go through this switch to endorse in on the house path, it was necessary under the regulations to direct a flagman forward at least half a stat mi to warn the opposing train, even if it was decelerating for the meet.

Flaging used up at least an extra 15 minutes in this instance, waiting for the flagman to walk frontward, although everyone involved understood what had to be done and could make it safely if they knew a train was duplicating over. The Chief Dispatcher handled this by seting the notice in the meet order. For illustration: `` Eng 503 tally excess Denison to South Jct take siding run into Excess 501 South at Kenefick. Extra 501 South expression out carefully for Extra 503 North duplicating over at meeting point. '' The non-standard clause meant that Extra 501 should near Kenefick anticipating Extra 503 to be north of the siding switch by up to a train length. Excess 503 would hold its headlamp displayed brilliantly until it was clear of the chief path. This signifier of order served the intent rather good at other points every bit good as at Kenefick.

On the eventide of 20 May 1931, Extra 501 South had 90 autos and galley, and received order No. 53, Form 19, at Tupelo, 34.3 stat mis north of Kenefick, worded as in the preceding paragraph. Excess 501 left there at 9.01 autopsy, left Bromide Jct with 72 autos, and proceeded to Kenefick. Approaching Kenefick, Extra 503 's headlamp was seen, so Excess 501 slowed to 10 or 15 miles per hour with a service application. Just so, the headlamp disappeared, so it seemed that Extra 503 was safely in the hole. The engineman of Extra 501 released the brakes and opened the accelerator. At that instant the headlamp reappeared, bright as of all time -- the engine of Extra 503 had merely gone behind the cotton gin, and was really merely drawing out of the turnout. An exigency application of the brakes was uneffective so shortly after they were released ( a job with type K three-base hits ) , so the velocity was non reduced much at the point of collison. The engineman and fireman of Excess 501 were injured, but these were the lone casualties, fortuitously.

This is one of the better ICC probes, where all relevant factors were decently considered, and a merely decision reached. Under the regulations, the engineman of Extra 503 was at mistake for being beyond the siding switch without flag protection. Under KO & G ; operating patterns, nevertheless, the engineman of Extra 501 was at mistake for non taking sufficient attention to be certain Extra 503 was in the clear, though his error was apprehensible. The testers found a certain laxity in doing brake trials, failure to compare tickers daily with standard redstem storksbills, and too-infrequent scrutinies on the regulations, which they recommended that the company correct, and, for one time, made no cockamamie recommendations such as naming for automatic train halt.

There is a safe manner to manage instances when a train has to duplicate over or back into a turnout. For illustration, `` Excess 501 South clasp chief path meet Extra 503 North at Kenefick Extra 503 two-base hit over protecting harmonizing to regulation 99. '' If Excess 501 was non seen coming, engine 501 might crawl frontward a half-mile or so to go forth a flagman, so return to acquire its train on the turnout. This could be made legal with an order like: `` Excess 501 South delay at Cain until nine 15 915 autopsy for Extra 503 North, '' in which instance the flagman could be taken out at any clip up to 9.15 autopsy. By the way, the turnout at Cain, 8.8 stat mis north, held 75 autos, so Excess 503 would non hold had to duplicate over at that place.


This was the first twenty-four hours on the occupation for the operator at Lake Crystal, but he had had old experience as operator for another company. At about 3.05 am, he heard his reference and `` 31 E '' on the starter 's wire. He replied `` SD E '' after runing the train order signal lever. He so received and repeated order No. 14, addressed to No. 210 at Lake Crystal, and to No. 17 at Mankato, reading: `` No 210 meet No 17 at Cray No 210 return turnout. '' No. 17 had 90 autos and galley, so it would non suit on the Cray turnout. At 3.19 am, No. 17 left Mankato in ownership of the order. At 3.24, No. 210 arrived at Lake Crystal. The operator went out to assist with managing mail, and at 3.27 No. 210 began to travel. He thought that the train was merely drawing up until the individual manager was face-to-face the station for the convenience of the music director. Alternatively, the train gathered velocity as he inefficaciously waved stop signals at it with a torch.

Sulphur Springs

The Louisiana and Arkansas line between Greenville, TX and Shreveport, LA was individual path, operated by clip tabular array and train order. Sulphur Springs is near the western ( timetable way: Northern ) terminal of the line, with the turnouts of Brashear and Como on either side of it. Hughes Springs was the first unfastened office E ( south ) of Sulphur Springs. On the 11th of October, at 10.25 autopsy, northbound freight No. 54 standard orders at that place, among which were order No. 96: `` No fifty-four Eng 73 meet Extra 76 South at Como '' and order No. 97: `` No fifty-four Eng 73 meet Extra 76 South at Brashear alternatively of Como. '' At 10.51, order No. 106 was sent at the same time to Hughes Springs and to Hunt, the initial station on the subdivision at Greenville. Order No. 106 said: `` Order No. 95 is annulled. '' Order No. 95 dealt with motions impacting Extra 76 and a work supernumerary, and had nil to make with No. 54.


The Stationss are shown in the study on the right. Excess 2310 received order No. 291 at Phillipsburg: `` Eng 2310 tally excess Phillipsburg to Goodland meet First 96 Eng 5061 at Almena. '' First 96 was a second-class train, a troop train running as a subdivision of a cargo train, with 11 autos including troop slumberers. At Selden, the music director reported to the starter that a diary was running hot, and would necessitate attending at Norton. The expected hold made the starter privation to assist Extra 2310, but he did non desire to detain First 96 farther waiting for orders, so he allow it travel on to Norton while he issued order No. 295: `` First 96 Eng 5061 meet Excess 2310 West at Norton East Siding alternatively of Almena Order to First 96 at Norton. ''

Order No 295 was delivered to Extra 2310 at Prairie View, the last unfastened station before Norton, after the starter impressed on the operator at Norton of the importance of keeping No. 96, which would surely halt at that place. Excess 2310 left Prairie View at 6.10 autopsy. On this line, manual block protected following motions, and the train order signal was besides the block signal. The operator at Norton had displayed Stop for First 96, and the signal besides protected a rider train that had merely gone east. When this train cleared the block at Prairie View, the operator cleared the train order signal as he normally would make, burying the order for First 96. First 96 so came through, the hot bearing non holding given any more problem, and right by the signal, to the horror of the operator, who must hold realized what had happened in an blink of an eye.

Port Henry

An automatic block system is supposed to catch oversights in clip tabular array and train order operation and prevent accidents that would otherwise occur. An illustration of how this works is furnished by the accident near Port Henry, New York on 24 October 1954. This station was on the Delaware and Hudson line between Rouses Point and Whitehall, beside Lake Champlain. It was operated by clip tabular array and train order, with ABS. The velocity bounds for rider trains was 65 miles per hour, freight 45 miles per hour. On this forenoon, rider trains No. 18 and No. 34 were traveling southerly, No. 18 with 9 autos predating. The train order office at Westport is 63 stat mis south of Rouses Point and 11 stat mis north of Port Henry. The turnout at Port Henry is called Sherman, and its north switch is 2968 ' South of Port Henry.

At 10.58 am, the starter transmitted order No. 9 at the same time to No. 18 and No. 34 at Westport, and to Extra 4123 North at Whitehall, which read: `` No 18 take siding meet Extra 4123 North at Gunnisons No 34 meet Extra 4123 North at Sherman. '' Excess 4123 had 113 autos and caboose. No. 18 received this order, and eventually left Westport at 11.20. At 11.35, Extra 4123 left Whithall. Somehow the operator forgot that the order was addressed to No. 34 at all, and its skip on the clearance card was overlooked by both the starter and the operator. The starter had non told the operator how many transcripts to do, which may hold contributed to the confusion. So, No. 34 left Westport without the order and proceeded on its agenda. There was now a lap of authorization South of the south switch of Sherman.


Inexperience is frequently the ground for wrong actions, but it is frequently assisted and abetted by more experient higher-ups. The operator at Goreville, IL on the dark fast one on New Year 's Day, 1944 was a immature adult male who had been examined on the regulations 11 months before, at age 16, and found non sufficiently adept to manage train orders. In malice of this, wartime deficits of experient operators led to his assignment at Goreville on 26 December. Telegraph was used for despatching on this division, and the new operator was skilled plenty to manage this, although the sense of a message frequently was non apparent until after he had read the message he had copied once more. This immature adult male needed aid on this dark, and he did non acquire it.

Engines 2001 and 941 were ready to go Thebes for Salem Yard with 61 autos and galley. They received order No. 222: `` Engine 2001 run excess Thebes to Salem Yard meet Extra 1917 South at Omar, '' and left. At Cypress, 16 stat mis south of Goreville, order No. 106 was received: `` Excess 2001 North meet No 185 at Omar and run into Excess 1917 South at Goreville alternatively of Omar Extra 2001 return turnout at Goreville Extra 1917 South gets this at Goreville. '' The starter wanted to assist Extra 2001 every bit much as possible, so it was necessary to curtail Excess 1917 at Goreville, since it had already passed the last unfastened office North of Goreville, West Frankfort, 24 stat mis north, where it had received order No. 222 on Form 31. The northbound train was ordered to take turnout, go forthing the chief line for the southbound train, who would get at Goreville non cognizing better. All of this is rather right, and decently protected.

Except, of class, for the green operator at Goreville. Two southbound trains were to have order No. 106 at that place, and both were restricted. As order No. 106 was transmitted, No. 185 was waiting impatiently at Goreville at the train order signal at Stop, its normal place on the C & EI. ; There was force per unit area, and the operator did non comprehend that he was to do 5 transcripts, non the usual 3. He copied and repeated the order, and handed it up with a clearance card to No 185, which departed. The 3rd transcript went on the hook under the desk. A piece subsequently, he was copying another order for a northbound train when Extra 1917 approached. Sing no orders to be delivered, he cleared the train order signal, seemingly non interrupting the starter and inquiring him if it was wholly right to unclutter Excess 1917.

Excess 2001 and Extra 1917 met 2.7 stat mis south of Goreville, and 2.0 stat mis north of Omar, at 2.30 am. A deadheading music director and the fireman on engine 941 were killed. The failure to present order No. 106 had resulted in a lap of authorization between those points. Although Excess 1917 was restricted at the point at which it would have the order, the starter did non teach the operator on what to make in this instance -- to be on the platform with stop signals, and to inform the engineman instantly that his train was to be restricted at that place. This would hold detected the deficiency of transcripts for Excess 1917. Besides, the operator should cognize to confer with the starter before uncluttering Excess 1917. So small noise was made that it was forgotten than an order was held for it. The starter should hold enquired about this order when he got the OS for No. 185, and reminded the operator of it. The force per unit area of the minute besides contributed, but all the incrimination should non fall on the inexperient operator.

When a train order says a train is to be restricted at the point that it receives the order, the operator should take particular action, which includes seting a ruddy lamp on the platform, and puting gunmans 700 foot or so in rear of the train order signal, which should be observed at Stop and lighted. He should run into the train as it stops and state the engineman about the limitation. Compare this prescription with the actions of the operator at Custer City, OK, for illustration. Where the train order signal merely displays Stop and Clear, the operator on the platform with the signal at Stop normally means that Form 19 orders are to be handed up, so Josserand recommends that the operator non travel onto the platform if the train is to be restricted at that point. Several of the accidents discussed here demo this is non safe. At Goreville, the train order signal was three-aspect, so this stenosis does non use.


On 14 September 1944, southbound First No. 95 ignored a meet with northward No. 90 at Atherton, IN, and collided with it at Dewey, IN, 6.3 stat mis south of Atherton and 3.7 stat mis north of Terre Haute, IN on the Evansville Subdivision of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois. There were automatic block signals, but they failed to forestall the hit as the engineman of First 95 neglected to detect them as he had neglected the meet at Atherton. First 95 was a 14-car limited overnight between Chicago and Nashville, while No. 90 was a solid mail and express train of 15 autos. The C & EI ; had an first-class safety record, and this was one of the really few accidents to its rider trains, but 26 riders and 3 employees lost their lives.

The C & EI ; was a heavy rider haulier on its Chicago-Evansville chief line, which connected with Louisville and Nashville lines to all points south, transporting six or seven trains a twenty-four hours in each way. It brought coal up from southern Illinois every bit good, on a line originally intended to be the Chicago chief of the Frisco, traversing the Mississippi at Thebes, but this dream was defeated by the confederation of concern enemies and the authorities around the bend of the century. The chief line was dual or ternary path from Chicago to Clinton, IN, individual path beyond to Evansville. Miller system automatic train halt, installed by the C & EI ; in 1911 at its ain case, non that of the ICC, extended from Dolton Junction near Chicago to Clinton. This system used lineside inclines and a shoe on a stamp truck. The rider velocity bound on the chief line was 80 miles per hour. In 1944, CTC was merely a few old ages in the hereafter for the Evansville Subdivision, and trains were operated by clip tabular array and train order.

The dark of 13-14 September was foggy along the Wabash, which was crossed on a rickety truss span at Clinton ( 10 miles per hour velocity limitation ) . No. 90 received the undermentioned three orders at Terre Haute merely after midnight: Order No. 3, Form 31: `` First and Second 95 engs 1019 and 1012 have right over No 90 eng 1011 Clinton to Terre Haute. '' Order No. 11, Form 19: `` First 95 eng 1019 meet No 90 eng 1011 at Dewey First 95 return siding Second 95 eng 1012 gets this order and delay at Clinton until 2 40 am. '' Order No. 13, Form 19: `` First 95 eng 1019 return turnout and run into No 90 eng 1011 at Atherton alternatively of Dewey. '' These orders are clear and easy to understand, except that the ground for change by reversaling the right and holding First 95 return turnout is ill-defined, since order No. 3 seemed to hold the intent of necessitating No. 90, a less-important train, to take siding although it was superior by way. Order No. 11 established a meet with First 95, and helped No. 90 to the terminal of two chief paths, as if it were more of import. Order No. 13 moved the meet further north to Atherton. No. 90 passed Haley, 2.7 stat mis south of Dewey, at 2.14 am, 1 hr 1 minute tardily. Approaching Dewey, Stop signals were encountered and the train stopped, so proceeded at restricted velocity in the murky fog.

First 95 had received order No. 3 at Cory, merely South of Danville. At Clinton, order No. 13 was received, but in the modified diction: `` First 95 eng 1019 return turnout and run into No 90 eng 1011 at Atherton. '' The starter simplified things for First 95 by non publishing order No. 11 and so instantly supplanting it, teaching the operator at Clinton to drop the `` alternatively of '' portion. This got the occupation done, and was non unsafe in this instance, but it was a blazing misdemeanor of the Standard Code to publish orders in different words to those who were to put to death them. The ICC research worker did non object. First 95 passed Otter Creek Junction at 2.18 am, 37 proceedingss tardily. The Pennsylvania line from Crawfordsville came in here, 1.9 stat mis from Dewey. First 95 passed several signals at Proceed or Approach until the Stop signal caught the engineman 's or fireman 's oculus and brakes were applied in exigency, cut downing velocity to about 35 miles per hour at the blink of an eye of hit, so it was a really difficult impact.

The orders were handed up at Clinton to the engine, and to the forepart brakeman, siting in the 6th auto. The brakeman read and understood the order, but did non give the order to the music director and flagman. Alternatively, he made his manner frontward so he could drop off and open the north switch at Atherton, which was merely a twosome of stat mis off by that clip. He took no action as the train went on and passed Otter Creek Junction, and was still inert when the brakes went into exigency. We can non cognize what went on in the engine cab, but the events are consistent with the engineman and fireman falling asleep or into deep revery merely after Clinton, though with a meet at the following station, merely 4 stat mis off, this is difficult to believe. The deficiency of a meeting-point whistling seems to state that the meet was ignored. The music director, of class, knew nil of any meet, and can non be blamed for non detecting Rule S-90, merely for non happening out at one time what was in the orders received at Clinton. The brakeman should hold known, but he seems to hold been nitwitted.

The ICC research worker makes a great disturbance over the block signals and regulation 509 pertaining to stop-and-proceed actions. The state of affairs at Dewey as First 95 approached the standing No. 90 is shown in the diagram. Signal 172-7 would hold been at halt, and Signal 171-9 at Approach every bit shortly as No. 90 entered the overlap South of Signal 173-8, and No. 90 was so traveling at restricted velocity. First 95 would hold encountered Signal 171-9 at Approach, and so had 9587 ' to halt, rather ample for the maximal velocity. Even if No. 90 had moved further, the fillet distance would non be less than about 4000 ' . It seems to me that there was nil whatever at mistake with the automatic block signals, except that it ever reduces protection against opposing trains to stop-and-proceed, and there is no manner to rectify this with overlap signals. See Quincy, MS for a similar illustration. If First 95 had observed the signals decently, there would hold been no accident. Apparently, no action was taken at the Approach signal, so it is no admiration that an exigency application when the Stop came into position through the fog would non do. The ICC study erroneously assumes that signal 171-9 would non expose Approach until No. 90 had passed Signal 173-8, which is untrue. No remark is made about the change of order No. 13, and the deficiency of a whistle signal ( though the pertinent regulations are quoted ) . However, the causes of the accident are right stated.

Tipton Ford

Motor auto 103 made up Missouri and North Arkansas train No. 209, running from Joplin, MO to Harrison, AR. Between Joplin and Neosho, the M & NA ; used KCS paths. In the 20 stat mis, there were two turnouts, Saginaw near Joplin, and Tipton Ford a little more than halfway between Joplin and Neosho. Tipton Ford no longer appears on route maps, though Saginaw does. The M & NA ; was a direct, branchless line from Joplin to Helena, AR, 368 stat mis long, through beautiful but hard up Ozark state, paralled as a through path by a Missouri Pacific line non far to the North of it, and by the Frisco 's Springfield-Memphis line. When it was mostly abandoned except for a few short sections after World War II, the 65 stat mis between Seligman and Harrison survived for a piece as the Arkansas and Ozarks Railway.

No. 209 left Joplin at 5.30 autopsy, 1 hr and 15 proceedingss late ( likely after waiting for a connexion ) . First 56 left Neosho at 5.40 autopsy, 3 hours and 15 proceedingss tardily, superior to No. 209 by way. It was necessary to assist No. 209 from Joplin against the delayed train, so dispatcher Sebring at Pittsburg, KS composed order No. 84: `` First No 56 meet No 209 at Tipton Ford and delay at Tipton Ford until 5 50 autopsy Saginaw 6 autopsy for Extra 563 South. '' Engine Numberss are non given in the ICC study, so possibly they were non used on the KCS at the clip. Besides, the clip 6 autopsy, an even hr, was subsequently non permitted ; it would be 6 01 autopsy alternatively.

Excess 563 had arrived in Joplin at 4.10 autopsy, and was to follow No. 209 out. Both Extra 563 and No. 209 were given transcripts of order No. 84 on Form 31. Conductor Gibson of Extra 563 signed for it, and the order was made complete for him, and so Conductor Nicholas of No. 209 signed for it, and received complete at 5.08 autopsy. A C transcript of the order was produced in grounds, with the signature that was non proved non to be Nicholas ' . Operator Hadley was regarded as an excellent operator, but it still had to be established that he did non forge the signature himself after neglecting to present the order. Hadley had been fired from the AT & SF ; old ages before after he failed to present an order at Holly, CO, but his calling at Joplin had been faultless.

The individual irregular event was that Conductor Nicholas had non registered out, the first clip he had been observed non to make so. This may hold been grounds of some mental abnormality, but he was non noticed to move in an unusual mode. The engineman would hold required a clearance card, on which Order No. 84 would hold appeared, and he would hold read it. Something was required on No. 56 to hold left Joplin at any rate. The ground for the coincident oversights by music director and engineman is wholly unknown, but it is consistent with other similar accidents that if the engineman entirely forgot the meet, the music director would non hold taken the needed action. All the work forces involved were experienced and dependable.


The individual path of the Nickel Plate parallelled the multiple-track chief line of the New York Central System along Lake Erie in this country, which was the Buffalo Division, Buffalo to Conneaut, 116.8 stat mis. In 1928, it did non hold automatic block signals, but a manual block was used for rider trains merely. The Form 31 train order was non used, merely Form 19 and Form 17 ( the latter peculiar ) . With both signifiers, complete was given upon repeat. A Form 19 had to be used to curtail a train. With this signifier, the operator was required to read the order to the music director and engineman after presenting it personally to them, and so to take their signatures. This was non required for a Form 17, but this signifier could be used for assisting orders merely.

The Stationss in the country of involvement are, from the West, Thornton Junction, so 5.9 stat mis to Fairview Pit siding, with Fairview station merely east, 3.6 stat mis to Swanville, and 8.5 stat mis more to Erie. Thornton Junction, Fairview and Erie were train-order offices. Second 58, engine 611 and 94 autos and galley, received order 48, Form 19, at Thornton Jct. : `` 2nd No 58 eng 611 will wait at Fairview Pit until four 40 440 autopsy for No 51 eng 640 No 13 and 2nd No 58 will run into at Swanville No 13 will take turnout. '' This order was received at 4.12 autopsy, and Second 58 was 5 hours and 17 proceedingss late departure. This order shows the old `` will wait '' and `` will run into '' give voicing instead than the ulterior `` delay '' and `` meet. '' It is a comparatively complex order, but easy comprehendible.

What happened was that the engineman formed the feeling that he had until 4.40 autopsies to make Summerville, where No. 13 and No. 51 would take turnout, blotting Fairview Pit from his memory. So, he approached Fairview Pit at 4.29 autopsy and kept traveling. No. 51, with engine 640, 89 autos and galley, and running 1 hr 36 proceedingss late, received order No. 48, Form 17, at Erie at 4.11 autopsy, doing good clip at 30 to 40 miles per hour. No. 51 did non make Fairview Pit, which it could hold made by 4.40 autopsy, but collided with Second 58 a short distance west of Swanville at 4.32 autopsy. Although each train was running at 15-25 miles per hour at the blink of an eye of hit, there were fortuitously no human deaths, and tonss of people to give grounds subsequently.

It did non lend to the accident, but the method of bringing by operator Ryan at Thornton Junction to Second 58 is funny. He said that engineman Hites jumped off the engine, without halting the train, so the order could be read to him and his signature could be obtained, so clambered back aboard somehow ( a likely narrative! ) . When the galley came by, he handed up the order with a hoop to the flagman, who was on the rear platform. We suspect that both Form 19 and Form 17 were normally handed up without halting the trains, the reading being omitted and the signatures forged. An impractical regulation will normally name Forth such inventiveness. The order did, anyhow, acquire to everyone concerned, and was read and understood by all but the engineman, who formed a aberrant reading.

Conductor Friend had legion grounds why he did non draw the air as his train passed Fairview Pit before 4.40 autopsy without seeing a train at that place. First, he said the engineman may hold received orders at Fairview that he did non cognize of ( but Fairview was beyond Fairview Pit! ) . Second, he was worried about a possible dynamitist in the train -- a auto brake that would travel into exigency on any brake application -- and this would interrupt his train in two. Third, when he saw No. 51 coming, he was afraid the two engines would run into on the span if he did so. This creativeness demonstrates that he knew his responsibility, but merely did non make it. Flagman Stearns besides said he thought about it, but by the clip he got to the valve, the brakes were already in exigency. The narrative is dismally familiar.

Small Rock

The starter responsible for this subdivision had 11 subdivisions under his supervising, largely subdivisions, but which amounted to 465 stat mis, and there were 29 active motions at the clip of the accident. At 1.07 autopsy he completed order No. 29 to C & E ; engine 1903 at Olympia: `` Eng 1903 tally excess Olympia to Blakeslee Jct. '' Excess 1903 departed with 60 autos and caboose at 2.00 autopsy. At 1.51 autopsy he completed order No. 32 to C & E ; engine 1802 at Gate: `` Eng 1802 tally excess Gate to Saint Clair. '' Excess 1802 so started out instantly at 1.55 autopsy. Nothing could now be done. The fireman and front brakeman of Excess 1903 were killed.


Jesup was an of import junction on the Atlantic Coast Line, between Waycross and Savannah in eastern Georgia. On 24 March 1949, a hit of a rider train and a light engine occurred merely South of the south switch of the turnout at Jesup, on the Folkston-Jesup via Waycross line, 73.3 stat mis, which was operated by train orders and had no automatic block signals. The traffic on this line amounted to 12.4 trains per twenty-four hours, which was easy handled by train orders. The north switch of the 1.28 stat mi siding at Jesup was 792 ' South of the station. The turnout was within yard bounds. The following turnout South of Jesup was at Slover, 4.9 stat mis south, and the following unfastened train order office was at Offerman, 19.2 stat mis south.

The engine crew wrongly interpreted the order to mention to No. 58, which they had non yet met, and which was much on their heads. Not cognizing that No. 58 was running in subdivisions, they assumed the starter had helped them against the agenda. No. 58 was due at Slover at 7.02 am, Jesup 7.18 am, which meant they would hold to be in the clear by 6.57 am at Slover and 7.13 am at Jesup. Without the order, they would hold to stay at Jesup for No. 58. However, they now believed they had until 7.40 am to do Slover, which they could easy make in the half-hour interval. The flag was whistled in at 6.56 am, and readyings made for going.

There were holds in go forthing, and clip grew short. By 20 past seven, it was clear that there was non sufficient clip to do Slover, so it was decided to flag No. 58. At 7.23 am, the engine was detached from the train and run south within yard bounds about a stat mi from the south switch to set a flagman at that place. Just as the flagman was acquiring down, the headlamp of First 58 was seen through the fog and the engine quickly reversed. The flagging was excessively late, and the engine reached about 15 miles per hour in contrary before it was struck at 7.27 am by First 58, running at 59 miles per hour. The hit killed the engineman and fireman of First 58. First 58, with engine 1509 and 6 autos, had left Offerman at 7.06 am, 27 proceedingss late, and had made up about 15 proceedingss over the 19 stat mis.

The claim was made that person 's pollex covered the of import word `` Second, '' as in the accidents at Mango, besides on the Coast Line, and David on the Western Pacific, in all of which an order was taken as mentioning to the agenda, when it merely referred to a individual subdivision. This was likely a metaphorical pollex, stand foring an effort at a logical account for a mental procedure that really did non register the qualifier. As has been often pointed out in these surveies, one time a perceptual experience has been formed, it is held in malice of grounds to the contrary. The head truly does non see the `` Second '' or similar word, though it is physically at that place.


On the clear eventide of 10 October 1925, southbound No. 89 with engine 473 and 7 autos departed Lakeland at 9 autopsy, 3 hours and 10 proceedingss tardily. At Plant City, it received the undermentioned orders: No. 137 ( Form 19 ) , `` 1st No 82 meet No 89 on dual path at Uceta, '' and No. 139 ( Form 31 ) , `` No 89 pull by dorsum in siding meet 1st No 82 at Seffner alternatively of on dual path Uceta. '' The first order truly intend that First 82 was to wait at the terminal of dual path for No. 89, while the 2nd superseded this, seting the meet at the blind turnout at Seffner. It would be interesting to cognize whether the 2nd order would be interpreted as allowing No. 89 to travel South of the turnout switch at Seffner without flag protection ( see the KO & G ; accident at Kenefick for a similar instance ) . Harmonizing to the Standard Code, it would non. No. 89 left Plant City at 9.33 autopsies, now 3 hours 23 proceedingss tardily.

Second 82, engine 457 and 3 autos, departed Tampa Union Station at 9.40 autopsy, 10 proceedingss late, and received order No. 139 at Uceta, allowing it to continue, which it did at 10.03 autopsy. Note that Second 82 was closely following First 82. No. 89 met First 82 at Seffner on order No. 139. The green signals were whistled and acknowledged. Although it had nil whatsoever against Second 82, No. 89 proceeded due south. The fatal pollex had covered the `` First '' in order No. 137, so it was supposed that all subdivisions but the first would be at the terminal of dual path at Uceta. The music director and engineman both agreed to this, and did non demo the orders to any other members of the crew. The guiltless engineman of Second 82 was killed.

We note that trains were directed to run into `` on dual path '' at Uceta. Under the Standard Code, a meet is ever a meet, and if the trains are directed to run into at Uceta, so the train traveling on dual path must wait there for the train coming off. In this instance, the nonstandard phrase `` on dual path '' certainly meant that the train would continue at one time, efficaciously doing the dual path a long turnout. In fact, these short subdivisions of dual path, as is remarked elsewhere, are merely that, and trains run intoing must place one another to avoid holding to look into a registry at the terminal of dual path ( which is non provided ) . The intent of these subdivisions was to cut down congestion, and they could non make that unless operated in this mode, which was comparatively safe, in malice of the catastrophe at Nashville. Josserand ( p. 309 ) says that the train traveling on to dual path can continue at one time if ordered to run into at that place, but such a meet order should non be issued. It is better to give the train right over the other to the terminal of dual path.


Shaw discusses the accident on the Frisco at Marshfield, MO on 17 September 1918 reasonably good, but since this is such an of import illustration of the rare starter 's mistake it is deserving remark here. Shaw does non give a wholly consistent history of the train orders involved, for one thing. The fact is that Second 39, a westbound cargo had no cognition of Passenger Extra 1260 until they collided at Marshfield, while Excess 1260 held an order assisting it against Second 39. This could be either a failure to present the order at Conway, or a failure of the starter to convey the order to Conway compounded by uncluttering the train at that point. The preponderance of grounds indicates that the latter was the instance.

An excess train can either unclutter an opposing regular train 's agenda clip or be `` helped '' against the perchance delayed habitue train by train order. An of import supernumeraries will normally be instructed to run into a less of import regular train by an expressed order, such as: `` Second 39 eng 56 meet Excess 1260 East at Marshfield. '' This order restricts Second 39, non allowing it to go through Marshfield until Extra 1260 arrives at that place. It at the same time helps Excess 1260 East by allowing it to disregard the agenda of Second 39 every bit far as Marshfield, where it must take turnout at the West switch as the inferior train. Meet orders are the safest manner to manage these state of affairss, safer than run-late or delay orders.

The starter must guarantee that the order will be delivered to the superior train ( Second 39 ) before the inferior train ( Excess 1260 ) is allowed to move on it. This is done by holding the operator who will present the order to Second 39 either reiterate the order, or give the `` X '' response. This ensures that the train order signal is against Second 39, and that the operator is cognizant of his duties. It would be best, of class, to really hold the order delivered and the signatures of the music director and applied scientist sent to the starter in reception of it. The `` 31 '' order signifier provides for these signatures, and `` complete '' is given after they are sent. The `` 19 '' order signifier does non necessitate signatures, and complete is given after it is right repeated. A completed order may be acted upon. In pattern, there is no important difference in the grade of safety of the two signifiers, and a train is considered `` held '' every bit shortly as the order is repeated or X 'd.

There is one instance in which an order must non be made complete to the inferior train until a Form 31 order has been made complete, and that is when the order is sent in attention of person other than the operator. Merely the signatures can vouch that bringing has been made. This signifier is ever available in instance of demand ( signatures can be written on the Form 19 order if the Form 31 order is non used ) . In the present instance, under Frisco regulations of that clip, a Form 31 should be sent to No. 39 at some station E of Marshfield, such as Conway, and a Form 19 to Extra 1260 at some station West of Marshfield, such as Springfield. It would hold been even better if a transcript of the order had been transmitted to the operator at Marshfield, who would maintain his train order signal at halt until one or the other of the trains had arrived and it was obvious that they were cognizant of the meet. This is called a `` in-between order, '' and is first-class pattern.

The existent instance in 1918 was a little more complicated. The existent order assisting Excess 1260, order No. 115, was a agenda delay order between Springfield and Newburg giving right over all but first category trains ( and hence over Second 39 ) and ordering a maximal velocity of 30 miles per hour. Therefore, a in-between order would non hold been appropriate, since the meeting point was unknown. Engine 1260 was a 2-8-0, and its train was 6 slumberers, 1 luggage, 6 slumberers and a galley. At Strafford, West of Marshfield, it received order No. 123 to run 15 proceedingss tardily on order No. 115. At Marshfield, it picked up order No. 127 stating: `` No 9 eng 1069 meet rider excess 1260 E at Conway. '' For its portion, Second 39 received order No. 115 at Newburg and order No. 113 at Lebanon, reading: `` Second 39 eng 56 has right over No 32 to Marshfield and keep chief line. '' This order was amiss worded, since it should hold given both bounds of the right -- '' Lebanon to Marshfield, '' every bit good as `` Second 39 clasp chief path at Marshfield. '' All the inside informations of the orders are non given in the ICC study, and we have the digitisation garble to postulate with every bit good. These orders could be much more clearly worded.

The operator at Conway testified that he was out of the office for supper at the clip the order was transmitted, and that the train order signal was fastened at clear, since he held no orders for trains in either way. This is normal pattern when the station is closed. The study does non state if Frisco pattern was to maintain the train order signals at halt, or to fix them at halt merely when an order was to be transmitted. He received no remark when he OS 'd the train to the starter. This history was supported by an insurance agent who had eaten dinner with him, and accompanied him back to the office. No record of the order was found at Conway, but so once more, the grounds could really easy have been destroyed.

What likely happened was that Excess 1260 was ready to travel at Springfield, but could non go forth without something on Second 39, since the agenda was delinquent. The starter tried to raise Conway, but could non because the operator was out of the office. He would no doubt return before Second 39 passed Conway, so the starter completed the assisting order at Springfield at one time so that Excess 1260 could acquire on its manner, meaning to convey the order to Conway every bit shortly as the operator returned. Unfortunately, by that clip he had forgotten all about the affair, and non even the OS of Second 39 at Conway restored his memory. The call from Marshfield did, nevertheless. The order book is supposed to forestall this kind of thing ( and it does ) , but the critical mistake was finishing the assisting order before the superior train was held.

There were automatic block signals on this line that would hold prevented the accident had they been decently observed. A signal displaying Approach was run through without slowing velocity by Extra 1260, and so no halting distance remained at the Stop signal. One possible ground was that the automatic signal was connected to the train order signal, and showed Approach when `` 19 '' orders were to be handed up. The engineman of 1260 took this to be the ground for the Approach, non the Stop facet at the following signal. There was testimony that after the order was received, the accelerator was opened. Neither the ICC study nor Shaw points this out. Second 39 was anticipating to run into eastward No. 32 at Marshfield, and so was non running quickly ( the engine, a 2-10-2, could non run fast, anyhow ) . Three work forces on engine 1260 died in the hit, but non the engineman, and 12 soldiers in a wooden tourer slumberer at the forepart of the train.


The most tragic railway accident in Oklahoma happened on the SL-SF at Kellyville, OK, 8.4 stat mis west of Sapulpa, on 28 September 1917, about an exact twelvemonth before the Marshfield hit. All of the 32 killed, and most of the injured, were going in the Jim Crow manager of westbound Train No. 407. No. 407 was composed of engine 1035, a 4-6-2, a steel luggage auto, mail auto, two managers, a chair auto, three slumberers and an office auto, all wood except for the luggage auto. In the accident, the mail auto was driven up and over the first manager, which it telescoped. If all the autos had been steel, there would likely hold been no human deaths. No. 407 was en path from St. Louis to Lawton, OK ( the location of Fort Sill ) , and left Sapulpa at 2.12 autopsy.

This accident was a authoritative illustration of misidentification. Order No. 56 stated: `` Excess 1322 East has right over No 407 Depew to Kellyville '' while Order No. 61 read: `` No 406 gets this and run into No 407 at Kellyville. '' There was besides an Excess 1343 traveling eastward against No. 407 's clip in the country. Passenger trains No. 406 and No. 407 had stops at Kellyville. Excess 1322 was an empty troop train returning from Fort Sill, with 29 tourer slumberers, 2 loaded box autos and a galley, which left Oklahoma City at 10.30 am, and passed Bristow, 13.4 stat mis west of Kellyville, at 2.12 autopsy. Excess 1322 was, like the Excess 1260 at Marshfield, a troop train pulled by a reasonably new 2-8-0, but empty in this instance. Excess 1343 was a cargo that had some work to make in Kellyville.

At this clip, Frisco cabooses displayed train designation in an lighted box on the galley. At this period, new Frisco engines had a little engine figure on the cab side, with a big FRISCO on the stamp. However, Frisco pattern both before and after was to hold a big engine figure on the stamp. The engine figure was besides painted on the sand dome, shown on a home base on the smokebox door or headlamp bracket, and illuminated at the sides of the headlamp. A few engines had illuminated engine Numberss on the smokebox near the stack, a La Santa Fe. Illuminated Numberss near the headlamp are useless at dark when the headlamp is on bright, but are rather seeable when the headlamp is extinguished. The prominence of the engine figure on most American engines is because of the usage of the engine figure for train designation. Train orders ever province things like: `` No. 407 Eng 1035. '' If you see a train with engine No. 1035, it will be No. 407. Excess trains are, of class, merely identified by the engine figure.

The right order made certain that No. 406 would make Kellyville, or No. 407 would unclutter its clip every bit far as Depew. The meet order made the meet certain, and it was at that place when No. 407 arrived. Since it was superior to No. 407 by way, and besides because it received the meet order at that place, it should hold held the chief line, but the study does non discourse this subject. Excess 1343 was on the turnout, holding decided to clear No. 407 at that place. When No. 407 arrived, it saw a rider train and a cargo train, merely as one would anticipate from the train orders. Unusually, cipher on No. 407 took attention to detect the engine figure on the waiting cargo train, at any one of the five topographic points where it was clearly shown on the engine and galley. No. 407 made its station halt, with its engine near engine 1343, and left at 2.30 autopsy. It encountered Extra 1322 East at 2.42 autopsy, 2.3 stat mis west of Kellyville, with the consequences detailed supra.

The starter acknowledged that there was a opportunity Excess 1343 would be taken for Excess 1322 ( the consist of the trains was non known to the crew of No. 407 ) when two trains were seen at Kellyville. He besides observed that a `` in-between order '' sent to the operator at the unfastened Kellyville office would hold prevented the accident. The operator would non hold allowed No. 407 to go forth before Excess 1322 arrived in this instance. Although the in-between order was recommended in the Standard Code, the Frisco had non adopted it. The ground given was that it would take excessively much clip. The lone extra clip is that required for the operator at the meeting point to reiterate the order. In this instance, the right order alternatively of a meet order was a really hapless pick. Unless some clip order had been given to Extra 1322 ( which is possible ) it should be deprecated.

Again we see the disregard of the music director 's responsibility to be jointly responsible with the engineman for the operation of the train. He, every bit good as the engineman, is responsible for placing that the proper train has been met at a meeting point. In this accident, the engineman was careless, and committed an mistake. The music director, on the other manus, neglected his responsibility and should hold been held chiefly responsible for the accident. The ICC study discusses the background of these two work forces in some item. The music director had been suspended, barred from rider service, dismissed and subsequently reinstated in rider service due to a deficit of music directors. The engineman had been promoted to engineman, demoted to fireman, and subsequently reinstated. It was going really hard to happen satisfactory work forces, particularly in wartime.

White Oak

No. 112, dwelling of engine 1049 and 8 autos, including 4 dormant autos, was on clip and due at White Oak at 12.12 am. At Claremore, order No. 86, Form 19, was received, saying: `` No 112 engine 1049 delay at White Oak until 12.17 am for No 403 engine 1330. '' At Chelsea, 12.4 stat mis west of White Oak, order No. 88, Form 19, was received, which said: `` Orders No 84 and No 88 are annulled. No 403 delay at White Oak until 12.38 am Witt 12.44 am Catale 12.50 am Chelsea 1.00 am Bushyhead 1.10 am Foyil 1.14 am Sequoyah 1.20 am Degroat 1.25 am. '' No 403, which was running tardily, had become even later, and a new agenda was given in this order for the benefit of opposing inferior trains. No. 112 was chiefly interested in the annullment, which meant that it could continue from White Oak on clip, alternatively of waiting 5 proceedingss for No. 403. No. 112 was superior to No. 403 by way, but it still had to near all turnouts prepared to halt when No. 403 was delinquent until the the train was met, so the agenda besides helped.

No. 403 had engine 1330, a 2-8-0, and 7 autos, including one slumberer. The Frisco seems to hold used these new 2-8-0 's, with 63 '' drive wheels, as dual-service engines. We noted them managing troop trains at Marshfield and Kellyville. No. 403 's agenda, if it resembled the agenda of No. 3 of a few old ages subsequently, allowed 14 hours and 45 proceedingss for the 424.6 stat mis from St. Louis to Oklahoma City, an norm of 29 miles per hour. However, there were 81 intermediate Michigans including three meal Michigans of 20 or 25 proceedingss, so leting 4 proceedingss per halt, a net running clip of 8.47 hours consequences, for an norm of 50 miles per hour, which is no average accomplishment. It was no admiration that 1330 was a twosome of hours tardily as it approached Vinita.

Order No. 86 was received at Afton by No. 403, giving it an excess 5 proceedingss to do White Oak. The order board was out at Vinita when No. 403 arrived, a small before midnight. The music director of No. 403 went to the office and received order No. 88 at that place, with a clearance card, from the operator. Engine crews were changed at Vinita on No. 403, and the engineman being relieved handed the clearance card and orders he had received at Afton to the alleviating engineman. The crew went over to the eating house for refreshments, where the music director joined them subsequently. It seems that he had decided to go forth Vinita at 12.05 in order to do White Oak by 12.17, 12 proceedingss for 7 stat mis. This was really short clip, even though he merely had to unclutter the going clip, since No. 112 was of the same category. This showed that, for some ground, the import of order No. 88 had non made an feeling.


Northbound freight No. 238 left Thomas Yard, Birmingham, with engine 4208, a heavy coal-burning, stoker-fed Mikado built by Baldwin in 1930 with 64 '' drive wheels, 48 autos and caboose in the eventide of 15 February 1939. After midnight, at Winfield, it was acquiring on the clip of No. 107, the Sunnyland, so the starter gave some aid in order No. 9: `` No 107 eng 1520 delay at Sulligent until 405 am for No 238 eng 4208. '' There was besides a wire for No. 238: `` No 107 35 mins delinquent Amory and non demoing Call operator Sulligent every bit shortly as you get at that place. '' While this was taking topographic point, Conductor Connell walked up to the engine, inspecting his train, and when he got to the office, collected the order and wire and climbed into the cab, expecting a conference with the operator at Sulligent.

No. 238 received order No. 16 at Sulligent, giving more aid: `` No 107 eng 1520 delay at Quincy until 435 am for No 238 eng 4208. '' No. 238 bygone Sulligent at 3.55 am, 14.3 stat mis south of Quincy. There would be clip to do Quincy, and be in the clear by 4.40 am, since the second-class cargo had to unclutter the excellent No. 107 by five proceedingss. The engineman claimed after the accident that he had read `` Amory '' for `` Quincy '' although the words are rather different, and the order was neatly written. The engine crew claimed that the order was read several times subsequently, with the same mistake. Now Amory was 9.4 stat mis further north, doing 23.4 stat mis to travel in 45 proceedingss. This would be smart running, since it would take 40 proceedingss running steadily at the velocity bound to make it. Quincy, an unfastened office, was reached at 4.18 am, an norm of 37 miles per hour, so it appears that 4208 could merely hold pulled it off, flexing the velocity limit a spot. Without limitations, 4208 could turn over at 60 or 65 miles per hour with easiness.

The ABS used double signals at the terminals of turnouts, with intermediate signals between turnouts. There were long convergences to guarantee that opposing trains would have restrictive facets before they came together. The layout of the signals at Quincy was as shown at the right. Not all the convergences are shown, merely the 1s given in the ICC study. The signals are shown with their facets when the trains have their several places. In this instance, No. 238 and No. 107 would each hold accepted Clear facets at signals 6228 and 6177 when they were approximately 4 stat mis apart. The following signal for No. 107 at signal 6203 would be Stop, and for No. 238 Approach at signal 6212. If No. 238 had been a small farther along, as was possible, so signal 6177 would besides hold shown Approach, more than two stat mis from the north switch, and signal 6212 Clear. Apparently, neither train responded to any signals at Approach. No. 107 arrived at excessively high a velocity ( particularly in position of the expected delay ) . No. 238 responded merely to the Stop at signal 6204, and overran it by 2158 ' , a considerable sum, because of the 1.23 % falling class. There was no clip to flag, and the hit occurred at 4.20 am in clear conditions. The engineman and train porter of No. 107 were killed, along with a hobo on No. 238. There was a 3° curve at this point, but visibleness was good.

It is a job supplying good protection for opposing trains with an convergence system. At the lower limit, opposing trains will have Stop facets at the terminals of a block, and at least one train will hold received an Approach facet. This appears to hold been the instance here, which was a terrible trial. Note that the convergence was extended to the E more than two stat mis. The study does non give equal information about the convergence to the E, but it is rather possible that both trains were given Approach facets. A better solution is the usage of Absolute-Permissive Block ( APB ; see the Attean, ME incident on the CP for an illustration ) , which efficaciously extends the convergence to the following turnout. In this instance, both headblock signals are at Stop, and preceded by Approach, so that opposing trains are stopped a block apart.

The ICC was perturbed that the ABS had non prevented the hit, but signals can non make so if they are non observed. It was non mentioned that a in-between order would hold helped to decelerate down No. 238, and likely prevented the accident. Quincy was an unfastened office, so this was a possibility. The other thing was the affair of the S-90 whistle signal 14 ( N ) . Since the engineman did non mean to run into or wait for anything at Quincy, it was non given. It would besides non hold been heard in the galley, harmonizing to the testimony. The 4200 's, like many Frisco engines, had a deep steamboat whistling that was beautiful to hear, but non much of an attention-getter, and could non be heard at the rear terminals of trains. This was by and large true for 100-car trains, so the whistle signals of regulation S-90 were moot, and mostly ignored. The state of affairs was about as bad in air-conditioned trains, with certain Windowss. To hear whistle signals, a sailor had to travel to a anteroom and open the Dutch door. Of class, this should be done, and was ever possible on rider trains, if non on cargos. Radio, of class, would hold been an first-class reply to this.

Conductor Connell really seems to hold reached for the music director 's valve, or at least he said he did, but a spot slowly. When he opened it, he merely got a short blow, to his surprise. The brakes had already been applied in exigency, and had acted on all autos back to the 6th in forepart of the galley. A turned angle prick was discovered at that place. Apparently there had been other instances of turned angle pricks in Thomas Yard, and were likely hooliganism. One would hold expected that the brake line gage on the galley would hold showed a low force per unit area. If you are sailing along at 60 miles per hour and you notice that there is merely 10 pounds per square inchs in the train line, it causes an uncomfortable feeling. The brakes on the last seven autos had likely leaked off easy during the trip, but it is fantastic that this was non noticed for over a 100 stat mis, and during the earlier train review at Winfield.


Passenger Extra 1054 South was running on a agenda order, order No. 54, which stated: `` Eng 1054 tally passgr excess go forthing Amory on Wednesday Aug 9 as follows with right over all trains Lv Amory 1030 autopsy Aberdeen 1050 pm Hamilton 1101 autopsy. Pickensville 1204 am. Ar Magnolia 230 am. '' The format of the order is non easy to reproduce here ; the Stationss and times were on separate lines beneath the first portion of the order, from Lv Amory to Ar Magnolia. This is a standard manner to run a scheduled supernumerary. The Frisco even had a particular train order signifier for it, so the lines would be neatly written and times related to their proper Stationss. The `` right over '' portion is indispensable ; a scheduled supernumerary without rights over anything would be useless. All trains on the route had to really keep this order before it was made complete for Excess 1054, so as non to be caught between Stationss without it. Excess 1054 had nine autos.

Regular train No. 208 was running north from Magnolia the dark of 9-10 August 1939, and its opposite number train No. 207 was following Excess 1054 due south. These were the day-to-day Amory-Pensacola overnight trains with connexions to Memphis. Pickensville was the agenda meeting point of No. 207 and No. 208, at which No. 208 would usually keep the chief path, since it was superior by way. At Magnolia, it received order No. 77: `` Passgr Exa 1054 South meet No 208 eng 1014 at Pickensville No 207 eng 1012 has right over No 208 eng 1014 Amory to Pickensville. '' This order seems all right, but it contains a concealed defect that invites confusion. This defect was non recognized in the ICC probe, although it might hold had a bearing on the accident. 1012 and 1014 were Baldwin-built light Pacifics of 1904 with 69 '' drive wheels, while 1054 was a 1912 Schenectady merchandise.

Let 's seek to retrace what would go on. Excess 1054, with right over all trains, would keep the chief path at the meeting point with No. 208. No. 208 could non go through Pickensville, since No. 207 had right over it beyond Pickensville, and No. 207 would be due when No. 208 arrived at that place. No. 207 's high quality merely extended to the north switch at Pickensville, and beyond there No. 208 was superior to it as usual. Therefore, No. 207 would hold to take turnout at the north switch. What you would hold, so, is Excess 1054 on the chief path, and No. 207 and No. 208 tete-a-tete on the turnout, which was likely non what the starter had in head. What he about surely wanted was for No. 208 to take turnout, while Excess 1054 and No. 207 passed on the chief at a short interval. The phrase `` No 207 eng 1012 clasp chief path at Pickensville '' would hold to be added to order No. 77 to do the motion clear.

Far better than order No. 77 would hold been: `` Excess 1054 and No 207 eng 1012 clasp chief path and run into No 208 at Pickensville. '' A definite meet is ever safer than a delay, and it is besides safer to stipulate explicitly which trains are to take turnout or keep the chief path when there could be any confusion. In this instance there was confusion. The engineman of No. 208 worked out that he should keep the chief against No. 207 ( right ) and forgot that Extra 1054 was superior. Conductor Shaw even sent the train porter up to the engine to remind the engineman to take turnout at Pickensville, but the advice was seemingly rejected.

The Frisco non merely prescribed that whistle signal 14 ( N ) be sounded at the station board when nearing a meet or delay, but that it be repeated if the train was to take turnout. It was sounded one time, as required, since the meet was by no agency overlooked. It was a hot eventide, and Conductor Shaw found comfort in the air-conditioned coach-sleeper combination as Pickensville was neared, where the tight enclosure and the whistling of the cool air obscured the engine whistling. The brakes were applied in exigency every bit shortly as Excess 1054 was seen on the chief, headlight bright. There was still a knock, but fortuitously cipher was killed. Brakeman Dearinger said he remembered about the repeat of 14 ( N ) , did non hear it, and pulled the air -- when the brakes were already applied in exigency, which was several proceedingss excessively tardily. At least he knew the regulation, if he did non really detect it.


The Wheeling and Lake Erie ran diagonally across Ohio from Wheeling to Toledo. Pittsburgh and West Virginia trains joined the line at Pittsburgh Junction, approximately 3 stat mis east of Jewett. This was on the Second District of the Toledo Division, widening from Pittsburgh Jct. to Brewster, OH, 47.6 stat mis. Jewett had an of import pace, and the rider station was located between the westbound turnout, to the West, and the eastbound turnout, to the E. The west switch of the eastbound turnout was 4900 ' E of the station. Just West of the pace bound mark, 1300 ' E of the east switch, was a distant switch signal. From this point to the station, around a 3° curve to the left and under a span that restricted vision, trains were required to continue at restricted velocity. There were no automatic block signals, and the traffic was heavy, approximately 25 trains per twenty-four hours.

On 16 July 1937, Second 92, a second-class cargo train with engine W & LE ; 6016, 24 autos and galley, left Brewster eastbound. At Harmon, 2 stat mis east of Brewster, order No. 43, Form 19, was received: `` No 90 four 94 and 2nd 2nd 90 two 92 will run into first 1st 90 five 95 at Dewey have right over 2nd 2nd 90 five 95 Lonas to Sherrodsville and over 3rd 3rd 90 five 95 to Pgh Jct 1st 95 return turnout at Dewey 2nd 95 return turnout at Sherrodsville Second 2nd 90 two 92 will go through No 90 four 94 at Bolivar No 94 return turnout at crossing over Bolivar. '' Note the spelling of train Numberss ( besides required on the Southern and some other companies ) when first mentioned, and besides the antediluvian `` will '' phrasing. However, the order is clear and expressed, and carefully specifies who is to take turnout.

Second 92 arrived at Jewett at 7.49 am, where it received order No. 53: `` Third 3rd 90 five 95 will run into 2nd 2nd 90 two 92 at Jewett 3rd 95 return turnout on eastbound turnout. '' One might quibble that the words `` 2nd 92 gets this at Jewett '' should be added, but the east switch of the eastbound turnout was two stat mis beyond the train order office, supplying plentifulness of clearance and non curtailing the train at the train order signal. The train pulled frontward at 7.54 am and stopped clear of the east switch of the eastbound turnout. The headlamp was left on, but the switch was non lined for the turnout, as is the usual usage.

Third 95 was a P & WV ; train, engine P & WV ; 1000, 45 autos and galley, going Rook, PA at 5 am, where it performed a running brake trial. It pulled through Pittsburgh Jct. at 4-5 miles per hour without fillet, where a clearance card, six Form 19 orders, and a message were handed up at each terminal of the train. The engineman read order No. 53, and remarked, `` We meet 2nd 92 at eastbound siding at Jewett, he takes the hole. '' He handed the orders to the fireman, who handed them to the brakeman to read, since he was busy with the fire. They were still reading the orders when Second 92 's headlamp was seen in front as they came out from under the overbridge on the curve, and the brakes were applied in exigency. Fortunately, cipher was killed, although Third 95 was traveling at 15 to 30 miles per hour at the point of hit.


This accident occurred on 1st December 1946, at Angora, Minnesota on the Duluth Winnipeg and Pacific. The ICC claims it was on the Duluth Missabe and Iron Range, but they err. This is the line that runs northwards to Fort Frances, Man. from Duluth. Third 418 received order No. 5 at Orr, reading: `` Third 418 Eng 2459 meet Excess 2480 West at Angora. '' At Gheen, it received order No. 6, reading: `` Order No. 5 is annulled. Third 418 Eng 2459 meet Excess 2480 West at Foreman. '' Excess 2480 West, unluckily, merely received order No. 5 at West Virginia. There was no account of how the clearance at West Virginia happened to exclude order No. 6 when it was All right 'd by the starter.


The Canadian Pacific has a direct line from Montral to New Brunswick that passes through Maine merely north of the settled countries, from Megantic, Que. to Adams Junction, N.B. , which was portion of the Atlantic Division. The Moosehead Subdivision extended from Megantic to Brownville Junction, 117 stat mis, organizing the western half of this line. In 1919, this line was operated by clip tabular array and train orders, with dispatching by telephone, except for electric train staff blocks near the end point: Megantic to Boundary, 15.2 stat mis, and Barnard to Brownville Junction, 8.5 stat mis. Traffic was rather heavy, approximately 41 trains per twenty-four hours.

Onawa had been the location of an earlier accident, on 21 January 1913, when 3rd category cargo train No. 72 collided with the rear of 3rd category cargo train 74 1.5 stat mis west of Onawa, at 3.15 autopsy. The ICC study is extraordinary in that flagging, the deficiency of which caused the accident, is ne'er mentioned! No. 72 had antecedently let No. 74 base on balls at Elliott, 7.5 stat mis west of the point of hit, and now No. 74 was seemingly lingering waiting for clip when it was run into. No. 72 had waited the prescribed 10 proceedingss at Elliott before following No. 74. The Atlantic Division had had some jobs with rear hits in the old ages past, and a bulletin of 28 December 1911 had extended the 5 minute spacing to 10 minute spacing. The ICC dumbly comments on the deficiency of unfastened offices to implement spacing, although mere train spacing at Stationss can ne'er replace for proper flagging.

Stations on the Moosehead Subdivision are shown at the right. X marks the location of the hit. Moosehead and Bodfish are non unfastened offices, but the others are. Eastbound is down. On the forenoon of 20 December 1919, first category rider train No. 39 was traveling west in four subdivisions. Third 39 carried steerage riders from the line drive Empress of France that had been landed at St. John, and were bound for Montreal. Engine 783 had 11 autos: a wooden boxcar luggage, a manager, two settler autos, two tourer slumberers, one settler auto, one coffeehouse auto, one tourer slumberer and two galleies. At Brownville Junction it received three Form 31 orders, Numberss 20, 28 and 38. Order No. 20 stated: `` First No 39 eng 818 late Second No 39 eng 852 on block Third No 39 eng unknown run four 4 hours and twenty 20 proceedingss tardily Barnard to Boundary. '' Order No. 28 was: `` Order No 20 is annulled. First No 39 eng 818 late Second No 39 eng 852 on block Third No 39 eng unknown run five 5 hours tardily Barnard to Boundary. '' Finally, order No. 38 said: `` Engine 783 show signals and run as Third No 39 Brownville to Megantic. ''

In these orders, each subdivision was mentioned, with the remarks `` late '' or `` on block, '' which was non common pattern, but seemingly was required by the despatching manual of the Atlantic Division. Adding this information was non portion of the Standard Code. Third No. 39 departed Brownville Junction at 6.25 am, 5 hours and 5 proceedingss tardily, passed Barnard at 6.51 am, and the unfastened office at Onawa at 7.09 am, 5 hours and 10 proceedingss tardily. At 7.14 am, 2.3 stat mis west of Onawa, it collided head-on with eastbound cargo First No. 78. The wooden box luggage auto absorbed a good trade of the daze, but 19 riders were killed in the manager and first settler auto, every bit good as the engine crews of both trains.

First 78 was made up of engine 2516, 30 tonss and 2 empties, and a galley. It left Megantic at 6 autopsy the eventide before, 30 proceedingss tardily. Six autos were set out at Holeb. At the non-telegraph station of Moosehead, it met First and Second 39, every bit good as Excess 3470 West, which delivered order No. 28, Form 19 to it. Helping orders can be forwarded to non-telegraph Stationss rather safely this manner, on Form 19, since non-delivery would at most consequence in hold. This order gave First 78 five hours on Third 39, so they had ample clip to do Morkill for it. First 78 arrived Greenville at 6.30 am, where fresh transcripts of orders No. 20 and No. 28 were received. They left Greenville at 6.40 am, and arrived Morkill at 6.57 am, where they took siding.

Dispatcher Shaw noted the advancement that First 78 was doing. He was interested in acquiring them to Brownville Junction before they had 16 hours of responsibility, so quickly gave them clip against Fourth 39, in order No. 47: `` Third No 39 eng 783 late Fourth No 39 eng unknown tally 8 hours tardily Barnard to Megantic. '' This order was transmitted to operator Kingdon at Morkill, who repeated it and received complete. When First 78 pulled in, he had it ready and ran out to manus it up to the cab and the galley. At the galley, he handed it to engineman Chase, who was deadheading, who in bend gave it to conductor Manuel. Flagman Gardiner read it when it was laid on the galley tabular array.

Brakeman Austin heard engineman Bagley say to the fireman: `` We have eight hours on Third 39. '' Conductor Manuel and flagman Gardiner had the same sentiment, `` Eight hours '' was heard to be exchanged. Small thought was traveling on here. They had merely received five hours on Third 39 merely half and hr earlier at Greenville, but did non inquire how it could hold lost so much clip so rapidly. In their avidity to make Brownville Junction, First 78 left Morkill, and operator Kingdon OS'ed to Dispatcher Shaw. Both of these work forces thought that the train might be traveling to Bodfish for Third 39, but a consideration of the clip would hold shown the futility of go forthing Morkill at 6.57 and holding to be clear at Bodfish at 7 am, with the needed 5 proceedingss clearance. Operator Valley, who handled the 8 am - 4 autopsy fast one at Morkill, had arrived on First 78 and thought something was amusing, but could non do Kingdon appreciate the state of affairs.


The scene of this accident is the wild state West of Moosehead Lake, on the Moosehead subdivision of the Atlantic Division. There were unfastened offices at Megantic, Holeb, Jackman and Greenville in the section of involvement. The clip was the forenoon of the 8th of August, 1957, which was a all right, clear morning.Eastbound train No. 908, a second-class cargo train with two units, 27 autos and galley, departed Megantic at 9.25 am. Westbound train No. 951, a second-class cargo train with two units, 50 autos and galley, departed Greenville, 82.6 stat mis east of Megantic, at 9.45 am. By timetable, these two trains would run into at the distant turnout of Elmer. No. 908 was superior by way.

If No. 951 could non make Elmer and unclutter the chief path by 11.02, it would hold to take turnout someplace east of Elmer for No. 908. No. 908, since it was of the same category, would hold to near all turnouts prepared to halt unless No. 951 was in the clear. The starter, likely from wont, fixed the meet of the two trains at Elmer by train order, to forestall any hold to the two trains by transporting out this clip table process. The meet order was to be given to No. 908 at Holeb, and to No. 951 at Greenville. The starter could non raise Holeb on the telephone after a twosome of attempts, and No. 951 was eager to go forth Greenville. So he transmitted the order to Greenville, it was repeated, and made complete at 9.29 am. Order No. 225 read: `` No 908 Eng 4016 meet No 951 Eng 8460 at Elmer. ''

There was, nevertheless, a backup on this line that should hold prevented the accident, automatic signals arranged for absolute-permissive block ( APB ) . The arrangment of the signals is shown in the figure. The Ten marks the location of the accident, at 11.05 am. The signals were 3-aspect searchlight signals. The halting distance from 45 miles per hour, the approximative velocity of the trains, is about 1700 foot. The two `` headblock '' signals for this block, signals 816 and 791, each govern every bit far as the other. When a train passes either one, they both assume a Stop facet. The intermediate signal in the way of the train, say signal 808, remains at Proceed if the path in front is clear, and the signal for go forthing the block does non expose Stop. The intermediate signal in the opposite way, signal 797, goes to Stop at the same clip as signal 791. This block is so short, 13,430 ft. , that there is merely one brace of intermediate signals. These signals are spaced so that trains out of the blue meeting them at halt will be able to halt short of one another. For trains traveling at 45 miles per hour, the distance between them when they stop will be about a half-mile. In most instances, APB blocks are long plenty to incorporate two or more braces of intermediate signals, which can be staggered by a shorter distance.

If trains approach the headblock signals from opposite waies at near to the same clip, they both will have Proceed facets on come ining the block. The intermediate signals will so be at Stop for both, surely a surprise, but if the proper action is taken, the trains will halt safely. Except for this luckless instance, one train will ever happen a Stop facet at the entryway to the block. In this instance, if signal 791 shows Stop, signal 785 will demo Approach. A train may go through signal 785 at Clear, and find signal 791 at Stop, if a train passes the headblock at the other terminal of the block while the first train is traveling between these two signals.

A better manner to set up APB with short blocks is to include the subdivisions in rear of the headblock signals in the control scope of the headblock signals, so that two trains nearing at the same time will have Approach facets that change to Stop every bit shortly as the opposing train enters the block. This should vouch that the trains will be traveling at medium velocity when they encounter the Stop facets at the intermediate signals. When trains approach a meeting point under normal conditions, the headblock signal will demo Approach if the train to be met has arrived at the turnout in progress, and is keeping the chief line or the turnout is unfastened.

South Park Junction

South Park Junction was within the metropolis bounds of Denver, and within yard bounds on the Colorado and Southern every bit good. At this point, the narrow-gauge diverged ( on dual-gauge path ) for South Park and Leadville. Eastbound No. 73, with engine 70 and 4 autos, had left Grant at 5.15 am, on clip, and had lost about 15 proceedingss as it approached Denver. Opposing trains No. 70 and No. 60 were superior by way, and had to be met before No. 73 arrived in Denver. At Sheridan Junction, 7.6 stat mis west of Denver, No. 73 received order No. 1: `` No 70 engine 9 delay at South Park Jct until 829 am Valverde until 833 am Denver Mills until 836 am for No. 73 engine 70. '' No. 73 was able to do Valverde on this order, where it pulled into the turnout, connected merely on the west terminal, and met No. 70 at approximately 8.30 am. It backed out, and proceeded against No. 60 's agenda, which put it at South Park Junction at 8.34 am. The hope of doing South Park Junction, 1.4 stat mis off, in two or three proceedingss was a really sanguine one.


A pure clip table failure occurred merely South of the station at Broomfield, Co on 22 September 1958, on the Colorado and Southern. No. 30, a southward first-class rider train with engine 9936B and 7 autos, collided with Extra 700D North, with 51 autos and manner auto. No. 30 was on clip, holding passed Cheyenne at 4.04 am, Louisville, the last unfastened office, at 6.39 am, and Broomfield at 6.47 am. There was a 20 miles per hour velocity limitation at a route traversing near the Broomfield station, and No. 30 was speed uping from this, but had non increased its velocity greatly at the minute of hit. The hit occurred on a 2° curve, with vision obscured by edifices.

Both enginemen, and the fireman of No. 30, were killed. Testimony by the lasting crew members of Extra 700D claims that the engineman was warned several times that he was on the clip of No. 30 by the fireman, which was supported by the inexperient caput brakeman, and the music director said he had been concerned. However, the lone rational and proper action by the music director would hold been to draw the air when the south switch at Semper was passed. That he did non put to death his responsibility was likely due to the fact that everyone was asleep on Extra 700D before it reached Semper. No reference was made in the ICC study of the failure to detect Rule S-90 nearing Semper, which applies to schedule run intoing points every bit good as to develop order meeting points. The music director must take immediate action under the regulations if the engineman fails to sound whistle signal 14 ( N ) , -- O. There was no difference between what did go on and what would hold happened if all were asleep.

There is no inquiry of the running orders being misunderstood -- the registry cheque was for the old dark 's No. 29, and 4.20 am, though it is unusual that the cheque was non for Prospect at the clip Extra 700D called for orders at that place. There was a train registry at Prospect, and Extra 700D would hold left a registry ticket, but would non hold had to look into the registry at that place, since No. 29 was the lone superior train non 12 hours tardily on its agenda. The statement that No. 30 had no signals was true, but irrelevant, as No. 30 was non yet due at Prospect. It might hold been better to state: `` Eng 700D tally excess Prospect to Cheyenne No 29 of 21 September has arrived and left Prospect. '' Nos. 29 and 30 were the lone regular trains on the subdivision, so it would look clearer to mention to them by name, and non run the hazard of misinterpretation.


The operator at Chugwater kept the train order signal at halt, and when Extra 828 was in sight, went on to the platform with stop signals. This is rather right in response to the statement that Extra 828 was to have an order curtailing it at that place. This order was received and understood by the music director and engineman of Extra 828. A really of import point is at issue here, the actions of the train given right at the concluding point mentioned in the right order. It is by and large agreed that this train must take turnout at that place, or that its high quality under the order ceases at the switch where it would come in the turnout, the premise being that it does non hold high quality beyond that point. The farther reading depends on company pattern. On some roads, and we will presume on the Burlington as good ( though this is non mentioned in the ICC study ) , the trains mentioned will run into at this point, if they have non already met under the clip portion of the order. Other roads would necessitate that farther proviso would hold to be made in instance Extra 828 did non make Chugwater foremost.

Therefore, if the order mentioned were sufficient, the starter intended that Extra 828 South and Extra 750A North would run into at Chugwater if non before so. Since the turnout at Chugwater had a capacity of 91 autos, and Extra 750A had 104 autos, it is hard to believe that the starter meant for Extra 750A to draw through the turnout while Extra 828 remained on the chief path, though under the reading we have assumed that would be the instance, and Extra 828 was right in staying on the chief path. To hold 750A hold the chief path, the right order would hold to hold been worded `` Excess 750A North has right over Extra 828 South Cheyenne to Chugwater keep chief path at Chugwater and delay at Altus until 710 autopsies, etc. '' But so there would hold been trouble with `` Excess 828 gets this order at Chugwater. ''

Excess trains have no high quality by way ; excess trains in the way specified by the clip tabular array as superior for trains of the same category merely keep the chief path at meets betweeen excess trains. If Excess 750A and Extra 828 were directed to run into at Chugwater, so Extra 828 would take turnout by this regulation. Whether there was confusion or non over this proviso, Extra 750A had small right to near Chugwater at full velocity, 45 miles per hour. It was as if they assumed precedency over Extra 828, which would hold to hold been conferred by some other order, and expected them to be in the clear at any point they could make, including Chugwater. Under the reading of the right order that we have assumed to use on Burlington, there would be a meet at Chugwater, and Extra 750A would hold to halt if Excess 828 were non found at that place. A farther ground for nearing Chugwater with cautiousness was that Extra 828 was to have the order at that place.

The position nearing Chugwater was obstructed by the main road span and other objects ( it is even more obstructed today ) , so they likely did non see Extra 828 's headlamp until the last minute. I hope that Extra 828 was protected to the North as it should hold been, standing on the chief path, and the flagman was non in the coffeehouse with everybody else. Excess 750A was a much more of import train than the local Extra 828, but the fact that Extra 828 received the order at Chugwater likely spoiled the starter 's purpose to set it on the turnout at that place for Extra 750A. Apparently, Extra 750A merely did n't believe things through decently, or forgot the order. Possibly if we knew all the orders held by the two trains, some other decision could be drawn.


Excess 902 South had 25 autos and waycar. It left Trinidad at 7.25 autopsy with a Permissive Card Form C, a Clearance Form A, and order No. 45, Form 19. We are non told what the permissive card was for, but it is used to warn a train to continue at restricted velocity looking out for a train in front, and likely referred in this instance to something in the vicinity of Trinidad. Extra 902 reached Penrith at 10.45. Since they had to clear No. 2 by five proceedingss, they would hold to be clear at that place by 10.57, 12 proceedingss subsequently. Penrith was 4.1 stat mis north of Royce, and they would hold to be clear at Royce by 10.50. It would look that they could non do Royce in the clip available. However, the engineman decided to continue on short clip, since he would be at the north switch merely earlier 10.55, and his headlamp would maintain No. 2 at that place while he cleared.

Now let 's return to No. 2. It would hold taken approximately 12 proceedingss to acquire to Royce from Clayton, so they would be nearing the south switch at Royce around 10.50. At a stat mi from at that place, the engineman of No. 2 would hold sounded the station whistling, Rule 14 ( m ) , and so the meeting-point whistling, Rule 14 ( N ) . Burlington Lines regulations did non necessitate the music director give a individual sound on the pass oning signal on rider trains nearing meeting or waiting points, but if Rule 14 ( N ) were non sounded at the proper topographic point, the music director had to halt the train instantly, utilizing the music director 's valve. Tonight, this was non done, and No. 2 sailed by the north switch at Royce at approximately 10.01, four proceedingss before the delay expired. As the train passed the north switch, the headlamp of Extra 902 could be seen. The hit occurred 2297 ' North of the north switch at Royce, killing the engineman of No. 2. 16 riders were among the 22 injured.

The music director of No. 2 knew the regulations, because he tried to claim that he was transporting them out by opening the music director 's valve when Extra 902 's headlamp was seen in front. He should hold done this about a stat mi and a half earlier, when the engineman did non whistle or slow velocity nearing Royce. The duty was his, and he was every bit guilty as the engineman for the result. The guilt of Extra 902 was much less, since they merely shaved the clearance clip, and were struck before the waiting clip was up. This is a instead above-average ICC study, whose decisions are proper, every bit good as the recommendation that the C & S ; pull up its socks.

However, it would non be a typical ICC study if it did non incorporate something irrelevant. In this instance, it was the demand that a 31 order be read to the operator before it was signed, and that the engineman read the order to the music director when it is delivered to him ( Rule 210 ) . This was likely adduced to show that the regulations were non being followed decently, as the music director of No. 2 said he ne'er did it. However, there were no jobs with the orders at all in this accident. They were right delivered and understood, merely non obeyed. The action of reading an order to the individual presenting it is merely marginally utile, and has likely ne'er prevented a individual accident. It might originally hold caught the nonreader, which was no job in these yearss ( though it might be now! ) . 19 orders are non read to the operator, evidently, and this is non questioned. Reading of the order to the individual to whom it is delivered, which has been required at times, is exhaustively baneful and may good hold caused accidents.


Folsom, New Mexico is located on the Colorado and Southern where it crosses the volcanic tableland dividing New Mexico and Colorado. It is a picturesque small town from which the Folsom points, rock tools of prehistoric huntsmans, were named. The scenery is out of the blue dramatic, and the railway line has crisp curves and heavy classs as it winds around the bluffs. In 1938 this was a individual path line with no automatic block signals, transporting two rider trains and two cargo trains in each way daily, with sometimes extra cargos. On 16 February, at 11.42 autopsy, northbound rider No. 2, engine C & S ; 354 and 5 autos, collided with Extra 5206 South in the fog near Folsom, killing both enginemen, the fireman of No. 2 and the caput brakeman of Excess 5206. Eleven riders were and eight employees were injured. The accident happened on a 6° curve, on a cut between two fills.

This disagreement arose because the order was foremost transmitted to Texline by telephone and repeated, the starter underscoring each word and figure in his order book. The signatures were transmitted, and complete was so given in the usual manner. This was wholly proper. At Trinidad, the starter himself copied the order on a Form 19 tablet, doing three transcripts, two for Excess 5206 and one for his file. Apparently he had been believing about hold to No. 2 at Clayton, and that the meet should be moved. The order was likely written from memory, and non compared with the words in the order book. This was an inadvertence that anyone could do, since we normally see what we expect to see.

The lone manner to get the better of this would be to hold person read the order back to the starter, who would underscore the words and figures once more, as if the order were being repeated at some distant point. There is some hesitating about this in the ICC study, but this solution is non suggested. Such mistakes are so rare that excess stairss whenever a starter delivers an order are non justified, it would look. It would hold been a comfort to the starter in this instance, who admitted that he was non overworked or confused, to recognize that his oversight was a human one, non the consequence of sloppiness or maliciousness. If he had checked the order over and over, there would be no different consequence. Simple `` dual checking '' normally does no good whatsoever ; at that place has to be a definite fluctuation.


No. 83 had engine 5126, 14 autos and galley. At Laclede, 7.3 stat mis east of Meadville, two orders were received. No. 78, Form 19, said: `` Second 72 delay at Wheeling until 540 autopsies Meadville until 547 autopsies Laclede until 602 pm No 83 will utilize south path Brookfield to Needles, '' and No. 80, Form 19, read: `` Fourth 72 meet No 109 and No 83 at Mooresville. '' On the clearance card it said under block information: `` Block clear on arr Second and Third 72 at Laclede. '' No. 83 so went to the west terminal of the pace to work. A spot ulterior Second 72 arrived, and the crews of the two trains shouted their designation at each other and acknowledged by lantern signals as the trains passed. For some ground, the crew of No. 83 took Second for Third 72, and departed West on the chief line at 6.04 autopsy.


Belmont, Nebraska is on a wooded ridge where the Chicago Burlington & Quincy `` High Line '' between Alliance and Billings pierces the scenic Pine Ridge bluff. At the clip of this accident, 25 July 1942, Nebraska 's lone railway tunnel was merely north ( west by clip tabular array ) of Belmont. This tunnel has now been opened out into a big cut, and the path layout changed. Belmont is 12.8 stat mis east of Crawford, and 25.75 stat mis west of Hemingford. From Crawford to Rutland, 6.07 stat mis west of Belmont, the Eastward Advance Track extended, doing efficaciously a dual path or a long turnout. There was no train order signal at Crawford, and all trains had to have clearance Form A at that place.

Excess 6155 East left Edgemont at 10.50 autopsy. Its running order, No. 627, read: `` Eng 6155 tally excess Edgemont to Alliance Extra 6155 East usage due east progress path Crawford to Rutland. '' At Crawford it received orders No. 503: `` Eng 5277 tally excess Alliance to Edgemont meet Extra 6155 East at Nonpareil, '' and No. 504: `` Excess 6155 East meet Extra 5277 West at Belmont alternatively of Nonpareil. '' A assistant engine, 5290, was added in forepart of the waycar, and Extra 6155 started up the long hill at 2.55 am on the due east progress path with 59 autos, anticipating to run into Excess 5277 on the 4036 ' siding at Belmont. Excess 6155 re-entered the chief path at Rutland, likely through a spring switch.

Excess 5277 departed Alliance with order No. 503 at 1.10 am. At Hemingford, Extra 5277 received order No. 504, every bit good as order No. 507: `` Order No 504 is annulled Excess 6155 East meet Extra 5227 West on eastbound progress path. '' Excess 5277 departed Hemingford at 2.20 am. This order was copied at Crawford at 2.11 am, and set on the hook. At 2.45 the clearance Form A issued to Extra 6155 did non include order No. 507. There is no account in the ICC study as to the starter 's OK. This affair of doing certain all orders are delivered is the primary ground for the Form A. If it is non All right 'd by the starter ( which is the usual process ) , at least the order Numberss should be added to the clearance card as they are received, non when the train is ready to travel.


The accident at Granite, CO on 20 August 1925 on the Denver and Rio Grande Western was a head-end hit of two heavy rider trains, No. 7 and No. 8, because No. 8 did non have a transcript of an order altering the meeting point from Pine Creek to Granite when it left Tennessee Pass. It is an interesting survey of how train orders are mishandled, incorporating several good lessons. Subdivision 3 of the Salida Division extended from Salida to Minturn, 87 stat mis, beside the Arkansas River on a changeless ascent to Tennessee Pass, with a maximal class of 1.7 % . It was a individual path, dispatched from Salida by train orders, with no block signals. Eastward trains were superior to westward trains of the same category.

No. 7, with 13 autos, doubleheaded by engines 759 and 787, left Salida, 42 stat mis west of Granite, at 1.19 autopsy, 44 proceedingss tardily, where it had received order No. 65: `` No 7 engs 787 759 delay at Brown Canon until one 30 five 135 autopsy Arena one 40 five 145 autopsy for Excess 1186 clasp chief path meet No 8 eng 778 at Pine Creek. '' Pine Creek was 5.6 stat mis east of Granite. At Buena Vista, 17 stat mis from Granite, orders 67, 71 and 72 were received. Order 67 read: `` No 7 engs 787 759 tally twenty five 25 mins late Americas to Waco 20 20 mins late Waco to Malta 15 15 mins late Malta to Tenn Pass. '' Order 71 said: `` No 8 eng 778 return siding meet No 7 engs 759 787 at Granite alternatively of Pine Creek. '' Order No. 72 was: `` No 7 engs 759 787 delay at Pine Creek until two 30s six 236 autopsy. '' No. 7 departed Buena Vista at 2.14 autopsy, 34 proceedingss tardily, passed Pine Creek, and approached Granite, where it encountered No. 8, 1.5 stat mis east of the station. Two employees were killed, firemen on the two engines.

No. 8 had 14 autos and engine 778. At Tennessee Pass, 24 stat mis west of Granite, it received a clearance card and four orders, Numberss 56, 65, 69 and 72. Since No. 8 was really tardily, order No. 56 gave clip for westbound inferior trains to utilize over the subdivision: `` No 8 eng 778 delay at Tenn Pass until one 40 140 autopsy Keddar one 40 seven 147 autopsy Malta one 50 six 156 autopsies Snowden two naught two 202 autopsies Kobe two naught seven 207 pm Granite two 15 215 pm Riverside two 20 eight 228 autopsy Buena Vista two 30 nine 239 pm Nathrop two 40 nine 249 autopsies Arena two 50 nine 259 autopsies Brown Canon three naught eight 308 autopsy Belleview three 13 313 autopsy. '' Order No. 69 was: `` No 8 engs 778 run twenty mins tardily on order No 56 Tenn Pass to Salida, '' and order 72 specified: `` No 8 eng 778 tally thirty five 35 mins late on order No 56 Tenn Pass to Salida. ''

Note that order No. 71, which superseded portion of order No. 65, was losing. This was the cause of the accident, since a lap of authorization was created between Pine Creek and Granite. The clearance card that was delivered to No. 8 mentioned merely the four orders it received, although it had been OK 'd by Dispatcher Smith. The order book showed that what Smith had OK 'd was 72, 71, 69, 65 and 56, and this record appeared to be echt. Note that the orders are listed from higher to lower Numberss, the usual pattern. No. 8 left Tennessee Pass at 2.19 autopsy, 3 hours 29 proceedingss tardily on its agenda, and 35 proceedingss tardily on order No. 56, as proper. No. 8 passed Granite at 2.55 autopsy, 40 proceedingss tardily on order No. 56, to the full within its rights, meaning to run into No. 7 at Pine Creek, but really run intoing it slightly sooner.

The ground for the oversight by Operator Rehklan at Tennessee Pass was connected with the fact that order No. 72 made order No. 69 moot. It did non supplant order No. 69, so that order was still alive, though without consequence. Operator Rehklan saw no ground for presenting it to No. 8, and seemingly filed it on his ain enterprise, drawing it out of the stack of orders for No. 8. What he pulled out was non order No. 69, but order No. 71. One supposes that he made out the clearance card subsequently on the footing of the Numberss of the orders in the stack, non on what he had sent to the starter. Orders should be added to the clearance card as they are received, which seemingly was non done on the Rio Grande. It is non much of a cheque if the list of orders is made out from the stack on manus, and does non catch mistakes like the present one.

If order No. 72 had superseded order No. 69, so the operator could hold filed order No. 69, since it was now dead, and removed it from the clearance card. In this instance, the starter should hold addressed an order to the starter stating: `` Order No 69 is annulled. '' The operator claimed his actions were normal pattern, but the starter did non believe so. If you check the orders numbered 72 delivered to the two trains, you will happen that they are non the same. In the order book, train order No. 72 had both paragraphs. The starter sent each paragraph to the train concerned, perchance merely to salvage clip in conveying and reiterating. This is a cardinal misdemeanor of the Standard Code rule that orders are sent in the same words to those who are to put to death them, and a unsafe pattern that has resulted in accident.

The hours of opening at the Granite office had merely been changed. The starter had thought the office to be closed, but found out it was unfastened non long before the meet was scheduled. He addressed an order for No. 7 at that place, but told the operator non to set out the xanthous flag demoing that a 19 order was to be handed up on the fly, lest No. 8 think the order was for it, altering the meet, and arrive on the chief path. The operator was speaking to the starter on the telephone when a train approached, that he thought was No. 7, but the starter said No. 7 could n't perchance be at that place yet. He looked out, and found it was No. 8, for whom he had no orders, so he cleared the train order signal when No. 8 was rather close. No. 8 opened the accelerator when the signal was cleared, merely as the starter informed the operator that No. 8 should hold been on the turnout to run into No. 7. The operator put the train order signal to halt, and ran out on the platform, beckoning smartly, but was unable to halt No. 8. The flagman noted the train order signal fly to Stop, and the operator hotfooting out, but it did non do a sufficient feeling on him.

The ICC research workers pointed out that there was chance to hold restricted No. 8 with a Form 31 order at Tennessee Pass, where trains had to halt to register anyhow. If order No. 71 had been a Form 31 alternatively of Form 19, so it had a better opportunity of bringing. The lone manner it could assist in this instance was by being of a different colour than the filed order No. 69. A 31 order can be filed merely every bit easy as a 19 order, or forgotten. In fact, on 1 March of this twelvemonth, the D & RGW ; had merely promulgated the policy of utilizing Form 19 to curtail trains except in 8 particular instances: reception for a new clip tabular array, bringing at a unsighted turnout or closed office, bringing at the point of limitation, after a train had been cleared, cut downing clip on clip orders, defects of path and Bridgess, traveling against current of traffic, and utilizing a subdivision of dual path as individual. The ICC justly deprecated the public presentation of functionaries, who should hold better enforced the regulations and monitored public presentation. They found mistakes in the order books, such as two orders under the same figure, and 19 orders used to curtail trains at the point of limitation.

Custer City

In 1950, motor trains No. 609 westbound and No. 604 eastbound operated between Tulsa, Oklahoma and Vernon, Texas via Enid, go forthing their terminuss in the forenoon and arriving in the eventide. Thingss were likely much the same on 3 July 1945, when motor auto 2123 and trailer arrived at Custer City in the hot midafternoon of a cheery twenty-four hours, on clip. Custer City was in the center of the Enid-Hobart subdivision of the Western Division of the Frisco. The Santa Fe 's day-to-day rider trains No. 45 and No. 46 on the Orient line ran over the Frisco between Foley, merely North of Custer City, and Ewing, merely North of Clinton.

The order was transmitted at the same time to Clinton and Custer City, and the operator at Custer City repeated the order before it was made complete at Clinton. This made it a keeping order for No. 509, until signatures were obtained and the order was made complete. The operator took no particular steps, such as having No. 509 with stop signals, as he should hold done, and managing the order at one time. Alternatively, he busied himself with mail, express and luggage, burying the order on his desk. Train order signals on the Frisco were usually at halt, cleared merely when there were no train orders for bringing. When No. 509 was ready to travel, he cleared the train order signal by wont, and the motor auto muttered away at 2.51 autopsy. When he OS 'd No. 509 to the starter, he likely was told what he had done. There is no reference in the ICC study about what was done with regard to a clearance, but it was likely filled out and OK 'd when he repeated the order.

Lake George

The Ann Arbor at this clip used Form 19 orders merely, did non necessitate in-between orders ( which would non hold helped in this instance ) , and did non necessitate the starter to OK clearance cards. The job of operators ' burying orders had been attacked in a handbill of 26 May 1924, in which operators were directed to get down make fulling out a clearance for a train when the first order for it was received, adding ulterior orders as they were received. This surely reduces the opportunity of burying an order greatly, but it is likely non rather every bit good as look intoing the orders to be delivered with the starter and holding him OK the clearance. Some such system is decidedly required, since go forthing orders lying about free has been the cause of many accidents.


Dispatcher Curtis, whose circuit of responsibility was from 4 am to 4 autopsy, issued order No. 63 at 2.58 autopsy to the Stationss concerned, which read: '' Extras 763 and 786 North meet Extra 778 South at Bicker No 71 eng 874 at Mullin, Extra 767 South at Goldthwaite and Extras 178 and 182 coupled South at Lomota. '' Seven trains were mentioned in the order, which surely saved paper for the company. No. 71 was a third-class local cargo that had left Temple at 11.40 am, and was to acquire this order at Goldthwaite, 10.3 stat mis north of Mullin. The ICC study says that No. 71 arrived at Goldthwaite at 4.30 autopsy and departed at 4.25 autopsy, which is certainly some sort of clip deflection. Whatever the instance, order No. 63 was non delivered to No. 71, which proceeded on its agenda.

Now, Dispatcher Curtis had been relieved by Dispatcher Dobrowolski at 4 autopsy, and order No. 63 was on the transportation, but there was no notation beside it that signatures had non been received. This had been company pattern for some three old ages, but some thought it was insecure, since the relieving starter would trust on the notations and non look into the order book exhaustively. Operator Polansky at Goldthwaite was on duty day-to-day from 7 am to 10 autopsies, with an hr off for tiffin and an hr off for dinner. He made five transcripts, two for Excess 778 South and No. 71 and one for file. The two transcripts to Extra 778 South were delivered, but the staying 3 were put on a hook under the desk and forgotten. When he checked with starter Dobrowolski about No. 71, `` Anything for 71? '' the starter replied, `` No, allow them travel. '' He cleared the train order signal and No. 71 left.


This accident occurred in northern Tennessee, on the Southern non far north of Knoxville, on a subdivision between La Follette and Vasper, 10.1 stat mis. The day of the month was 4 October 1926. Hicks was 1.7 stat mis from Vasper. That forenoon, freight Extra 281 was to travel from La Follette to Vasper before rider train No. 101 left that point, so the starter transmitted order No. 515 to both points set uping a meet at Vasper. This ICC study does non give the diction of the order, and does non state if it mentioned that No. 101 was to acquire the order at Vasper, the point of limitation. As usual, the order was a Form 31 to the restricted train, No. 101 and Form 19 to the helped train, Extra 281 East. The order was repeated at Vasper, and so made complete at La Follette. The order was delivered to Extra 281, which left La Follette with three autos and caboose at 8.55 am. It stopped to take H2O a stat mi West of Hicks, so proceeded.

The Southern did non necessitate clearance cards to be All right 'd at that clip, but seemingly it was sometimes done. The operator at Vasper said this was non usual when there were no orders to be delivered. It would look that this is a clip when it would be specially necessary, as here. Operators were, nevertheless, supposed to get down a clearance card when an order was received, and this the operator did non make. The perennial order in this instance was lost in a heap of documents on the desk, and forgotten, as the operator testified. After the order was repeated, the operator was busy with the usual mail, express and luggage of three rider trains that arrived before he made out the clearance. It is non hard to see how orders could be forgotten in such a frowsy muss.

The operator 's desk should be kept clear, and used merely for train orders, messages and commercial messages. The clearance should be started when the first order for a train is received, and kept with the orders in a clearly-defined topographic point, so it is obvious at a glimpse if orders are held for a specific way. There should be a device to barricade the train order signal at Stop when an order is received, so that there will be a reminder if there is an purpose to unclutter the signal. When it is clip to unclutter a train, the operator should convey, for illustration: `` Clear No 1 with orders 2-12-13 and 15. '' The starter should look into the order book, and answer `` Clear No 1 with orders 2-12-13 and 15 805 am JLM, '' where the clip and initials of the overseer or starter are added. The ulterior Southern regulation book of 1 August 1956 required precisely this process for the OK'ing of clearance cards in Rule 211 ( B ) . Clearance cards on the Southern were Form 603, but there was no difference from the usual Form A.


This accident illustrates how trains were moved against the current of traffic by train order on multiple paths. The phase was the Erie line between Suffern and Newburgh Junction, NY, on 11 August 1958. Coming from Rutherford, NJ the line is 4-track every bit far as SF tower, and so double path to NJ tower at Newburgh Junction. At that point the chief line returns straight in front, and the Graham ( cargo ) line diverges to the North. Around 6.15 am, a cargo train, Extra 703, arrived at NJ on the Graham line, and proceeded onto the eastbound chief. This train would be busy exchanging in the locality of Hillburn for some clip.

Eastbound rider train No. 50, the first train of the twenty-four hours, left Monroe at 6.25 am ( times in the ICC study are standard times ; I 'll utilize daylight nest eggs times here, as advertised in the clip tabular arraies ) and was due at Sloatsburg at 6.47 am, Hillburn 6.51 am. Since Excess 703 would be working on the eastbound path, the starter decided to run No. 50 around on the westbound path between NJ and the first crossing over West of Hillburn. Therefore, he transmitted order No. 105, Form 31, to SF for all due west trains, and Form 19, to No. 50 at NJ. This order read: `` Train No 50 Eng 859 has right over opposing trains on westbound path Newburgh Jct to first crossover west of Hillburn. '' The operator at SF should hold displayed the train order signal at Stop, so copied and repeated the order. This would keep all westbound trains short of the crossing over that No. 50 would utilize to recover the eastbound path. Then, the order could be repeated by NJ and made complete for bringing to No. 50.

The occurrences on this forenoon are shown in the life at the right. We see Excess 703 arrive, caput onto the due east chief, and halt to work at Hillburn. Now No. 50 arrives at NJ. When its engineman acknowledges the train order signal, a ruddy flag displayed at the tower, the interlacing signal is changed to Restricting, and order No. 105 is delivered. No. 50 is lined for the due west path, and returns eastward on it. The train order signal at SF should protect it until it rejoins the eastbound path at Hillburn. No. 50 would continue to the crossing over, which would be a facing crossing over for it, and halt while the front brakeman lined the crossing over switches, which were manus operated. The flagman, meanwhile, would hold thrown off a lighted fusee when the train slowed, and would hold gone back a ways with drooping equipment. They would hold seen Extra 703 on the eastbound path, and block signals would be protecting the motion, so aggressive flagging would non be necessary. If the conditions was dazed or snowy, gunmans would surely be placed as a safeguard. If there were no block signals, and if this were an arbitrary location, so full protection with a flag would be necessary before the crossing over was line. They would non anticipate a train to be following them on the due west path, since the starter would ne'er make anything so risky. After they were back on the eastbound path, the flagman would likely go forth a lit fusee to protect them as they got under manner.

When No. 50 reached SF and was identified and reported to the starter, he would so invalidate order No. 105, which would allow trains to continue every bit usual on the westbound path. The Form 31 order would non, normally, be completed. However, Train No. 53 left Hoboken at 5 am, and was due at Suffern at 6.40 am, Sloatsburg 6.56 am. This puts it in the locality at precisely the clip that No. 50 was running against the current of traffic. In fact, the two trains, if on clip, would run into about at SF. No. 53 should hold been stopped by the train order signal at SF, and would hold proceeded after order No. 105 was made complete for them, and pulled up to the crossing over at Hillburn to wait for No. 50.

The towerman at SF did non expose the train order signals before he copied the order. He was so distracted by a telephone call, and forgot the order wholly. When No. 53 showed up, he cleared his place signal as usual, and No. 53 went by. Although both towers, both trains, Extra 703 and the starter had radio-telephones, neither No. 50 nor No. 53 could be warned in progress of the hit, which took topographic point at 6.47 am non rather a mile E of Sloatsburg. Two riders and three train-service employees were killed, and 37 people injured. The velocities of the trains were reduced to about 20 miles per hour at the point of hit.

Several failures to detect the regulations contributed to the accident. The process when an order is to be sent is for the starter to turn to a station, so to give 31, West ( for illustration ) . The operator so puts the train order signals at Stop, which here meant barricading the interlacing signal at Stop and seting out a ruddy flag to demo there was a confining order. He transmits `` SD, West '' to demo that this has been done. Now the order is transmitted and repeated. Here on the Erie, the starter would non anticipate the SD answer, and would convey the order without it. In this instance, the skip was fatal.


The coalfields of northern West Virginia were B & O ; district. Lumberport is on what was called the West Virginia Short Line, from Short Line Junction merely north of Clarksburg, to New Martinsville on the Ohio River. At one clip there were two paths from Clarksburg to Pittsburgh, one via Fairmont and Connellsville and the other over the Short Line, each with several rider trains a twenty-four hours. Looking at B & O ; timetables, it seems that the two Stationss of Shinnston and Haywood, which were served by both lines, were in opposite waies on the two lines! This is rather rugged state, but I can barely conceive of what would do this. Apparently the direct line from Fairmont to Short Line Junction was closed to through traffic sometime in the 50 's.

The section we are sing Begins at MD tower in Clarksburg. Operation is by signal indicant over the 0.7 stat mi to Short Line Junction. Then we go up the Short Line to Dawson Mine 4 stat mis off, and eventually to Lumberport, 9.9 stat mis from MD. At 4.24 autopsy on 21 July 1955, order No. 509 was made complete to engine 904 at MD, stating: `` Eng 904 plants excess 430 four 30 autopsy until 610 six 10s pm between Short Line Jct and Lumberport non protecting against excess trains Eng 904 tally excess Dawson Mine to Lumberport. '' Orders in this signifier were the pattern in this country, to allow an engine to exchange mines in an country without flag protection, and so upon termination of the on the job clip to run extra to their terminus. They would hold to get down the tally as an excess from Dawson Mine, non any arbitrary point in working bounds.

Engine 904 carried out its responsibilities, and at the termination of the on the job clip set out from Dawson mine, forcing its 34 autos, with the caboose leading. The starter issued order No. 521 at 6.08 autopsy, which said: `` Eng 4433 tally excess Lumberport to Short Line Junction. '' Engine 4433 was a light assistant returning to Clarksburg. Excess 4433 left Lumberport and collided with Extra 904 a stat mi from Lumberport. The music director of Extra 904, who was in the galley, was killed. The starter said he had overlooked the returning Extra 904. His purpose had been to run Extra 4333 after Extra 904 had arrived in Lumberport.


On the StJ & LC ; the train order signal was usually at clear when the operator held no orders for bringing. When signaled to have orders by, for illustration, `` 19 East '' the train order signal was to be put at halt instantly, before answering `` SD East. '' This meant taking the ring on the cord off the hook at allowing the signal go to Stop for both waies. Any train in the other way would be given a clearance card while the signal was at Stop. In add-on to this, the signal would be placed at Stop when any train left the station, and maintained at Stop for 10 proceedingss, for the intent of spacing trains. This is a slightly less desirable usage of a train-order signal, and contributed to the confusion in this accident.

The StJ & LC ; ran from Swanton, non far from Rouses Point, to St. Johnsbury, near the New Hampshire boundary line, 96.1 stat mis. Greensboro was 28.5 stat mis from St. Johnsbury. West of Greensboro, offices were unfastened at Lamoille, 3.23 stat mis, and Hardwick, 6.93 stat mis. East of Greensboro, the first unfastened office was Danville, 16.32 stat mis. On the afternoon of 5 May 1944, eastbound assorted train No. 74 preceded Extra 38 East, which had 7 autos and galley. Westbound mixed No. 75 left Danville at 3.50 autopsy. and may hold met No. 74 at Walden, 8 stat mis farther west and 8 stat mis from Greensboro, which was non an unfastened office. Extra 38 showed up at Hardwick about this clip, and the starter decided to assist it against No. 75. Order No. 15 was transmitted to Greensboro and Hardwick, reading: `` No 75 Eng 33 meet Extra 38 East at Greensboro This order to No 75 at Greensboro. '' After it was repeated by Greensboro, it was made complete for Excess 38 at Hardwick, and Extra 38 departed at 4 autopsy crisp.


The Tulsa Division ( later it would be called a subdivision ) of the Missouri Kansas & Texas extended from Wybark on the chief line, through Tulsa, to Osage on the Oklahoma City line, 79 stat mis. On 19 July 1922, Extra 613 South ( which was headed north-west ) collided with rider train No. 224 at Alsuma, which was between Tulsa and Broken Bow. The study does non to the full explicate the dissension between clip tabular array and geographic waies. There had been some downpours in recent yearss, and the line between Tulsa and Osage was washed out at several points, so service had been suspended on this subdivision.

Excess 613 was an engine and galley, and had received two orders, both Form 31, at its initial station of Muskogee. Order No. 2 read: `` Nos 227 229 226 and 230 of July 19th annulled between Wybark and Tulsa No 84 No 81 No 224 and No 225 of July 19th annulled between Tulsa and Osage. '' Order No. 7 read: `` Eng 613 tally excess Muskogee to Tulsa has right over No 84 Wybark to Tulsa No 3 delay at Wybark until 410 am over due Tulsa divn trains Wybark 205 am have arrived and departed over due trains Muskogee 205 am have arrived and departed except No 3. '' Excess 613 left Wybark at 3.46 am for Tulsa. At Coweta, an overheated diary required attending, so Extra 613 proceeded.

The study references much reading of orders to one another in Muskogee and the assorted inquiries that arose. The engineman and music director of Extra 613 came to the decision that No. 224 was annulled between Tulsa and Wybark, though the order clearly states Tulsa and Osage. This seems to be another instance of the continuity of feelings. Once erroneously understood as Tulsa and Wybark, it seems to be seen as that of all time after. All the order-reading may hold contributed to this feeling. It seems that the junior work forces present may hold thought otherwise, but were overborne. Possibly none of them read excessively good. Fortunately, accidents due to this cause have been really rare. Any system that depends on written messages demands first-class reading comprehension.

Capital of wyoming

Cheyenne, OK was approximately at the center of the 138-mile Panhandle & Santa Fe line from Pampa, TX to Clinton, OK that approximately follows the flaxen Washita River. This accident is interesting because of the contestants, eastbound train No. 63 formed of gas-electric motor M-105, and westbound assorted train No. 62 dwelling of engine 1001, a 2-6-2, four cargo autos and a combine. These were second-class trains, though they were the Daily-except-Sunday rider and merely trains over this vague line. I will utilize compass waies to depict what went on, but the clip table waies were precisely opposite! Clinton was so the rail hub of western Oklahoma, with lines of the P & SF ; , AT & SF ; ( KCM & O ; ) , CRI & P ; and SL-SF radiating from it.

Gas-electric autos had the disadvantage of transporting big measures of really flammable fuel. Although suited Diesel engines that used a much less risky fuel were available, the conversion was non general or speedy. M-105 was an all-steel auto built in 1913, 69 ' 9 '' long and weighing 107,580 pound, with engine, luggage and rider compartments. It had a 275 horsepower engine, and a fuel capacity of 325 gal, of which 225 gal remained at the clip of hit. In the 1940 's there had been at least five accidents affecting gas-electric motor autos. The first, on the PRR at Cuyahoga Falls, OH in 1940 was by far the most black, when every rider perished in the gasolene fire after a hit. This accident, which involved a coincident failure of train orders and manual block, is described in another page on this web site.

In the same twelvemonth as the Cheyenne accident, there was an accident on the CB & Q ; at Montgomery, IL when motor auto 9850 collided with a work supernumerary that should non hold been at that place. 9850 was built in 1928, had engine, rpo, luggage and rider compartments, 275 horsepower, and carried 250 gallons of gasolene. One rider was killed in this accident, and 4 employees. In 1945 there were two more accidents, one on the Seaboard at Richland, GA when motor auto 2021, running as Second 11, ran into a stalled cargo, First 11, that was non decently protected. The other was in Chicago, when AT & SF ; M-185 ran into a B & OCT ; reassign tally at a crossing. M-185 had a 400 horsepower engine, and carried 500 gallons of gasolene. SAL 2021 had merely engine, rpo and luggage compartments, towing a manager for the riders, which was a safer agreement. It boasted 275 horsepower and carried 350 gal. No riders were killed in the SAL accident, and merely one at Chicago. In 1945, the ICC claimed that there had been 6 such accidents in the predating 5 old ages, and 54 people had been killed. So far, I have found 5 accidents that killed 53.

The 1914 accident at Tipton Ford, MO of a Missouri and North Arkansas motor auto that killed 43, largely in the fire, seems to hold been the first such accident. The Cuyahoga Falls accident of 1940 was the lone other with a big toll, so it appears that with these two exclusions, gas-electric autos have really fared rather good, though a possible ground was absolute deficiency of riders. The Rock Island seems to hold equipped its motor autos with diesel engines. For illustration, the small Rocket, 9090, had a 650 horsepower Winton engine with compressed-air start. The organic structure was altered from a rider compartment to a mail storage compartment, and it pulled a stainless-steel manager. By contrast, I recall a motor auto on the Missouri-Illinois that had engine and rider compartments, and towed a luggage auto. The small cross engine blew smoke rings when idleness.


The Fourth Division of the Denver and Rio Grande Western extended from Alamosa, CO to Chama, NM, 92.41 stat mis. This narrow-gauge, single-track line through fascinating and varied scenery still exists as a tourer museum bearer. On 29 September 1922, the daily-except-Sunday Alamosa-Durango Train No. 115 had engine No. 169, 2 luggage autos, a baggage-RPO, 2 managers and a parlour auto, all of wooden building. It left Antonito, 30 stat mis east of Toltec, at 9.20 am, about an hr behind clip, keeping order No. 24: `` No one hundred fifteen Eng 169 run one 1 hr tardily Lava to Osier fifty 50 mins late Osier to Cumbres, '' a clear and absolutely apprehensible order.

Engine 411 had broken a chief rod, and was gimping to the stores at Alamosa for fix. Excess 411 East received order No. 24 at Cumbres, 20 stat mis west of Toltec. Operator Lively said Engineman Smith read the order back to him right in the office. Fireman McGuire said when Smith climbed into the cab he said: `` We have an hr and 50 proceedingss on No. 115, so I guess we can travel to Big Horn. '' Excess 411 bygone Cumbres at 9.35 am in mulct, clear fall conditions, with the aspen already aureate. No. 115 and Extra 411 met about a mile E of Toltec at 11.10 am, traveling at approximately 18 miles per hour and 15 miles per hour, severally, on a curve that varied from 3° to 20° on a class from 0.17 % to 1.42 % , with a drop on one side and a canon on the other, visibleness less than two carlengths. The engineman and fireman of No. 115 were, unluckily, killed, and 23 others were injured.


David, CA, on the Third Subdivision of the Western Pacific, which extended through the Feather River Canyon from Portola to Oroville, 116.3 stat mis, was the scene of two accidents to freight trains, one in 1931 and the other in 1942. Except for the fireman killed in the earlier accident, there were no human deaths. At these day of the months, the line had no automatic block signals. Westbound trains were superior by way, and the maximal velocity in the David country was 25 miles per hour, where the line was in a side-hill cut on a canon wall. At David, the path was tangent and the class was 1 % go uping due east. Some Stationss and the distances between them are shown at the right.

The orders given in the ICC study are typed in capitals, as were the existent orders, since the WP supported the usage of typewriters, possibly to demo how clear they were. Excess 43 got order No. 236 at Keddie, reading: `` First 74 eng 209 delay at Poe until one 30 130 autopsy Pulga one 50 five 155 autopsy Cresta two 15 215 autopsy for Extra 43 West. '' This gave Extra 43 authorization to continue against all subdivisions of No. 74, since the ulterior subdivisions would surely follow the first. Excess 43 arrived at Pulga at 1.07 autopsy, where order No. 244 was handed up, reading: `` Second 74 eng 205 delay at Oroville Yard until two forty five 245 autopsy Oroville two fifty five 255 autopsy Quartz three five 305 autopsy Bidwell three fifteen 315 autopsy for Extra 43 West. '' This gave Extra 43 clip on Second 74, so it could continue against the green signals of First 74 when it was met. All of this was rather clear and proper. Most starters would hold put 305 autopsy in words as `` three naught five. ''

By 1942, traffic had increased to 21.1 trains per twenty-four hours, an uncomfortable sum of traffic on a hard individual path. On 1 November, Extra 49 West had departed Portola at 12.35 autopsy with 73 autos and caboose, keeping simple running orders issued by the first-trick starter at 10.35 am, order No. 60: `` Eng 49 tally excess Portola to Oroville Yard. '' That eventide, Extra 22 East departed Oroville Yard at 6 autopsy with 74 autos and caboose, keeping order No. 88, issued by the second-trick starter at 5.23 autopsy, to the consequence: `` Eng 22 tally excess Oroville Yard to Portola keep chief path meet Extra 49 West at Poe. '' Both these orders may hold contained information on other meets, but the ICC study quotes merely the parts pertinent to this probe.

Order 88 restricted Extra 49, so it was placed at Pulga for that train at 5.23, at the same clip that it was sent to Oroville Yard, the prescribed process when curtailing a train. The 2nd fast one starter somehow formed the impression that order 88 had been fulfilled, though it is hard to see how, since Extra 22 had merely left Oroville Yard. The ICC study is rather inconsistent in stating that order 88 was annulled -- it could non be, for that would invalidate Extra 22 every bit good. Possibly the fatal order 91 said: `` That portion of order 88 saying clasp chief path meet Extra 49 West at Poe is annulled. '' There is no satisfactory ground given for this extraordinary action, but someway order 88 was filed by the operator at Pulga, and non delivered to Extra 49 West, who so knew nil whatever about Extra 22. The starter said he had been sick and was taking medical specialty, but even a insouciant mention to the order book and the OS sheet would hold shown the mistake.


Engine 335 was running visible radiation as Second 62, a second-class agenda, from Portola, where it received order No. 245: `` First 39 tally two 2 hours and forty 40 mins late Winnemucca to Portola Second 39 tally eight 8 hours late Winnemucca to Portola. '' Second 62 departed at 11.55 am, 6 hours 25 proceedingss late, and met First 39 at Bryant, 90.7 stat mis west of Antelope. At Gerlach, 49.8 stat mis west of Antelope, order No. 288 was handed up: `` Third 39 tally nine 9 hours and thirty 30 proceedingss late Winnemucca to Portola, '' which was made complete at 3.02 autopsy. The engineman misinterpreted this as giving him more clip against Second 39, and decided to travel to Pronto, 26.1 stat mis east of Antelope, for Second 39. This mistake was confirmed by the fireman, the merely other crew member on the light engine. It is dubious that he of all time looked at the order, whatever the testimony. Second 62 departed Gerlach at 3.45 autopsy, 4 hours 55 proceedingss late, and Sulphur, the last unfastened office West of Antelope, at 4.40 autopsy, 4 hours 35 proceedingss tardily.

Second 39 had made a brake trial at Elko, 177.3 stat mis east of Antelope. At Winnemucca, it received order No. 245, Form 31, every bit good as order No. 287, Form 19: `` Engs 174 and 333 tally as Second and Third 39 Winnemucca to Portola, '' made complete 2.55 autopsy. Second 39 departed at 4.06 autopsy, 8 hours and 1 minute tardily. Several little points should be made here. The ICC ever includes brake trial and Hours of Service Act information in the accident studies, in instance they have any bearing on the topic, or to govern them out as contributory causes. The times that orders 287 and 288 were made complete was to demo that the engine Numberss for Second and Third 39 were known when order 288 was issued. The engine Numberss were non included because these trains had train indexs, which would hold displayed 2-39 and 3-39 severally. Finally, the starter assumed that engine 174 could infer that it should expose green signals, although it should hold been told so explicitly. This would hold lengthened the order, since the two engines would hold to be treated individually.

Second 39 passed Jungo at 4.54 autopsy, 8 hours and 3 proceedingss tardily. On its run-late order, it was due at 4.51 autopsy. Second 39 had non lost eight hours on its agenda, by the way. It was some sort of particular motion, possibly a troop train, and merely started tardily. It was a really common pattern to run subdivisions instead than supernumeraries, and utilize run-late orders liberally. This saved calculating out where meets would happen, and composing the necessary orders, but it was non about as safe. Why a visible radiation engine was run as a subdivision of a cargo train ( unless it was to pick up a train someplace en path ) alternatively of an excess is a enigma. Could at that place be any ground to do it superior to westbound supernumeraries, which might be managing gross cargo? It was late plenty ( five or six hours ) to do it a nomadic encirclement.

The fireman complained that if engine Numberss had been included, `` Second '' 39 eng 333 would non hold been confused with Second 39 eng 174. This is merely faintly possible, sing that Second and Third were confused, if the orders were read at all. Besides, it is possible that the engines could be changed on subdivisions, or one subdivision could run around another. One could every bit good confound 174 and 333, which are no more distinguishable than Second and Third. Train indexs did do train designation easy and definite, and were likely superior to engine Numberss when decently used on engine and galley. This is another accident due to the continuity of an initial semblance.

The Western Pacific is represented in the ICC accident probes by the three events at David and Antelope, every bit good as two incidents at Sunol, CA between Stockton and San Francisco. One of these, on 28 November 1930, was a rear-end hit due to hapless flagging and running on the clip of a superior train, while the other, on 22 September 1941, was a head-end hit of a light engine disregarding the agenda of an opposing cargo train. The ICC often quoted these accidents in teasing the WP to put in block signals. The prevalence of light engines and subdivisions in these accidents is noteworthy. The casualties were really few, and did non include gross riders.


Engineman Green had arrived in Chattanooga on Second 94, and instantly reported as engineman on Second 95 to return over the division he had merely covered. He had merely finished oiling around his engine when Conductor Davis came up with the orders, and gestured that they should be stuffed in his overalls, since his custodies were dripping. There were three orders, but when he had cleaned his custodies with waste and pulled them out, he did non look into the clearance card, and merely found and read two of the three orders that had been given him. What he did non see was order No. 245, Form 31: `` Third No 94 eng 562 will keep chief track meet Second 95 eng 568 at Chickamauga. '' Fireman Brown was busy acquiring his fire ready, and did non trouble oneself with the orders, nor were they offered to him. Second 95 departed Chattanooga at 2.57 autopsy, 10 proceedingss tardily.

Conductor Davis had read the orders, and told Train Porter Fielding to travel up near the forepart to open the north switch at Chickamauga to allow the train in the hole. The music director and brakeman concentrated on roll uping tickets, traveling back through the train. When the train did non decelerate nearing Chickamauga, the porter became agitated, but hesitated to draw the air in instance he was incorrect, and rushed back to happen Davis. Davis was pacifying a Pullman rider over a fare difference when Fielding arrived in terror. `` Good God, halt the train! '' yelled Davis, and Fielding opened the valve merely behind him. The brakes were already applied in exigency as Green saw Third 94 in front, and the train jarred to a halt 8000 ' South of the south switch.

Third 94 had received order No. 245 at Dalton, which it left at 2.37 autopsy, and passed Graysville, 6 stat mis south of Chickamauga, at 3.15 autopsy, prepared to halt at the north switch, but ne'er reached it. Green had come up on Second 94, but since Third 94 was inferior by way, he expected it to be running against his agenda, and in the clear someplace farther on. Conductor Davis was unaware of his place on the route until porter Fielding explosion in, and had non expected to hear any whistling back in the Pullmans. The train porter seemingly did non cognize plenty about the regulations to lose the meet whistling, and was hesitant to halt the train. Had he done so, there would hold been no accident.


No 220, a local train pulled by Pacific 2120 with three wooden autos, left Butte at 7 am in ownership of order No. 209. At Homestake, 6.1 stat mis west of Welch, it received block non clear and a cautiousness card reminding of the meet at Welch, every bit good as order No. 210, to the consequence: `` No 220 eng 2120 return siding meet No 651 eng 1758 at Spire Rock. '' No. 651 was a local cargo following No. 1 up the hill. The order was picked up by the fireman, who unfolded it and read it. Engineman Nielsen asked about the meet with No. 1. Fireman Caldwell said: `` Changed to Spire Rock! '' and handed the orders to Nielsen. Nielsen rolled up the orders and lodge them in his overalls without reading them.

The music director knew that the meet was still at Welch, and as they approached gave three sounds on the pass oning signal. This signal had two significances on the NP, either halt at the following station, or nearing meeting point. Engineman Nielsen did non give the Rule 14 ( N ) whistle signal, but applied the brakes, meaning to halt at the station at Welch. When it became clear that he was non traveling to head in, the music director reached for the music director 's valve, but it was at the other terminal of the auto, and the brakes went on in exigency about so, as Nielsen had seen the fume from No. 1 above the stones of the cut. No. 1 had reduced velocity fixing to halt at the West switch, but the two trains met on a 6° 36 ' curve about halfway between the turnout switches at 7.51 am. Fireman Caldwell was mortally injured, the lone human death except for a intruder noted in the study.

The pass oning signal was besides misunderstood, and the music director was non prepared to take immediate action. In fact, the Rule 14 ( N ) whistling was non given in clip. Some companies ( SL-SF ) required that the whistle 14 ( N ) be given twice when a train was to take turnout, one time at a stat mi and one time at a half stat mi. The exchange of these signals is the lone manner a cheque can be established between the head terminal and the rear terminal. There may be many instances where they have prevented an accident, and these instances we will non meet in the ICC studies. What we do happen, nevertheless, is that music directors do non take action when it is their responsibility to make so, and leave running the train up to the engineman. In fact, it is likely true that the fireman was more frequently a cheque on the engineman than the music director.


This study is one of the worst of the ICC accident studies, and besides is severely mangled by the OCR plan that digitized it. On 2 April 1913, trains No. 41 and 42 of the Chicago Burlington & Quincy collided on the chief path at the turnout of Wakeley, Wyoming, 5.19 stat mis east of Sheridan. No. 41 was superior by way, so it held the chief path, while No. 42 should hold headed in at the West switch. Both trains had received transcripts of order No. 50, reading ; `` No 41 eng 2918 will run into No 42 eng 2915 at Wakeley. '' No. 42 received the order at Sheridan, No. 41 at Verena, 13.62 stat mis east of Wakeley, at 2.23 autopsy. These two trains were long-distance expresses between St. Louis and Seattle. All the autos in the 10-car trains were wooden.

When engineman N. E. Miller of No. 42 sounded the station whistling for Wakeley, fireman F. B. Miller said: `` Meeting 41 here, are you? '' Engineman Miller replied: `` No, at Arno. '' Arno was the following turnout, 6.4 stat mis off. The study does non work out the enigma of where Arno came from ; it may hold been the clip table meeting point for the two trains. The engineman was all of a sudden unsure, and pulled out the orders to hold a expression. He applied the brakes in exigency on seeing `` Wakeley '' in the order. The train stopped good past the West switch, and No. 41 could be seen coming. No. 41 idea at first that No. 42 was non at that place yet, and began braking to halt at the West switch. Then they saw No. 42, and supposed it to be on the turnout near the telephone booth near the center of the turnout, and in the clear. The turnout was on a 2° curve, and it can be hard to state which track a train is on from a distance. When it was seen to be on the chief path alternatively, brakes were applied in exigency and the fireman jumped. All the work forces on the engines survived, but one rider and one express agent were killed. The hit occurred at 2.43 autopsy, in light snow.

The research worker recommends a regulation that the music director and engineman should read their orders to each other, presuming that if this was done, the right reading would emerge and be understood by both. There is no reference at all of regulation S-90 and the meeting point whistling Rule 14 ( N ) , which is a much more effectual tool to the same terminal. It is by and large true that the engineman and music director have an apprehension about the motion of their train, but it is non practical to hold a conference in every instance, as when picking up orders while in gesture. The research worker was evidently non really familiar with railway operations or regulations, and makes no other recommendations.


Omar was a 4000 ' siding on the Akron-Denver line of the Chicago Burlington and Quincy, between Hudson and Wiggins. In 1936, this busy line was a few old ages from having one of the innovator CTC installings, and was operated by clip tabular array, train orders, and ABS. The early forenoon of 27 October was patchily dazed, some countries light, others covered by a dense cover. Excess 6325 East, with 30 autos and galley, arrived at Hudson at 4.10 am, where it received order No. 31: `` No three delay at Wiggins until 457 am Omar 502 am for Extra 6325 East. '' and order No. 33: `` No 301 delay at Vallery until 515 am Wiggins 525 am for Extra 6325 East. '' With aid against these westerly rider trains, Excess 6325 left Hudson at 4.18 am in the dazed somberness.

In malice of the fog, the engineman of Extra 6325 ran good, up to 50 miles per hour, because he said he could still see the signals good plenty. The brakeman in the cupola of the waycar said he could merely see about a carlength. In malice of the good advancement, it was impossible to do Omar in clip for No. 3, so Excess 6325 stopped at Crest, and music director Challstrom called the starter for orders. This was a instance in which the music director would copy a train order, a rare go oning except in exigency. He copied and repeated order No. 49 on Form 19, reading: `` Excess 6325 meet No 301 at Omar and No 67 at Wiggins. '' He seemingly merely made one transcript, and gave that to flagman Raub, who read it and passed it on to brakeman Trant, who handed it to the engineman, who clipped it on his clipboard and did non demo it to the fireman. As he handed the order over, brakeman Trant said: `` We meet 301 and 67 at Wiggins. '' Thus was the wrong reading established, which persisted on the head terminal.

Excess 6325 sailed toward Omar through the fog, while No. 301 left Wiggins at 5.30 am, 28 proceedingss late, with 10 autos and engine 2826. Its engineman was running instead carefully in position of the fog, which was patchy and increasing westward. The block signal was at Approach at the west terminal of Omar when Extra 6325 encountered it at about 50 miles per hour. A service brake application was instantly made, and the train stopped 167 ' E of the east switch, go throughing the headblock or go forthing signal at the east terminal. The headlamp of No. 301 was already in position around the 1° curve, so brakeman Trant leaped down, illuming a fusee, and ran in front to flag. His fusee was acknowledged by two short, but hit could non be prevented, and No. 301 hit Excess 6325 at 20-25 miles per hour. Fortunately, there were merely 18 riders who could action for hurting and agony.

Dispatcher Gasch was criticized for non publishing a fog order ( `` Fog or storm between A and B '' ) as a warning, but the being of the fog was no secret to anyone involved. The music director and flagman of Extra 6325, who knew absolutely good that No.301 was to be met at Omar, did nil as their train sailed by the West switch on the chief line. There were non even tickets to deflect them. Again, we see the continuity of an initial feeling. It requires the co-operation of more than one individual to most efficaciously overcome a incorrect feeling, and at least a careful re-reading after the initial feeling has had clip to melt in the encephalon. The engineman 's mistake in organizing a false feeling is apprehensible and excusable ; the music director 's mistake in non taking action is blameworthy and negligent.


Rule 220 by and large had three paragraphs. The first two related to the `` life '' of an order, which continued until fulfilled, superseded, annulled, or the train involved lost its agenda by annullment or the 12-hour bound. The 3rd provided that when a music director or engineman was relieved in the class of a tally, all train orders must be delivered to the alleviating music director or engineman, and must be compared between the music director and engineman. The accident at White Oak illustrates the usual instance when the engine crew is relieved at an intermediate point. Rockmart illustrates the rarer instance when the relieving engineman is an official. On the C & NW ; , a written transportation of orders had to be filled out, demoing how of import this process was thought to be.

A route chief of engines was siting First 2 from Atlanta to his place in Rome on the Southern on 23 December 1926. At McPherson, where the train had a meet with an opposing train, he went up to the engine and informed the engineman that he would manage the engine from at that place to Rome. We do non cognize what understanding the two work forces had over the train orders, but the engineman went to sit in the train, taking the orders with him. The route chief seemingly did non like to be looked over the shoulder, though a Superintendent 's bulletin some clip before had said that in such instances, the engineman should stay on the engine.

Train order No. 92 was delivered on Form 31 to First 2 at Atlanta, and on Form 19 to southbound Train No. 101 at Dalton. Both these trains were of import, all-Pullman trains of all-steel equipment, of 10 and 9 autos, severally. Order 92 read: `` No 101 one nothing one Eng 1456 meet No 32 30 two Eng 1326 at Shannon No 6 six Engs 1260 and 1205 coupled at Atlanta Jct First No 2 two Eng 1219 at Rockmart and Second No 2 two Eng 1265 at Braswell No 32 thirty two No 6 six and First and Second No 2 two return turnout. '' The Southern repeated train Numberss in words, every bit good as clip, to guard against misreading, although the engine Numberss are positive designation plenty for most companies.

Train 101 arrived at Rockmart 6.35 autopsy, and received a clearance card saying that the block would be clear after the reaching of First 2. After taking H2O, the train drifted to the south switch, its headlamp on brilliantly. The position to the South was obstructed by curvature and a cut. Excess 5243 South had besides taken siding to let the rider trains to go through, and had been instructed to endorse up plenty to allow First 2 to head in at the south switch and clear. First 2 whistled for the station, so whistled its green signals to Extra 5243 as it appeared, traveling at 50 miles per hour or more on the 1 % falling class. Excess 5243, recognizing the danger, gave one long blast on its whistle alternatively of admiting First 2 's signals. Then the two trains saw one another, and the brakes were applied in exigency. It was a really difficult hit, but most of the casualties were in the dining auto of First 2, where 3 servers, a cook, and 11 riders were killed. The fireman and baggageman of First 2 were killed in the hit, while the route chief of engines survived until the following twenty-four hours. The engine crew of No. 101 had, of class, jumped from their standing engine.

The route chief was wholly unmindful of the meets established by order No. 92 and the demand to take turnout. He was running on his high quality by way, which permitted No 2 to continue on its clip. The music director of First 2, the 1 who had non compared orders at McPherson, had delegated to the baggageman the sounding of meet communication signals, while he busied himself with his chief occupation of ticket aggregator. The baggageman may hold given such a signal approaching Rockmart, but it seemingly was acknowledged by two short, non by the prescribed two longs and a short of Rule 14 ( N ) . This should hold been followed by an immediate usage of the music director 's valve, but possibly a mere baggageman would be loth to make this. At any rate, managing this signal was the music director 's occupation entirely. On the footing of his misdemeanors of Rule 220 and Rule S-90, the music director should hold been held chiefly responsible for the accident.


The Colorado Midland ran between Colorado Springs and Leadville, 135 stat mis. In July and August, a day-to-day `` Wildflower Special '' was run between Colorado Springs and Spinney, 57.7 stat mis. The five-car train had an unfastened observation auto on the terminal, and a tiffin counter in one of the managers. It was given a particular agenda with right over all but first category trains, go forthing Spinney on the return trip at 12.40 autopsy. On 27 August 1915, veteran engineman Smith and his fireman were entertaining two lady lensmans from Chicago in the cab, a non unusual characteristic of these gay trips. At Howbart, they received order No. 51: `` Particular 39 East will wait at Idlewild until one 30 130 autopsy for No 454 Eng 38, '' and left at 1.05 autopsy. Westbound No. 454 had engines 36 and 38, 5 tonss, 26 empties and a galley, and left the Springs for Leadville at 6.00 am. At 12.30 autopsies, they received order No. 51 at Lidderdale, 5.5 stat mis east of Idlewild.

Engineman Smith misread Lidderdale for Idlewild, perchance distracted by his invitees, the fireman did n't look at the order, flagman Draper read the order right, but forgot it, and Conductor Baxter was busy with his tickets. In a word, SNAFU. So the particular sailed through Idlewild and got merely about a half-mile beyond the east switch before meeting No. 454 on a 10° curve with a drop on one side and a canon on the other. Fortunately, merely 33 riders could claim to hold been injured, and the party in the cab was merely shaken up. The ICC disapproved of the goings-on, and misspelled Idlewild as Idelwild. If music directors were merely good for roll uping tickets, their wage should hold been reduced.


Accidents in which non merely the train order system, but besides a block system intended as a backup, fail are of particular involvement. The Marshfield hit occurred in malice of automatic block signals, and the manual block did non forestall the Rockmart or Cuyahoga Falls hits. Woodmont, PA, on the Newtown Branch of the Philadelphia and Reading, provides another illustration. This single-track subdivision extended 16.6 stat mis northeasterly from a junction with the Philadelphia-New York chief line at Cheltenham. The first 5.4 stat mis to Bryn Athyn was protected by an automatic block system utilizing Hall enclosed-disk ( banjo ) signals. The line beyond to Newtown was divided into two manual blocks, Bryn Athyn-Churchville, 5.7 stat mis, and Churchville-Newtown, 5.5 stat mis. The station of Huntingdon Valley was 0.7 mile West of Bryn Athyn, and Southampton station was in the block Bryn Athyn-Churchville, as was Woodmont station, which was merely east of Bryn Athyn.

Automatic signals 713 ( eastbound ) and 713-A ( westbound ) were located west of Huntingdon Valley. There was a semaphore block signal E of the Bryn Athyn office for due east trains merely. A path South of the chief path, connected merely at the east terminal, was used for meets at Bryn Athyn. This path ended merely east of the block signal, and the switch was at the beginning of a curve. To the E of the switch was automatic block signal 716 regulating westbound trains. The path circuit regulating signal 713 drawn-out 1500 ' E of the switch and signal 716, while the path circuit regulating signal 716 was likewise overlapped West of signal 713-A. The automatic block signals functioned decently throughout this episode.

Harmonizing to the agenda, No. 154 left Newtown at 6.50 am for Philadelphia, and it was followed at 7.30 by No. 156. No. 151 left Philadelphia at 6.48 am for Newtown. On the forenoon of 5 December 1921, everything began harmonizing to agenda, and No. 151 stopped at Huntingdon Valley, its clip table meeting topographic point with No. 154, at 7.15 am. No. 154 pulled up to signal 716 at Stop at 7.28 am, on clip. It followed a flagman into Bryn Athyn, where order No. 9 was received: `` Disregard signal 716 and run carefully, '' made complete at 7.31 am. The starter had had some wire problem that forenoon, and believed the signal to be out of order, which it was non. It was exposing Stop because of No. 151 on the path circuit at Huntingdon Valley.

Meanwhile, No. 151 had flagged into Bryn Athyn at 7.42 am, to happen the block signal at Stop and No. 154 on the chief path. No. 154 was excessively long to suit in the spur path, so it was decided that No. 154 would back plenty to let No. 151 to draw in front and back in. Meanwhile, the starter was eager to avoid hold to No. 156, which was already on its manner, so he issued order No. 11: `` No 151 will run into No 156 at Bryn Athyn No 151 return turnout. '' This was addressed to No. 151 on Form 31 at Bryn Athyn, and made complete at 7.44 am, seemingly with the music director 's signature entirely. The engineman, nevertheless, would non continue to endorse in for No. 151 until he held an order allowing it. He was given a transcript of order No. 11, and seemed satisfied. He pulled in front, backed in, and No. 154 went on its manner at 7.46 am. Then No 151 at one time proceeded on the chief line, and within a stat mi encountered No. 156 on a 7° curve in a cut. No. 151 had engine 167, a luggage auto and manager of wood, and two steel-underframe managers.

The operators at Bryn Athyn and Churchville gave contradictory and hovering testimony about the block process that forenoon. Operator Clayton at Bryn Athyn foremost claimed he did non describe No. 154 clear of the block, and that Churchville had non asked for the block. Subsequently, he admitted that he reported the block clear when No. 154 passed signal 716, and gave permission for No. 156 to come in the block. This would hold been near to the proper actions, but the block record showed grounds of altered entries, and it was admitted that these entries were made after the hit had occurred from memory. Operator Tomlinson at Churchville foremost said he gave a clear block to No. 156 on the apprehension with Clayton that No. 154 was ready to travel at Bryn Athyn. Subsequently, he said that after presenting order No. 11 to No. 156, he communicated with Bryn Athyn and determined that the block was clear of No. 154. The block record that he submitted in grounds proved to be a transcript created for the intent, and that the original had been destroyed. It is clear that the block operation was carried out in a slack mode, and proper records were non kept.

It was concluded that the music director and engineman of No. 151 had anticipated the contents of order No. 11, presuming it referred to No. 154 and non No. 156, and that they proceeded against a block signal. In the probe, the extraordinary fact was brought out that no one agreed on the existent terminal of the block. Company functionaries said the westbound block ended at signal 716, while the eastbound block ended at the Bryn Athyn block signal! Furthermore, the block signal seemed to be used as both a block signal and a train order signal. This is a unsafe combination ( see the accident at Norton, KS ) since the operation of the two signals is distinguishable. Keeping an order may hold been clearance against the train order signal, but it was surely non clearance against the block signal, which remained ( decently ) at Stop.

On the Pennsylvania Railroad, which had the most extended experience with manual block in the United States, the block signal was ne'er a train order signal, and could non be passed at Stop. Train orders were indicated by a xanthous flag or xanthous lamp in a specified location. The manual block in the United States was, nevertheless, mostly managed with the train order signal, without distant signals of any sort, and non placed at the point of limitation but near the office. These crude conditions greatly reduced the security of the manual block system. Crews relied chiefly on train orders for safety, while the manual block was operated as a formality, as in this instance.


The present narrative concerns two opposing excellent rider trains, No. 10 and No. 11, which ran between Baltimore and Hagerstown. Eastbound No. 10 was superior to westbound No. 11 by way. On 24 June 1915, the overworked starter was seeking to minimise holds to these trains caused by traffic and mechanical troubles. At Pen Mar, No. 10 received two orders. Order No. 57 said: `` No 10 eng 203 show signals Pen Mar to Hillen for eng 156, '' and order No. 71 said: `` No 11 engine 209 meet No 2 eng 205 at Monocacy 1st No 10 eng 203 at Flint and has right over 2nd No 10 eng 156 Westminster to Pen Mar 2nd No 10 starts from Pen Mar Park 1st No 10 return turnout. '' Flint was the clip table meeting point for No. 10 and No. 11, at which No 11 would hold taken the turnout. The starter wanted to guarantee that No. 11 would do Flint even if it were delayed a small

When No. 10 reached Highfield, there was a batch of work to make, so the music director advised the starter that he could non go forth before 5.27, 27 proceedingss tardily. The starter decided to assist No. 11 with order No. 74: `` No 11 eng 209 meet 1st No 10 eng 203 at Sixty alternatively of Flint 1st No 10 return turnout. '' This order was delivered to No. 10. Meanwhile, No. 11 had left Baltimore at 3.25 autopsy, where it had received order No. 71. The locomotor had developed a hot diary, which had to be repacked at Union Bridge, detaining No. 11. When the dispatcher heard this, he realized that the hold to both trains meant that they could outdo meet at Flint, the original meeting point.

Blue Mountain

The train registry is an indispensable portion of clip table operation. Before get downing his tally, a music director must confer with the registry to find if delinquent trains superior or of the same category have arrived or left. By `` delinquent '' is meant merely if they are authorized by clip tabular array to be on the route. When a train becomes 12 hours tardily on its agenda, the agenda becomes null, and the train can non continue on it. Therefore, the music director looks for trains that are delinquent by less than 12 hours, since those are the 1s that he must worry approximately. He besides registers his ain train, and marks the registry. Before get downing, he besides needs a Clearance Card to do certain that he holds all the train orders for his train. A written sum-up of the registry cheque ( normally on Form 52 ) is delivered to the engineman with the Clearance Card and orders.

The train registry concerned was at Highfield, a junction point 17 stat mis east of Hagerstown. First 204 arrived at Highfield at 2.17 am, and departed as No. 218 on the line north to York at 2.35 am. Second 204 arrived at 2.19 am, and registered with green signals. This train departed as No 204 on the chief line for Baltimore at 2.26 am, transporting no signals. The operator wrote in the clip of going in the registry. Fourth 204 overtook Third 204 temporarily disabled at a siding 4 stat mis east of Hagerstown. Third 204 had clip on two subdivisions of westbound rider train No. 7 to Chewsville, so orders and Numberss were exchanged, and Fourth 204 proceeded as Third 204 to Chewsville. Orders were obtained allowing the train to go on as Third 204, and it passed Edgemont at 3.55 am on its manner to Highfield.

Pen Mar

This accident occurred on 6 December 1912, merely little more than a hebdomad subsequently than the Blue Mountain hit, and involved the same Train No. 204. Excess 757 West left Baltimore at 1.10 autopsy, and reached Highfield at 10.52 autopsy, with 11 tonss and 25 empties, and helper engine 610 cut in behind the 4th auto. The web ICC study gives conductor Eichelberger 's name as `` Eyehole-Berger. '' Here it received order No. 118: `` Eng 757 will run excess Highfield to Hagerstown Extra 757 West will run into 1st No 204 at Blue Mountain and has right over 4th No. 204 Highfield to Chewsville. '' Excess 757 departed Highfield at 11.31 autopsy and collided with 1st No 204 1.6 stat mis west of Highfield at 11.43 autopsy while traveling at 18-20 miles per hour. The point of hit was in a 20 ' deep cut on a class of 1/46 % descending, near Pen Mar.

That same eventide, First 204 left Hagerstown and did some work at Edgemont, after which it took siding for No. 7. There it received order No. 119, addressed to 1st, 2nd and 3rd No. 204: `` 3rd No 204 eng 157 will go through 1st and 2nd No 204 at Edgemont and alteration Numberss consequently. '' Third 204 had a combine and two managers, seemingly empty rider stock, and was bound from Hagerstown to Highfield. At Hagerstown, it had received order No. 115: `` Engines 325 and 157 will expose signals and run as 2nd and 3rd No 204 Hagerstown to Highfield. '' First 204 had seemingly received a similar order to expose signals for Eng 325 at Hagerstown. We do non cognize what engine was to run as Fourth 204, since that train had likely non yet been made up at Hagerstown. So now we have three subdivisions of No. 204 on the route, and a 4th to go forth Hagerstown a small subsequently.

When Third 204 reached Edgemont, it found First and Second 204 on the turnout, so the lone topographic point it could conceal was on the storage path on the other side of the chief. Order No. 119 was addressed to C & E ; First, Second and Third 204 Edgemont: `` 3rd No 204 eng 157 will go through 1st and 2nd No 204 at Edgemont and alteration Numberss consequently. '' The starter wanted to acquire the rider stock around the slow cargo trains, which might hold extra work to make, so he decided to run engine 157 to the forepart of the waiting line. This order was absolutely appropriate. Engine 157 so departed as First 204 at 11.30 autopsy, clashing with Extra 757 really shortly thenceforth.

What had happened was that Third 204 had non been given a transcript of order No. 118, so when it was promoted to First 204 it knew nil about the arrangments that had been made for run intoing Extra 757. Edgemont was an unfastened telegraph office, so it would hold been easy for the starter to present a transcript to the new First 204, which he did non make. He assumed that the old First 204 would interchange orders with the new First 204, a really reasonable process that the crews themselves would understand. However, it was non done ; in fact, there seems to hold been really small treatment among the crews, and there was no rearrangement of signals, since all three subdivisions at that place carried green signals. The old Third 204 merely departed as the new First 204, with no other formalities.

The crews involved said they would hold exchanged orders if there was no unfastened office at Edgemont, but did non make so since the starter could ever do certain that each subdivision had the necessary orders. The ICC probe brought up Rule S-94 about interchanging individuality and orders with a handicapped train at a noncommunicating point, but this was unquestionably non applicable here, except as a general rule. It truly stands to ground that when the individuality of two trains is exchanged, so should the orders be exchanged. This accident showed that there was some uncertainness when subdivisions were involved.

There is an extra job here because of the designation of trains by engine figure. Changing subdivision Numberss does non alter engine Numberss, so now the Numberss no longer match to the subdivisions. Engine Numberss are non systematically used for designation in the orders as quoted in the ICC study. From the Thurmont incident, it appears that the WM did utilize engine Numberss to place regular trains, and this would include subdivisions. If orders had been exchanged, so Extra 757 would hold found First 204 with engine 157 alternatively of the engine mentioned in order No. 118 ( which does non hold one, likely an skip in the study ) . This is rather a muss, and there is no easy manner out.

The ICC suggests that the three subdivisions could be annulled, and a fresh start made. However, an annullment would kill the subdivisions everlastingly. What could be done is to retreat the engines as subdivisions of No. 204, and have new engines take their topographic point. For illustration: `` Engs 112 247 and 157 are withdrawn as 1st 2nd and 3rd 204 at Edgemont. Engines 157, 112 and 247 show signals and run every bit 1st 2nd and 3rd No 204 Edgemont to Highfield. First No 204 eng 157 respect order No 118. '' Although non mentioned in the order, Extra 757 is interested, and should have a transcript at Highfield. This is a clear order, which would hold executed this complicated motion safely and with the least confusion.

Sections were a endurance from the yearss before train orders, when engines carried flags to give notice of trains following. The green signals carried for following subdivisions, and the white signals of excess trains, were posterities of these flags. White signals merely identified supernumeraries, and had no other map, but green signals were relied upon to protect following subdivisions. In the teens and mid-twentiess, subdivisions were really often used, as many of these accidents show. They were besides a primary cause of accidents. The Standard Code changed, seeking to happen a unfailing manner to manage subdivisions. At the clip of Pen Mar, the manner to alter the engine figure would be something like: `` Eng 157 is annulled as 3rd No 204 Edgemont and run as 1st No 204 Edgemont to Highfield Following subdivisions change Numberss consequently. '' A subdivision was non annulled utilizing Form K, which would be used for invalidating a agenda. It was the engine that was annulled. The word `` annulled '' is truly non proper here, and might be thought to mention to the subdivision, so it was subsequently eliminated in favour of equivalents.

There are two constructs involved here. The more of import is to guarantee that signals are displayed for following subdivisions, and for this train registries have come to be relied upon. Whenever a subdivision starts, it checks the registry to do certain signals were displayed for it. The less of import is printing the engine Numberss for train designation. Orders retreating engines or commanding them to run as certain subdivisions now does this occupation. Signals are put up and taken down merely at registry points, and if a subdivision runs to an intermediate point, it is annulled by Form K beyond: `` Eng 204 show signals and run as First 16 Hagerstown to Highfield. Eng 116 tally as Second 16 Hagerstown to Edgemont ( or else get down Second 16 with a clearance card ) . Second 16 is annulled Edgemont to Highfield. '' Second 16 is good and genuinely annulled, and a 2nd subdivision can non be run between these two points on the current agenda. Merely the last subdivision of a agenda, normally but non needfully the 2nd one, can be annulled. Opposing inferior trains, holding met First ( and merely ) 16 before making Edgemont, still have to cognize if Second 16 has arrived at Edgemont before continuing from at that place. The starter would supply the information in a train order ( `` Second 16 has arrived Edgemont with no signals '' ) , or give it clip or a meet against Second 16, and the engine figure would so be used for designation. The instance of a subdivision get downing at an intermediate point is similar. The order for the first subdivision to show signals would be sufficient. The consist of a train can ever be handled to or from any intermediate point ; the engine can come from or travel to an unfastened office visible radiation as the train if necessary.

Subsequently, signals were ordered displayed for a undermentioned subdivision from an initial station utilizing the clearance card merely, without a train order. The clearance card had a particular line for this, that was used merely at initial Stationss. Composing train orders for covering with subdivisions provides many involved and confusing exercisings, and gives rise to much contention and treatment. Think about instances in which other trains got themselves sandwiched between subdivisions running many hours apart. Sections were responsible for a big figure of accidents as good. The Pennsylvania Railroad finally abolished them wholly and ran everything except one subdivision of scheduled rider trains excess.


Hamlet, NC was a hub of the Seaboard Air Line, with lines radiating to Raleigh, Wilmington, Charleston, Columbia and Charlotte, each with a separate starter, but all working in the same office. Wilmington District trains climbed a heavy class to a junction with the Raleigh District and entry to the paces. To alleviate them from halting at the junction, and holding a hard clip get downing, they were supplied with a registry cheque message at Laurel, 10 stat mis off. This message was supplied by the Wilmington District starter in audience with the Raleigh District starter, and ran like this: `` All delinquent trains are by Hamlet at 9.40 am. '' This permitted Wilmington District trains to follow with Rule 83 and busy the Raleigh District chief path when there were no excellent trains to be cleared.

On the forenoon of 27 June 1911, freight train No. 17 received a message like this one, but had to duplicate the 1 % class anyhow, and had taken the first cut into the pace, on the Raleigh District chief, when it was run into by Second 33 with engine 684, a luggage auto and 10 managers. This was an jaunt train from the Durham & Southern delivered at Apex, NC, 82 stat mis north, and edge for Charlotte. It had orders to run 3 hours and 40 proceedingss late, and was 12 or 13 proceedingss tardily on this clip. There was a manual block on the Raleigh District, but it ended at the pace office, and did non protect the path where No. 17 was standing on a crisp curve. The Wilmington District starter had likely assumed that No. 33 was by, non cognizing about the signals it displayed, and did non really confer with with the Raleigh District starter before directing the registry cheque message. Although Second 33 was merely traveling 25-30 miles per hour, it was still a difficult knock, and 10 riders died.

It is a much better thought to utilize a train order for this intent, since the demands for entering and bringing are of a much higher criterion than for messages, and the information vitally affects the safety of trains. The Standard Code did non incorporate a train order signifier for this intent, but many roads adopted a Form V for the intent. Such an order might read: `` All first category trains due at Hominy before 2.01 am have arrived and left except No 2 Eng 660. '' This illustration specifies first-class trains because they are the 1s that must ever be checked against, and this order might be appropriate for several arising trains. Specific trains may be included or excluded as required. This signifier should non be combined with other signifiers, but we have an illustration of such a combination in the Broomfield accident, where it is combined with a running order.

While we are discoursing train registries and Rule 83, it should be remarked that it is non a good thought to trust on a train registry against supernumeraries that may hold been given right over you. In fact, some regulation books prohibit it, and require that you make direct designation, or that the starter spring you the information by train order. The ground is that an engine may run extra more than one time in a twenty-four hours, for illustration returning from helper responsibility, or working excess, unlike regular trains that run at most one time each twenty-four hours. If you see Excess 457 on a train registry, it might hold registered on a old trip, and non be the one holding right over you. At one clip, such supernumeraries besides noted the figure of their running orders. A regular train registries on the page matching the day of the month of its agenda reaching or going, an excess train on the page for the day of the month it really arrives or departs.


Although this accident happened on an electric interurban railway, the Denver and Interurban, the line was a subordinate of the Colorado and Southern runing under the Standard Code. The D & I ; ran 31 stat mis from Denver to Boulder, with a subdivision to Eldorado Springs, a resort South of Boulder. It was an AC electric, whose autos used pantographs, one of the rare interurbans to utilize this first-class engineering. Because of the high electromotive force, merely one substation was necessary, near the centre of the line, fed from a coal-burning station near Lafayette that supplied the 25 Hz grip power. The autos besides could run on the 600 VDC supply of Denver Tramway, collected by a trolley pole. At Globeville, Denver Tramway crews took over the autos for the tally to the fifteenth street end point. This line was double-track standard gage ( Denver Tramway was by and large 3 ' 6 '' gage ) . The following twelvemonth, D & I ; began utilizing Union Station alternatively, and survived until 1926.

Globeville was in North Denver, at the border of unfastened Fieldss, so the location of smelters and other honest labour, which has now disappeared, and the hints are disappearing every bit good. About 400 ' North of the station, the dual path became individual path, which curved foremost to the right, so to the left to head westbound via Westminster, 2 stat mis off, to D & I ; Junction, near which the C & S ; chief line was joined. There was a 1 % class go forthing Globeville. By clip tabular array, northbound trains were superior to southbound trains of the same category. The junction to Eldorado Springs was at Marshall, a few stat mis further west. C & S ; trains besides used this subdivision. As the autos entered individual path, the streetcar pole was pulled down and the pantograph raised. The crew consisted of music director, motorman and flagman. This uneconomically big crew was required because of the steam-road manner of operation.

On 6 September 1920, Denver Tramway motormen were on work stoppage, so runs began at Globeville, music directors staying at that place, while the motormen and flagmen turned the autos at the D & I ; auto barns a short distance to the South. The train registry at Globeville protected the individual path. Harmonizing to regulation, the music director would register his train, look into the registry and do out a registry cheque on a standard signifier for the motorman. Apparently, this had been done really loosely, with the operator registering for the music directors, and music directors trusting on ocular designation of opposing trains, and non supplying a registry cheque to motormen.

Motor 158 and dawdler were ready to do the 2nd trip of the twenty-four hours on jaunt tallies to Eldorado Springs at about 11.30 am. The operator at Globeville handed them a clearance, a slow order, and a running order, No. 52: `` Motors 158 and 152 run as two rider supernumeraries Globeville to Marshall on 2nd trip with right over Extra 703 South Louisville Jct to Marshall Passenger Extra 158 North and No 309 may run on a 5 min block Passenger Extra 158 and 152 North via Louisville Jct. '' The unusual parts of this order are the specification of the 2nd trip ( they had already run extra earlier that twenty-four hours ) , and the fact that No. 309, a regular northbound train, could follow Extra 158 more closely than the usual 10 proceedingss. The path of the train was besides specified, to run by Louisville Jct instead than Webb Jct, near Broomfield. All of this was wholly normal and harmonizing to regulation.

Conductor Schulze of Extra 158 had no transcript of the current clip tabular array, and tried unsuccessfully to obtain one before his train left. Motorman Cripps thought that the auto that pulled in while he was in the office was No. 308 that was due, while in fact it was No. 309 that was to follow him. He had merely had ptomaine poisioning and was n't experiencing excessively debonair, but since they were short of motormen, had agreed to travel on responsibility. Conductor Schulze instructed the flagman to manage the streetcar pole when they left, and gave a highball to Cripps, non holding supplied him with a registry cheque. The auto started away at 11.30. The operator thought it was merely traveling to the terminal of dual path to wait for No. 308, which was due at precisely that clip. In fact, No. 308 had left Boulder Jct at 10.41 am and passed Westminster at 11.24 am, 6 proceedingss tardily.

Excess 158 moved on to individual path, raised the pantograph, and accelerated. About 3000 ' from Globeville, on the curve to the West, it encountered No. 308 at 11.34 am, both trains traveling at approximately 35 miles per hour. Eleven riders and two employees, among them motorman Cripps, were killed in the violent hit. This was a straightforward Rule 83 accident, exemplifying really clearly what can go on when this responsibility is taken lightly. The D & I ; did non long last this accident itself, killed by high operating costs and the rise of the auto, in add-on to the likely antipathy of the C & S ; for running an interurban operation.


Nahor, NH was on the B & M ; line from Concord to Worcester, MA, halfway between Elmwood and Peterboro. Elmwood and Peterboro were register Stationss, 7.2 stat mis apart. Train 8122 was a gas-electric auto running in the forenoon between Concord and Peterboro. In 1931 it left Concord at 7.45 am and arrived Peterboro at 9.50 am. Its agenda was non far different on 16 October 1929, when it was ordered to expose signals between Elmwood and Peterboro for engine 1146. It left Elmwood at 10.28 am, and arrived Peterboro at 10.43 am. The music director registered in, and so the motor auto went to the turntable in the pace, where the green signals were taken down.

Excess 1446 East was merely engine 1446, one auto and galley, forcing a auto of coal in front as it left Peterboro at 11.38 am, which it set out at a siding a short distance from town. Conductor Raby had registered out, but had non taken the problem to look into the registry, since he had seen the gas-electric auto for Train 8122 standing near the turntable, non exposing signals. Operator Sullivan had mentioned that Second 8122 was non in yet when Raby was in the office, as testimony confirmed, but it made no feeling, since there was a treatment traveling on about another auto with its hopper doors open someplace. The starter had told Sullivan explicitly to do certain Raby understood. The running orders for Excess 1446 were order No. 89: `` Engine 1446 run excess Peterboro to Elmwood. '' It would non look excessively hard to hold worded this `` After Second 8122 arrives at Peterboro, Engine 1446 run excess Peterboro to Elmwood, '' to do the state of affairs rather clear, and allowing Excess 1446 know that there was a 2nd subdivision that twenty-four hours.


Although the division was chiefly single-track, operated by clip tabular array and train order, dual path was provided between the rider station at Nashville and Shops, 2.5 stat mis. At Shops there was an engagement commanding the switch at the terminal of two chief paths, with the normal engagement signals, and this was besides an unfastened train order office. It was a really common pattern to supply short subdivisions of dual path at engorged locations on a single-track line. As another concrete illustration, the CRI & P ; had 4.1 stat mis of dual path through Oklahoma City. There were No. 15 spring switches at each terminal, so that trains traveling with the current of traffic did non hold to halt to line switches. The velocity bounds through these switches was 30 miles per hour Rockets, 25 miles per hour rider and 20 miles per hour cargo. There were 5 gated crossings at which the velocity bound was 20 miles per hour, and first-class trains were required to run at restricted velocity at a point where the position was vague, so velocities were non high.

Rule S-83 states that `` A train must non go forth its initial station on any division or subdivision, or a junction, or base on balls from one of two or more paths to individual path, until it has been ascertained whether all trains due, which are superior, have arrived or left. '' Strictly, this means that there must be either a train registry, or an unfastened office where information can be obtained, or at least a telephone, at each terminal of dual path. At Nashville, this was, in fact, the instance. At Oklahoma City ( and most other topographic points ) it was non ( though there was a telephone at the west terminal of two chief paths ) . In fact, these short subdivisions of dual path were non operated like dual path, but more like long turnouts. Trains utilizing them would hold satisfied Rule S-83 at other points, and would be required to place trains run into on dual path as if they were encountered on a turnout. Normally on dual path a train is non concerned with what passes on the other path, but on these subdivisions things are different. Note that it is a really different instance from a single-track subdivision on a double-track line, which demands rigorous observation of Rule 83.

On this twenty-four hours, No. 1, with a luggage auto, 5 managers and 2 slumberers was running approximately 30 proceedingss tardily, go throughing Bellevue, 12.6 stat mis from Nashville, at 7.09 am. No. 4 received the undermentioned order at Nashville: `` No 4 eng 282 clasp chief path meet No 7 eng 215 at Harding No 1 has eng 281. '' The crew of No. 4 was really used to having an order like this, that gave them something on No. 7 every bit good as the engine figure of No. 1, the starter reminding them of the train in this manner. This order was in no manner novel or confusing, and there is no possibility that the `` 7 '' was erroneously read as `` 1, '' as is clear from the testimony of the subsisters.

No. 4 left 7 proceedingss tardily, at 7.07 am. The music director busied himself with his favourite occupation, tickets, and left the running of the train up to others. A switch engine and a cut of autos rumbled by on the other path, which the flagman noted and recognized as a pace movment, non No. 1. The engineman was on the incorrect side to detect, and likely the fireman was busy seting his fire in status for the tally in front, when the pace movment passed them. The music director and caput brakeman noted that something passed, but they could non see it good, of class. At Shops, the switch was lined and the signal was clear, so No. 4 entered individual path and accelerated. Everyone -- except for the flagman -- thought that the pace motion had been No. 1. We might inquire what the pace motion was making on No. 1 's clip, but that is another affair.

The operator at Shops checked his train book, which showed that No. 1 had non arrived, and instantly blew the exigency air whistling, traveling outside and waving frenetic washouts at the withdrawing train, which paid no attending. The starter was on the phone and aware of events. It is clear that the switch should hold been lined for No. 1, and the signal for No. 4 at Stop, until No. 1 had arrived. We do non cognize if the operator lined the switch and cleared the signal on the attack of No. 4 without sing No. 1. It besides would hold been so easy for the starter to hold arranged that the operator would phone him before uncluttering the signal to come in individual path. These are inquiries that can non now be answered, and they were non asked in the ICC probe.

It is easy to state that the flagman, who was inexperienced, should hold pulled the air when his train passed Shops. He would hold assumed that the music director would cognize best, and would decidedly hold been unpleasant to him had he stopped the train when they held an order against No. 1 handed up at Shops that merely had non been shown to him yet. No, the flagman can be exonerated, but the music director can non. The accident was due to his failure to positively place No. 1, and his was the primary responsibilty, which he abdicated. After the accident, he said that he ever conferred with the other crew members to do certain of the designation of No. 1, but this is a patent prevarication, since he did non confer with the flagman. The engineman was besides at mistake, of class, for non inquiring for signals from the music director as he approached Shops. The meeting-point whistling would hold been rather appropriate in this instance ( it may non hold been authorized by the NC & StL ; , and was non mentioned in the ICC study ) . If answered by a highball, it would intend that No. 1 was by.

The Long Island Rail Road had single-track subdivisions that joined chief lines at a figure of junctions, where there were signalmen commanding entree to the chief line by signals. Since the care of a train registry at these points would be inconvenient, to fulfill regulation 83 it was established that the signal would non be cleared for entry to the chief line unless all superior trains had arrived and left. This transferred the load from the music director to the signalman, but the signalman non merely could detect the chief line, but was in contact with the starter. This `` Rule 5 '' worked good, until the accident at College Point on 22 September 1913, when a baffled signalman allowed a train to come in in the face of a delayed opposing superior train. Because the two electric MU trains were both steel, there were merely 4 human deaths, but Rule 5 was brought into discredit. Note that this was rather a different state of affairs from Shops, or the many short double-track subdivisions throughout the state.


The Ligonier Valley was a short line that ran 10.5 stat mis south-east of Latrobe, PA to Ligonier, and from at that place 3.3 stat mis north-east to char mines and coke ovens at Wilpen, PA. Passenger trains made two day-to-day round trips between Ligonier and Wilpen, one in the forenoon and one in the eventide. On 5 July 1912, a rider train consisting of an engine and a combine, endorsing up, left Ligonier for Wilpen, and encountered engines 7 and 14 drawing 14 autos about a stat mi and a half E of Ligonier at approximately 5.30 autopsy. Because the wooden combine was taking, it was smashed by the two engines, killing 22 riders, a awful toll.

Except that it is insecure to take with a wooden rider auto, there are few lessons to be learned from this mishap. It is mentioned because the Ligonier Valley was operated like a simple electric line, without a clip tabular array, train Numberss, train orders, order book or even develop regulations. The starter issued verbal orders to develop crews over the telephone. In the present accident, the starter and the music director disputed whether a verbal order had been issued to wait for the reaching of the cargo train, and no decision was reached. Everyone was likely hung over from the predating eventide 's celebrations.


Dispatcher Gutzler, at Hiawatha, had written up order No. 306 to the consequence that: `` Engine 102 tally excess Hiawatha to Martin non go through Jacobs until two 30 five 235 autopsy No 606 engine 2 delay at Martin until three 15 315 autopsy for Extra 102 West. '' The diction `` non go through '' alternatively of `` delay at '' is funny. Gutzler wanted to acquire Excess 102 off, and gave it plenty against the regular train No. 606, which was of undetermined tardiness, to do Martin. He did non trouble oneself to state No. 606 about this at the clip, be aftering to manage it when he knew how No. 606 was running. He counted on operators inquiring to OK clearance cards to keep No. 606 safely ( but when the wire fails, the clearances can be issued, so endorsed ) . The engineman noted that the order did non hold the Superintendent 's signature, so Gutzman told him on the phone to add it. Excess 102 left Hiawatha at 1.10 autopsy

When Extra 3 was ready to go forth Martin, it got order No. 309, intended merely for it, reading: `` Eng 3 tally excess Martin to Jacobs This order annulled 315 autopsy No 606 eng 2 tally two 2 hours and thirty 30 mins late Martin to Jacobs No 612 eng 2 tally two 2 hours and thirty 30 mins late Jacobs to Standardville. '' The regular trains were taken attention of by the run-late orders, and Extra 3 's running orders would run out at 3.15 autopsy, maintaining them from being on the route unless they had reached Jacobs by that clip. Unfortunately, the clip should hold been 2.35 autopsy, after which Extra 102 could go through Jacobs. Gutzler was excessively busy with his rates and bill of ladings, which he did in add-on to dispatching, to see the orders carefully. He had created a lap order, and neither Extra 102 nor Extra 3 knew anything of each other. Excess 3 departed Martin at 2.45 autopsy, passed Jacobs, and collided with Extra 102.

Granite and Riverside

These two accidents are considered together because they have the same cause: hapless calligraphy doing station names to be misread, which led trains to continue excessively far. At Granite, on the Seaboard Air Line on 19 November 1912, Granite was read when Grandy was intended. The `` -te '' on Granite was written so that it resembled a `` Y, '' harmonizing to the research worker. These two Stationss were non far apart, so it was easy to confound them. Station names should be carefully selected for sharpness and brevity. This is a minor point frequently overlooked. Name callings of six to eight letters are likely of optimal length. Two-letter station calls were first-class for telegraphy, but non so good otherwise, since they lack information redundancy. Even here, naming two nearby Stationss KI and KO would non hold been a good thought in Morse yearss.

The Riverside accident on the Rutland Railroad, which occurred 14 March 1920, was due to taking the scribble at the right to read `` Bellows Falls '' instead than `` Bartonsville, '' as intended. The order itself, which is reproduced in full in the ICC study, is so illegible that complete sense can non be made of it. It is a admiration that it was accepted. It is the responsibility of the Chief Dispatcher to take a firm stand that handwriting be orderly and legible, and lettered if the operator can non compose legible book. An first-class solution is the typewriter, with excess big type to give a clear feeling when multiple Cs are made. Many companies, nevertheless, rejected the typewriter and insisted on script. Every typewritten order that I have seen has been wholly legible. It was likely easier to utilize the typewriter when having Morse than when despatching was done by telephone. Most operators preferred the `` factory. ''


When I searched for paperss incorporating the twine `` okla* '' to happen all the accidents in the State of Oklahoma, 109 paperss were returned, of which about 70 really were concerned with accidents in Oklahoma. Most were caused by derailments from broken tracks and bad path, and hits at route crossings, and most involved cargo trains or work trains. The accident with the highest toll of riders was the head-end hit at Kellyville in 1917, which killed 32 riders, followed by the 1929 sabotage at Henryetta, which killed 12 ( discussed in Unexpected Diversion Accidents ) . A rear-end hit at Norge in 1918 on the SL-SF killed 5. The Berry accident on the Oklahoma Railroad in 1944, and the Kremlin grade traversing accident on the CRI & P ; in 1948 each killed 3. The accidents at Custer City ( 1945 ) , Cheyenne ( 1943 ) and White Oak ( 1920 ) each killed 1 rider. Of class, many more employees were killed or injured, as is ever the instance, but this is a singular record -- merely 58 rider human deaths in 50 old ages, which can be explained as a combination of rareness of accidents and good survivability. Oklahoma main roads do in this many people in a twosome of hebdomads, twelvemonth after twelvemonth. Oklahoma was selected simply because I one time lived at that place, and because the ICC studies cover the bulk of the clip in which rider trains operated in this province.

Jolimont, 1881

On 30 August 1881, the first accident in Victoria affecting rider deceases and multiple hurts occurred. Four riders were killed, and 39 were injured, when a Sur broke on one of the wheels of the 8:54am express from Brighton to Flinders Street Station, doing the derailment of five passenger cars near Jolimont. The first auto to go forth the tracks, the 4th in a train of nine, was dragged along the metals for some distance. When the frontward matching finally broke, the passenger car fell over an embankment about three pess high, into boggy land. With the rear yoke of the toppled passenger car still attached to those behind, the balance of the train was all of a sudden checked, and the impulse of the fifth and 6th passenger cars caused them to hit upwards, and so fall in the same way. The passenger car that had fallen was wholly crushed beneath the one to which it had been coupled. The balance of the passenger cars were brought to a standstill, and although the 7th and 8th had left the tracks, they did non fall. There were about 120 riders in the three passenger cars that toppled over the embankment.

Picnic, 1882

On the eventide of 2 December 1882, one rider was killed and 178 were injured when a hit occurred between a particular train, which had been engaged to convey meaning buyers of land from the sale of the Box Hill estate, and the ordinary train from Melbourne to Camberwell. The catastrophe happened about 100 paces from a little roadside station called Picnic, between East Richmond and Hawthorn. The drivers knew nil of the at hand calamity until they got within two or three 100 paces of each other, and, as both trains were going at a just rate of velocity, the distance was excessively short to enable them to avoid a hit. The drivers stuck to their engines until they were merely within a few pess of each other, when they jumped off. The buffers of the engines snapped, and the forepart of the engine attached to the train from Melbourne was smashed in right up to the funnel. Two passenger cars in each train were telescoped.

Small River, 1884

On Wednesday, 2 April 1884, the 8.20 p.m. goods train from Melbourne to Geelong received the staff from the porter at Werribee station and proceeded to Little River, where the train was to traverse with the 7.10 p.m. rider train from Geelong to Melbourne. In the unauthorized absence of the Werribee station agent at choir pattern, his 17-year-old girl inexplicably telegraphed to Little River that the line was clear. Consequently, Little River station released the rider train to go to Werribee. In darkness and heavy rain, the two trains collided caput on close Little River. The two drivers and one rider were killed. One of the drivers killed was Thomas Kitchen, who had been driving one of the trains involved in the accident at Picnic 18 months before.

Beaufort, 1910

THE BEAUFORT BOLT: The 11.30 up goods train from Stawell, composed of 35 trucks, drawn by two powerful engines, was falling a steep slope about three stat mis long near Beaufort, when It got beyond the control of the drivers. A goods engine was standing in Beaufort station as the up train approached, and the signalman, seeing that something was incorrect, turned the oncoming train into a dead terminal. The bolting train struck the terminal with terrific force. The taking engine was derailed, and thrown along- side the line, while its stamp was left in an about perpendicular place. Tho 2nd engine and its stamp were jammed together in the signifier of a V. The driver of the first engine and the fireman of the 2nd were killed outright, and the other driver and fireman earnestly injured. The latter died before he was extricated from the place in which he was jammed beneath his engine.

Kilmore Junction, 1910

On 19 November 1910, the driver of a goods train was killed after his train got out of control on the Heathcote subdivision line, as it descended the steep class taking to the junction of the subdivision with the chief North East railway line at Kilmore Junction ( subsequently known as Heathcote Junction ) . The air brakes on the train had become faulty, so the driver and guard decided to utilize the manus brakes on the goods waggons to command the train on its descent. These proved uneffective and the train ran off down the class. It was diverted on to a 66-yard ( 60 m ) blowout siding which had late been provided at the junction to forestall out-of-control trains from running on to the chief line. When the engine hit the clay bank at the terminal of the runaway path it overturned, and the driver was fatally injured.

West Melbourne, 1912

On the afternoon of 4 September 1912, two people were killed and over 60 people injured when a particular train, conveying riders back to Melbourne from the Royal Melbourne Show, collided with a suburban train going to Coburg. The accident occurred on the Dudley Street span, between Spencer Street and North Melbourne Stationss. The Show special was supposed to be held at a signal so that the Coburg train could traverse in forepart of it while exchanging paths. However, the particular ran through the signal and the engines of the two trains collided. Three passenger cars of the Coburg train were telescoped and two compartments of the first passenger car of the show train were severely damaged.

Seymour, 1935

In the early hours of 1 September 1935, an empty rider train, returning from Albury to Melbourne, ran into the rear of another empty rider train, which had been halted at a signal merely north of Seymour station. The guard of the stationary train, Thomas Middlin, jumped clear merely before the clang, but died subsequently that twenty-four hours from hurts he received. The signalman at the old station, Mangalore, had fallen asleep after the transition of the first train, and awoke as the 2nd train approached, leting it to continue despite non holding received a `` line clear '' signal from Seymour. The driver of the 2nd train had besides been going excessively fast to halt in clip after go throughing the distant signal at Seymour which was at danger. The signalman at Mangalore was subsequently acquitted of a charge of manslaughter.

Laverton, 1976

On 10 July 1976 the up Port Fairy to Melbourne rider train, hauled by locomotor B61, derailed at Laverton. The derailment was caused by the train diverging through a 25 miles per hour ( 40 kilometers per hour ) crossing over at high velocity. The driver did non gain that the train was being diverted from the West line ( which was the normal up line ) to the east line. The crossing over was really near to the Princes Highway rail flyover, the supports of which were hit by the train after it derailed. As a consequence, the first passenger car, which was wooden bodied, was demolished to floor degree. One rider in that passenger car was killed and there were a figure of hurts.

Croydon, 1935

Early on on 10 February 1935, an empty electric rider train was going from Ringwood to Croydon, prior to running a service from Croydon to the metropolis. The driver had neglected to make a full brake trial and, as the train descended the class into Croydon station, the brakes failed to halt it. It went through the station and collided at approximately 60 miles per hour ( 97 kilometers per hour ) with a stationary electric train, standing in a turnout in the station pace. Both trains were empty and the driver of the traveling train jumped clear before impact. The crews of both trains suffered minor hurts and the Croydon fire brigade rapidly extinguished a fire which had broken out.

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